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Chapter 1
Introduction
A working democracy depends on the participation of people in the political and
economic decision-making process. The knowledge required to make informed political
decisions concerning an entire economy is enormous. This is especially the case for
policy measures such as the introduction of general minimum wages affecting many
sectors of an economy. Political economy and behavioral economics1 have established
that voters may lack knowledge about the mechanisms describing the interaction of
markets in the economy. Consequently, democratic decisions may be inappropriate
and hence may produce inefficient outcomes or even lead to economic crises.
We examine the consequences of voters’ misconceptions and show how unemployment
can be explained in an economy where voters do not take all general equilibrium
repercussions into account when a binding minimum wage is introduced. Although
the possibility of democratic failure is frequently doubted2, we can justify this approach
on several grounds.
Obviously political decisions are complex, whereas many single economic decisions are
less difficult, e.g., a baker thinking about the price to ask for his bread. There is strong
evidence in everyday life suggesting that agents are much more engaged in economic
activities directly affecting their pockets and welfare than in policy affairs beyond their
tangible experience. This does not mean that people do not have opinions concerning
these issues. But they are rarely engaged in amassing enough knowledge to base fully
rational opinion on. Furthermore, it is hard to believe that the crises affecting many
European social states cannot be at least partially explained by insufficient economic
knowledge on the part of the electorate and the agents of other democratic institutions.
For example, Tabellini (2000) has identified the lack of knowledge among citizens
1See Chapter 2 ”Conceptual Issues”.
2This pessimistic view on the performance of democracy is sometimes rejected as an oversimpli-
fication ignoring the economic rational-choice paradigm. One advocate of democratic efficiency is
Wittman (1995) “The Myth of Democratic Failure”.
1
Chapter 1. Introduction
and conflicting interests among voter groups as the main reasons behind the delay of
necessary reforms in European social states. Convictions about insufficient economic
understanding are further strengthened by the fact that the economic environment for
all industrialized countries has changed dramatically in the last few decades due to
many complex structural changes.
After substantiating the possibility of democratic inefficiency, we will examine solutions
counteracting detrimental policy persistence based on misconceptions. We investigate
whether democratic institutions can provide all the necessary information enabling
voters to make fully rational choices without requiring a complete understanding of
the economy. This task is usually assigned to political parties running for governmental
offices.3
Although political parties exist and operate by influencing public opinion the proposed
solution may still be problematic in itself. One possible answer to this puzzle is that
parties themselves may not be well informed about the functioning of the economy,
either because the knowledge is genuinely not available or because parties are not
able to adopt it for various reasons. Therefore parties may be subject to the same
misconceptions as voters. Another eventuality is that parties may be well informed
but either fail to or have no incentive to inform voters. Assuming that, at least after
a while, there will always be some people who know how to solve an economic crisis in
technical terms, we identify inefficient outcomes as a failure in political communication.
It is the outcome of the interaction between rationally uninformed and risk-averse
voters on the one hand, and political parties motivated by their partisans’ interests
and the desire for power on the other.
The thesis is organized as follows. In the next chapter (Chapter 2) we discuss the
foundations for our models. We survey the theory of learning in macroeconomics and
games and relate it to the model used in Part I dealing with the awareness of general
equilibrium effects. We also relate the political economy of reform to the model of the
voting game used in Part II.
In Part I (Awareness), we explain the emergence of a crisis in a democratic process in
terms of inadequate patterns of thought (misconceptions). The crisis is a result of a
“learning process” in which voters do not take into account all the general equilibrium
effects caused by a minimum wage in a labor market.
In Part II (Policy Reversal), we discuss the potential reversal of a crisis. It is one
possible result of a voting game between voters and parties in which parties signal the
3For example, see Art. 21 (1) of the German constitution, the Grundgesetz (1949) : ”Die Parteien
wirken bei der politischen Willensbildung des Volkes mit [Parties participate in forming people’s
political opinion]. ...”
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correct view about the economy. We also discuss the conditions under which a crisis
will persist.
Our findings support the intuitive and frequently voiced hypothesis that crises induce
reforms. The findings rest on the supposition that crises can prompt agents to review
their patterns of thought. They recognize that the crisis is caused by structurally
misguided policies derived from an inadequate theory about the economy. Reform is
the outcome of a political process in which an adequate theory is chosen instead of an
inadequate one.
After discussion of the two models of potential democratic failure and success in Parts
I and II, we advance some general conclusions in Chapter 11.
3
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Conceptual Issues
2.1 Learning Theory and Awareness
2.1.1 Learning Theory
2.1.1.1 Basic Ideas
In economics the problem of learning is typically studied within the framework of
game theory and macroeconomic theory. In the following, we illustrate the principles
of learning in macroeconomic terms.
A macroeconomic model usually consists of a vector of endogenous variables x, ex-
ogenous variables (shocks) y, parameters, and a probability distribution of shocks and
parameters.
Learning theory deals with dynamic economic models in which the state of the economy
at time t, xt, depends additionally on agents’ forecasts x
e
t,t−1 at time t − 1 about the
values of a subset of xt. The reduced form of such a model is
xt = F (xt−1, xet,t−1, yt) (2.1)
where
xt ∈ IRn and xet,t−1 ∈ IRm, m ≤ n.
The vector yt in equation (2.1) contains the values of exogenous shocks in t. The vector
xt−1 may contain values of endogenous variables that go further back than t− 1, and
xt may also depend on forecasts for more than one period in the future (expectational
leads).1
As can be seen from equation (2.1), the dynamics of the economy depends on “forecast-
ing rules” that transform all or part of the information available at t− 1 into forecasts
1See Bo¨hm and Wenzelburger (2004) for a discussion of models with expectational leads.
4
Chapter 2. Conceptual Issues
xet . These rules are generated according to a “learning scheme” - a description of the
process by which agents form their forecasts (expectations).2 The evolution of the
system involving expectation-formation under a learning scheme is called the learning
process.
The natural benchmark or limiting point for any kind of expectation-formation is ra-
tional expectation as defined by Muth (1961). Rational expectations are mathematical
conditional expectations where agents actually use the whole information available at
time t − 1. Furthermore, both the structure of the underlying economic model and
the probability distribution of shocks and parameters are known to the agents.
A rational expectation equilibrium is an equilibrium generated by rational expecta-
tions.3 It can be interpreted as the limiting point of a learning process where the
agents’ subjective probability distribution over the sequence {xt} converges to the ac-
tual (theoretical) probability distribution over {xt} according to the actual model, and
the actual distribution of shocks and parameters. Clearly, depending on the available
information, the model structure, and the learning scheme used, a learning process can,
but does not have to, lead to a rational expectation equilibrium. It may converge to
some other equilibrium or may not converge at all. Equilibrium in this context means
that the decision rules depending on agents’ forecasting rules do no longer change, i.e.,
the parameters of their decision function are constant over time.
We can now describe more precisely the questions learning theory deals with: Which
learning scheme in which class of models under which conditions generates forecasting
rules that converge to rational expectations? If they do not converge, what happens
then? If there are multiple rational expectation equilibria, is there one that can be
reasonably selected because it can be achieved by a “reasonable” learning scheme?
The last question goes right to the heart of economic theory as it concerns the economic
concept of rationality. The question is what does “reasonable” mean?
Note that the assumptions made by rational expectations make considerable demands
on agents. Not only do they have to know the true model of the economy and to
gather all information available in principle, they also have to have the cognitive
abilities enabling them to calculate optimal behavior. On these grounds, the standard
assumption of full rationality (in the sense of rational expectations) frequently has to
be defended as the outcome of a learning process in which agents - usually acting in an
imperfectly rational manner - eventually reach an equilibrium as if they were acting in a
2A useful distinction between “learning scheme” and “forecasting rule” is made by Wenzelburger,
see e.g. Wenzelburger (2002a). An example of a learning scheme is ordinary-least-squares estimation
(OLS), where the forecasting rules are formed with the parameter estimates from data available at
time t− 1.
3The classical representation of an equilibrium in rational expectations is the Lucas supply curve.
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fully rational manner, i.e., they achieve the rational expectation equilibrium. But even
if one relaxes the assumption of full rationality and is willing to accept equilibria other
than those with rational expectations, it is far from clear which form of rationality
should be reasonably used in a given economic context. With respect to learning, this
means that we have to discuss which learning schemes are appropriate, since they are
influenced by the degree of rationality involved.
There are basically two concepts of how learning can be modeled. One approach is
“educative” learning. In this approach, the reasoning process of agents is modeled
explicitly, analyzing whether this reasoning process leads agents to coordinate on a
rational expectation equilibrium. A game-theoretic example of an educative learning
scheme is the iterated removal of strategies that are never a best response (rationaliz-
able strategies).4 Educative learning schemes are rather difficult to justify since they
require considerable cognitive capacities from agents. A more realistic, and therefore
much more frequently analyzed approach to learning is adaptive learning. “Adaptive”
means that forecasting rules are adjusted when agents observe new data. One example
of adaptive learning is Bayesian updating. In the next section, we will have a closer
look at adaptive schemes.
2.1.1.2 Rational Learning and Boundedly Rational Learning
Definitions Learning requires that there is something to be learned. If agents have
rational expectations as defined above, there is no need for learning. The literature
distinguishes two classes of learning depending on the degree of rationality. There is
rational learning and boundedly rational learning.
We define rational learning in the following way: Expectation-formation under rational
learning is the same as under rational expectations, the only difference being that under
rational learning the probability distribution of parameters and shocks is unknown to
the agents. We need to consider two aspects here:
First, under rational learning agents behave in a totally rational manner under rational
expectations. They use all the information available and have the necessary cognitive
ability to compute mathematical conditional expectations. Therefore rational learning
is Bayesian updating of an a-priori subjective probability distribution as soon as new
data are observable. Especially in a game-theoretic context rational learning requires
forward-looking behavior from agents. Therefore agents have to take into account
future responses to their own actions by other players.5
4For an overview on educative learning, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
5Note that Nash equilibria can be interpreted as rational expectation equilibria, see e.g. Evans
and Honkapohja (1999). In a rational expectation equilibrium actions by agents are best responses
6
Chapter 2. Conceptual Issues
Second, under rational learning agents know the true model structure. This point is
not clearly defined in the literature. For example, Bray and Savin (1986) distinguish
between rational learning where agents’ “estimates are based on correctly specified
models” and learning in a framework of bounded rationality, where this does not have
to be the case. Hansen and Sargent (2001) consider model misspecifications policy-
makers could be confronted with. Although the actual model is not known to the
governing agency it knows the “benchmark model” of which the actual model is a
“perturbation”. We can say that here the concrete model structure is not known but
the meta-structure of the model is. Schinkel, Tuinstra, and Vermeulen (2002) identify
rational learning with Bayesian learning, i.e., in their view any learning scheme based
on Bayesian updating is rational, independently of whether or not agents know the
true model structure. For our purposes we will restrict the term “rational learning”
to cases where the true model structure is known to agents. Otherwise one might ask:
Why do agents within the model know less about the economy than the economist who
builds the model? To answer this question one always has to assume that agents some-
how have bounded knowledge relative to the model builder and hence, are boundedly
rational.
Accordingly, we define boundedly rational learning as any kind of learning that is not
rational learning. For example, learning with a misspecified model structure or with
a learning scheme that does not use all available information is boundedly rational.
Rational Learning As follows from our definition above, the learning scheme of
rational learning is Bayesian updating. The work on rational learning was pioneered
by Townsend (1978), who studied this type of learning in the framework of a cobweb
model and found convergence to a rational expectation equilibrium.
Starting from a model of information extraction from asset prices, Bray and Kreps
(1987) find that agents’ subjective probability distributions of parameters with cor-
rectly specified priors converge ”almost surely”to the true probability distributions of
parameters for any model of rational learning. They derive this finding from assump-
tions that are not very restrictive and call it “convergence of beliefs”. Unfortunately,
convergence to a rational expectation equilibrium cannot be assured. This is due to the
self-referential nature of the learning process and the possibility of multiple equilibria.
Self-referential means that the agents’ expectation-formation influences the path of
the economy in a way that would not be influenced by an outside observer estimating
according to their rational expectations. Here each agent has to take into account the fact that
all other agents also have rational expectations. In such an equilibrium we therefore have mutually
consistent actions and beliefs, such that subjective probability distributions over outcomes equal the
true probability distributions over outcomes.
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a rational expectation equilibrium. The outside observer only observes the states of
the economy; his expectations do not influence the development of the system as he
does not make any decisions within the system based on his forecasts. The crucial
point in Bray and Kreps’ analysis is that agents know the correct model, i.e., they
learn “within” a rational expectation equilibrium. When the agents’ model structure
is misspecified, Bayesian updating may not even lead to a convergence of beliefs.
In game theory, models of rational learning can be used to justify the concept of
Nash equilibrium since they explicitly model the way in which agents can learn Nash
equilibrium strategies, i.e., the rational expectation equilibrium. Kalai and Lehrer
(1993) analyze infinitely repeated games with incomplete information, where the payoff
functions of a player’s opponents do not have to be known to that player. If subjective
priors of players contain a “grain of truth”, i.e., if players do not assign zero probability
to events that “can occur in the playing of the game”, the strategies actually played
by the players converge to a “subjective equilibrium”. Fudenberg and Levine (1993)
arrive at what is basically the same equilibrium concept without explicitly modeling
a learning process and call it a “self-confirming equilibrium”. In a self-confirming
equilibrium the players’ beliefs have to be consistent on the equilibrium path, though
they may differ off the equilibrium path. Intuitively, in a self-confirming equilibrium
players will never learn that they hold erroneous beliefs off the equilibrium path since
they never observe the actions of opponents contradicting their beliefs. Therefore
every Nash equilibrium is a self-confirming equilibrium but not every self-confirming
equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
In summary, although in many concrete macroeconomic or game-theoretic models, the
convergence of rational learning to a rational expectation equilibrium can be shown to
exist, general convergence results are difficult to establish.
Boundedly Rational Learning In the following, we give an overview of bound-
edly rational learning schemes. The most commonly applied schemes in literature are
adaptive.
One of the earliest theories about expectation-formation is the so-called “adaptive ex-
pectations” hypothesis. Agents form their expectations by adding to the last period’s
expectation a fraction of the last period’s forecasting error (see e.g. Cagan (1956)).
Another form of adaptive learning scheme often drawn upon in the early literature
is “static expectations”. Under static expectations agents assume that a variable’s
realization tomorrow equals its realization today. Famous examples are models of the
Phillips curve where it is assumed that agents will expect tomorrow’s inflation rate
to be the same as today’s. Since this procedure is very simple, it is not implausible
8
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to assume that people actually behave in this way, although there is no reason to as-
sume that static expectations will generally lead to a rational expectation equilibrium.
Obviously the same holds for adaptive expectations.
In more recent literature, a frequently used and thoroughly analyzed approach to
learning in a macroeconomic context is ordinary-least-squares estimation (OLS), see
e.g. Sargent (1993). It is assumed that agents behave like econometricians and es-
timate the model’s parameters by OLS from observable data in the past. For linear
models, Evans and Honkapohja (2001) provide many convergence results to rational
expectation equilibria under OLS learning. In this adaptive learning approach there
are two sources of bounded rationality.
First, if there is prior information about the distribution of parameter values Bayesian
estimation is more precise. In that case OLS does not use all the available information
and is therefore boundedly rational.6
Second, it is usually assumed that agents specify their model as if they were in a
rational expectation equilibrium although this is not the case as there is learning
involved. They know the correct model structure of the equilibrium but they do
not know the true parameter values and have to learn them by OLS. Because the
learning process is self-referential, their parameter estimates will vary over time, while
they assume the constant parameter values corresponding to a rational expectation
equilibrium. Consequently, they estimate a misspecified model. Nevertheless, there are
several justifications for this approach. One is that real econometricians actually work
in this fashion. Furthermore, even if agents took into account time-varying parameters,
they would still need additional information that is usually not available (see Bray
and Savin (1986)). And last but not least, convergence to rational expectations can
be shown in many models in spite of the misspecification.
A more general approach to learning is proposed by Bo¨hm and Wenzelburger (1999)
and Wenzelburger (2002a). They analyze the conditions under which “perfect predic-
tors” exist for variables in an “economic law” with “expectations feedback”. Perfect
predictors are forecasting rules that converge to rational expectations. Instead of de-
riving convergence results for a given learning scheme, e.g. OLS, they examine whether
perfect predictors exist independently of a learning scheme for a given economic law
(model), especially in the case of non-linear models. For one-dimensional models of the
Cobweb type, e.g. a standard OLG model, Wenzelburger (2002b) provides an adaptive
learning scheme that generates forecasting rules converging to rational expectations.
For this purpose, Wenzelburger draws on the concept of an error function (historical
forecasting errors) that contains all the necessary knowledge concerning the underly-
6For a detailed comparison between Bayesian estimation and OLS, see Greene (1993).
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ing economic problem. The error function is defined independently of the forecasting
rule or learning scheme used. Interestingly, the exact functional form describing the
economy does not have to be known in order to use this function.
The same holds for learning through neural networks, another approach to bounded
rational learning.7 Neural networks are computational systems built in analogy to
biological structures in the nervous system of humans and more highly developed an-
imals. A neural network consists of nodes - called neurons - and connections between
nodes. A neural network can be very complex but it can be broken down to its basic
modules - perceptrons - which are sub-networks of the whole system. In a perceptron,
the incoming information is transmitted from input nodes to a receiving output node
which transforms the input signals into an output signal. The transformation is made
via an algorithm connecting the incoming signals from the input nodes. The percep-
trons themselves are connected with each other, such that the output nodes can be
input nodes for the following perceptrons. A neural network “learns” by training with
a fixed data set. The training consists of altering the weights of connections between
input and output nodes in such a way that the output signals fit in well with the
corresponding values of the training set.8
One advantage of neural networks is that they are very good at approximating un-
known functions, especially when they are trained repeatedly with new sets of data.
Therefore they are useful tools for modeling learning when the model specification is
unknown.9
Furthermore, even if they are trained on only one special problem, they can be used
to solve other similar problems, e.g. learning the Nash equilibria of similar games (see
Sgroi and Zizzo (2002)), albeit with a lower degree of success than in the original game.
Therefore this feature is very close to actual human behavior. As Sgroi (2004) points
out, it is precisely because of its limitations that it is so close to human behavior.
Another limitation is that neural networks tend to provide only locally optimal solu-
tions. This feature can be interpreted as “satisficing” behavior, a term introduced by
Simon (1956) . Satisficing behavior means that humans choose alternatives according
to some specified criteria, but those criteria do not have to be either unique or op-
timal in the sense of full rationality. Because of bounded cognitive capabilities and
7Neural networks belong to the framework of artificial intelligence. Further examples are classifier
systems or genetic algorithms. For an overview, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
8A frequently used numerical learning algorithm is back-propagation. The weights of neural con-
nections are altered so that an error function is minimized. The weights are adjusted according to
the error functions gradient.
9In the context of modeling bounded rationality in macroeconomics, Salmon (1995) provides a
comparison between Bayesian learning and OLS learning, on the one hand, and learning by neural
networks on the other.
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bounded resources, humans end their choice procedure when they find an alternative
that is “good enough”. Both characteristics - satisficing choices and limited similar
problem-solving - make neural network learning appealing by endogenizing bounded
rationality in human behavior.10
In game theory, both models of rational learning and models of bounded rational
learning are used to justify and refine the concept of a Nash equilibrium. In the
following we present the three basic models of boundedly rational learning. They are
thoroughly discussed and exemplified in Fudenberg and Levine (1998). Their common
feature is that a stage game is played repeatedly, and agents try to learn the strategies
of their opponents in order to respond optimally. There are many matching and
revelation settings conceivable. In a fixed-player model, the same players always play
against each other. In large population settings, one pair of players or all players
can be matched randomly, with agents either observing only the results of their own
actions or the aggregate actions and payoff statistics of all agents.
Partial best-response dynamic and fictitious play are usually analyzed in a fixed-player
setting. Agents build beliefs about their opponents’ strategies by observing their
historical actions. Players behave in a boundedly rational way in that they only
optimize the current period’s subjective expected payoff, i.e., they are myopic. They
play best responses to their beliefs without considering the influence their current
actions may have on the future play of other agents.
In the partial best-response dynamic, agents base their decisions on their opponents’
strategies from the last period only. One interpretation is that they have limited
memory, since they behave as if they had forgotten any actions that took place more
than one period before. An example for a partial best-response dynamic is the Cournot
adjustment process.
In fictitious play, each player learns his opponents’ mixed strategy profile by observing
the historical frequency of any pure strategy combination in the stage game. In other
words, the agents’ probability assessment that opponents will play a given strategy
profile corresponds to the relative frequency with which this strategy profile has been
played in the past. According to this assessment, the agent plays a best response in
pure strategies. One can interpret agents’ behavior as boundedly rational since they
always assume that opponents follow a stationary strategy, which, of course, does not
have to be the case.
The third class of models is evolutionary and is frequently represented by the replicator
10The modeling of bounded rational behavior through neural networks is carried out e.g. by Cho
and Sargent (1996) in a repeated play of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and by Salmon (1995) in a
macroeconomic model of monetary policy and inflation surprise.
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dynamics model. It is based on analogy to the biological concept of evolution but can
be applied in economic contexts as well.
In the standard replicator dynamic there is a homogeneous population with identical
agents, each of them playing one pure strategy from the same set of strategies. In
each round all agents are matched randomly pairwise and play the same stage game.
Players are genetically programmed to invariably play one strategy only. Therefore one
can identify the players with their strategies. The fraction of agents playing a certain
strategy, i.e., the fraction of a “phenotype,” can be interpreted as the probability
with which the corresponding pure strategy is played in a mixed-strategy profile of
the stage game. The population as a whole learns through replicator dynamics. The
net reproduction rate of each phenotype is proportional to the success of its strategy.
Success is measured as the deviation of a phenotype’s expected payoff from the average
expected payoff of the whole population. Hence the fraction of a phenotype with
higher than average payoff increases, while the fraction of a phenotype with lower
than average payoff decreases.11 It can be shown that every stable steady state of
the replicator dynamic is a Nash equilibrium (see Fudenberg and Levine (1998)). In
a steady state, each phenotype’s net reproduction rate is zero, i.e., all agents have
the same expected payoff. It is stable if a small perturbation from the fractions of
phenotypes representing a Nash equilibrium converges back to the Nash equilibrium.
Unfortunately, the dynamic may not always converge to a steady state, but if it does,
it provides a refinement to the concept of a Nash equilibrium. At the individual level,
agents do not behave strategically. They do not consider the fact that their current
actions may influence future play, nor do they assume that their opponents will behave
in an optimizing manner. Nevertheless, the Nash equilibrium can be learned by the
population without this knowledge at the individual level.
There are two psychological learning concepts justifying the use of replicator dynamics
to model real economic behavior. Both concepts rest on agents’ bounded rationality.
Agents only have to know which strategy is more successful, they do not have to
know why it is successful, i.e., they do not have to know the whole range of strategies
employed by all the other players and the payoffs they obtain (see Holler and Illing
(2000)).
One central concept here is that of “social learning.” Agents ask other agents about
their strategies and payoffs and imitate those strategies if they are more successful
than their own. Consequently, more successful strategies are adopted by a growing
number of agents, while less successful strategies are used by a declining number.
11Instead of a homogeneous population there are settings with more than one population. In such
heterogenous population models, the size of each population remains constant, and changes in the
fractions of strategies occur within the populations.
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The other central concept is that of stimulus and response. Here, an agent will try
different strategies in different rounds, i.e., he plays a (non-stationary) mixed strategy
over time. Pure strategies resulting in higher payoffs are reinforced. Accordingly,
“better” strategies are played with a higher probability in the subsequent periods.
In sum, replicator dynamics can be used to justify the Nash equilibrium concept in the
presence of boundedly rational agents. A rational expectation equilibrium in the form
of a Nash equilibrium can be achieved by a learning process without the assumption of
unbounded rationality. Moreover, it provides an interpretation of a Nash equilibrium
that does not require individual agents to play mixed strategies, which is advantageous
in view of the fact that it is doubtful whether agents use mixed strategies in reality
(see Rubinstein (1991)).
Behavioral Aspects of Boundedly Rational Learning A major shortcoming of
bounded rational learning models is that learning schemes are frequently introduced
arbitrarily. Assuming bounded rationality may be closer to actual human behavior, but
there is usually no explicit model of why agents use one scheme rather than another.
The learning scheme is assumed rather than explained.
Approaches to endogenizing the problem of learning can be found in behavioral eco-
nomics. As with rational learning, there is no clear definition of what behavioral
economics is. In fact, it is much less clear than the definition of rational learning,
and there is a broad range of literature that could be classified accordingly. For our
purposes, we will define behavioral economics as the modeling of bounded rational-
ity via explicit consideration of psychological, environmental, or empirically founded
deviations from complete rationality in individual human behavior.12
We assume that bounded rationality is any behavior that departs from the classical
economic definition of unbounded (full) rationality but is still compatible with the
everyday definition of rationality. In other words, it is “appropriate” as far as possible,
and it is not irrational in the sense of impulsiveness or mental illness, etc. Nevertheless,
it may not be fully logical, e.g., in the sense of subjective expected utility theory.
The main features of the classical assumption concerning full rationality can be found
e.g. in Rubinstein (1998), p. 8: The completely rational decision-maker has full knowl-
edge of the problem (e.g. knows all alternatives), clearly defined preferences, unlimited
abilities to optimize any choice function, and is indifferent concerning logically equiv-
alent descriptions of alternatives.
In considering deviation backgrounds, behavioral economics can also be interpreted as
12For a survey of behavioral economics see Simon (1997), Part IV.
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a microeconomic foundation for learning and other economic decision problems. In the
last section, we described two examples of psychological foundation in the context of
replicator dynamics: social learning through imitation and stimulus-response learning
through reinforcement.
Many of these types of phenomenon may be applicable to economic behavior and can
be used to specify a “reasonable” learning scheme in a given economic context.
The pioneer introducing the idea of bounded rationality in economics was Herbert
Simon.13 Within his concept of bounded rationality he distinguishes substantive and
procedural rationality (Simon (1976)). Substantive rationality is the kind of behavior
that leads to the achievement of a specified goal in the presence of given constraints.
If we combine substantive rationality with the goal of utility maximization and un-
bounded computational capabilities, we obtain the classical concept of optimization
(Salmon (1995)). In contrast to this, procedural rationality indicates a process con-
sisting of some reasonable deliberation strategy. The concept of procedural rationality
suggests that the results of real-life economic decisions can be analyzed more appro-
priately by focusing on the process of decision-making itself, instead of assuming that
substantive rational agents somehow behave “as if” they were achieving a strictly spec-
ified goal. Procedurally rational agents follow an explicitly modeled decision procedure
with outcomes that might be “only” satisficing (see paragraph ”Boundedly Rational
Learning”, p. 10) but not necessarily optimal, e.g. in the sense of unbounded rational-
ity. Therefore the knowledge gained by analyzing the actions of procedurally rational
agents may reveal much more about the actual learning behavior of boundedly rational
agents than the analysis of substantive rationality.
One attempt to model procedural rationality is the concept of the “adaptive toolbox”
summarized in a collection of articles edited by Gigerenzer and Selten (2001).14
The adaptive toolbox consists of three elements: search rules, stopping rules, and
decision rules. Each element represents one stage in a process that finally leads to an
13Much of his work in this field is to be found in Simon (1982).
14In contrast to our definition, Gigerenzer (2003) sees the adaptive toolbox as belonging solely to
the concept of bounded rationality and not to behavioral economics. In Gigerenzer’s view, behavioral
economics does not deal with procedural issues but with deviations in some forms of substantive
rationality from the substantive rationality of fully rational agents, where the deviations are due to
“systematic errors in judgment and decision-making” (see Gigerenzer (2003), p. 11). Behavioral eco-
nomics would not belong to bounded rationality since optimizing in a mathematical sense would still
be assumed. We see it the other way round and consider the concept of bounded rationality as be-
longing to behavioral economics and also count deviations of substantive rationality from unbounded
substantive rationality as belonging to bounded rationality. In our opinion, even if some forms of
substantive rationality may model the decision process unrealistically they still consider deviations
from full rationality are founded in empirical or experimental evidence. Therefore they can be clearly
distinguished from ad-hoc assumptions of bounded rationality as in Sargent’s modeling of agents as
econometricians.
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economic decision. The crucial point is that in each step agents use “fast and frugal”
15 heuristics instead of mathematically consistent procedures.
In real life, the total set of alternatives is rarely known. Therefore the first step consists
in a search for alternatives. Furthermore, if we recognize that it is often impossible
to obtain knowledge of all the existing alternatives (e.g. knowledge of all second-hand
cars on the used-car market in a large city) heuristics like random search or some form
of ordered search (e.g. according to the size of second-hand car dealers) are certainly
“rational” from a practical viewpoint.
The same applies to step two in the adaptive toolbox, the application of stopping
rules. One heuristic may be to stop searching if one has found an alternative whose
value is at least as high as an aspiration level. This strategy would correspond to Si-
mon’s satisficing behavior. The stopping rule is required to avoid exorbitant searching
costs. Furthermore, it has to be simple in order to avoid exorbitant computations in
optimizing a complex cost-benefit function for the search.
Finally one needs decision rules, which are the kind of rule most commonly analyzed.
A frequently used decision heuristic is the application of cues. The choice in favor
of an alternative depends on a number of characteristics with which alternatives are
compared. One cue in the used-car example might be the age of the car together with
the decision rule “take the newest.”
In his book “Modeling Bounded Rationality”, Rubinstein (1998) formalizes ideas de-
scribing the way real agents’ behavior deviates from unbounded rationality. He iden-
tifies three experimentally well-analyzed psychological phenomena giving rise to many
such deviations. First he discusses the framing effect, i.e., the fact that human deci-
sions may depend on the way the problem is presented. For example, it may make
a difference whether a tax reduction is presented as a gain or as a smaller loss for
tax payers. Second, we have the tendency to simplify decision problems. This phe-
nomenon obviously strengthens Gigerenzer and Selten’s argument that agents usually
use heuristics to solve their economic problems. Third, the choice function may de-
pend on which elements there are in the set of alternatives, i.e., the preference for one
alternative to another may be altered if the set of alternatives changes.
Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982) focus on behavioral aspects of decision-making
under uncertainty by analyzing the assessment of subjective probabilities. In this
framework they analyze the representativeness heuristic where agents assign events
higher or lower probability depending on the extent to which they represent the prob-
lem in question. They find that once probability has been assigned, people are conser-
15See Gigerenzer and Selten (2001), p. 174: “Fast refers to the relative ease of computation... .
Frugal refers to the very limited amount of information these strategies need.”
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vative in updating their assessments (beliefs) when new observations are made. Agents
need more than one observation indicating the necessity of a new assessment before
they will actually alter their original belief to accord with the new observations.
If we apply this empirical observation to our context (finding reasonable learning
schemes), we may alter, say, OLS learning to the extent that expectation-adaptation
through regression is made less frequently and expectations are held constant in the
meantime.
Kahneman et. al. also discuss how heuristics that are doing well can be learned
from experience. They emphasize that learning is essentially inductive rather than
deductive.
One implication of this observation is that the framing of the problem rather than its
logical structure determines which heuristic is chosen. People learn with respect to
the subject and not to the logical structure of the problem. For example, people may
use the same heuristic in two different economic environments because in both they
have to decide about a tax burden. On the other hand, they may use two different
heuristics for the same economic environment because they have to decide about two
subjects, a tax burden and the provision of a public good. And they will use these
two different heuristics although both problems may be the same in structural terms.
A further implication of the inductive nature of learning is the importance of feedback
effects. The more positive the experience with a heuristic has been, the more likely it
is to be applied in future, i.e., a heuristic that does well is reinforced.
There is a broad range of literature where the basic behavioral ideas discussed so far
have been applied explicitly to model learning as a process of procedural rationality.
Slembeck (2000) criticizes evolutionary learning models for neglecting the learning
capacities of individual agents and only analyzing learning at the population level.
He proposes breaking down learning to its component parts and calls his program
“bedingtes Lernen” [conditional learning]. Elements of conditional learning are the
consideration of the number of alternatives, interactions between agents, the availabil-
ity of information, and the quantity and quality of feedback.
Brenner (1996) models “learning in a repeated decision process” and identifies four
important features of learning. First, many changes in behavior that can be inter-
preted as learning are due to random variation in behavior. Second, imitation is a
biologically and psychologically well-established learning strategy. Third, he identifies
conservatism to the extent that people are sluggish and tend to repeat former strate-
gies again and again until very negative feedbacks urge them to change their behavior.
And fourth, learning depends strongly on experience with certain strategies in the
16
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past.
Another strand of the literature, represented by Thaler (1999), Mullainathan and
Thaler (2000), or Barberis and Thaler (2002), mainly analyzes departures from un-
bounded substantive rationality in the field of financial economics. Apart from bounded
rationality, Mullainathan and Thaler (2000) name “bounded will-power” and “bounded
selfishness” as further restrictions to classical economic theory. This literature iden-
tifies psychologically well-founded deviations from full substantive rationality that we
will consider in the next section.
2.1.2 Relation to the Awareness of General Equilibrium Ef-
fects
In this section we intend to relate our discussion of learning, bounded rationality, and
behavioral economics to the possibility of misguided policies caused by inappropriate
patterns of thought. Inappropriate here means that voters neglect general equilibrium
effects stemming from minimum wages implemented in one sector of the economy.
This can also be interpreted as an inappropriate learning scheme in that it does not
lead to a rational expectation equilibrium. The learning process itself and the results
will be discussed in detail in Part I “Awareness”. In the following, we merely outline
the basic framework of that model.
Suppose there is a two-sector economy with three labor markets exhibiting inelastic
labor supply. Workers are immobile across labor markets. In sector 1, we have two
labor markets, one for high-skilled and one for low-skilled workers. In sector 2, we
have a homogeneous labor force. In a majoritarian democratic voting process, where
each worker in each sector has one vote, workers have to decide upon the level of
a minimum wage for the low-skilled workers in sector 1. We assume that no group
has a majority of its own while each combination of two groups has a majority of
over fifty percent of the total votes. If unemployment occurs in the regulated labor
market, the unemployed low-skilled workers obtain a fixed fraction of the employed
low-skilled workers’ nominal wage as unemployment benefit. The benefits are financed
by a payroll tax on the nominal wage of each worker in each sector.
To decide which level of the minimum wage they want to vote for, workers have to form
expectations about the state of the economy connected with a minimum wage, i.e.,
they have to form expectations about their utility level depending on the minimum
wage. They vote accordingly. Therefore, the minimum wage actually implemented and
the state of the economy actually reached after voting depends on the expectations of
voter groups.
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When the agents make their forecasts, we will assume that they only consider the
direct effects caused by a certain minimum wage level. They only consider the direct
effects in sector 1 and neglect general equilibrium repercussions on sector 2 and on
macroeconomic variables. Therefore they assume that both prices and wages in sector
2 will remain constant as well as the tax rate with which unemployment is financed.
This behavior corresponds to a mixed learning scheme. On the one hand, we have
a boundedly rational learning scheme concerning the variables of sector 2 and the
tax rate. To put it more concretely, agents follow static expectations in that they
expect that the nominal price level in sector 2, the nominal wage level in this sector,
and the tax rate will remain constant after voting has taken place, independently
of the minimum wage level implemented. After the new minimum wage has been
implemented, workers observe the new price and wage levels in sector 2 and the new
tax rate. Although their static expectations are not confirmed, they take the new
values and assume once again that they will not change if a new minimum wage is
set in the period after elections. Nevertheless, we have completely rational learning
concerning all other variables. According to our definition, the learning process as a
whole is boundedly rational, since not all expectations are completely rational.
The question is whether this compound learning scheme based partly on boundedly
rational expectations will lead to a learning process that converges to a rational expec-
tation equilibrium. As will be discussed in detail in Part I, if agents had completely
rational expectations the high-skilled workers in sector 1 and the workers in sector 2
would always vote for the market-clearing wage as the minimum wage for the low-
skilled workers in sector 1. As two worker groups always form a majority of voters,
we can identify the free-market solution as a rational expectation equilibrium in the
political process. But as we will see, the learning process in most cases does not lead to
the free-market solution, since under the specified learning scheme at least two voter
groups would always vote for a minimum wage that is the highest one possible in their
view.16
As a result, a crisis will occur in the long-run, since unemployment among the low-
skilled workers will rise dramatically and the real wages of the high-skilled workers
and workers in sector 2 will decline significantly.
In the literature on political economics it has been well established that voters are fre-
quently not fully rational in their assessments of the economic consequences of policy
measures. According to Saint-Paul (2000b), the assumption of unbounded rational-
ity is even more questionable in economic policy than in standard economic theory
16The actual path of the learning process depends on whether agents clear the first or the second
goods market in their minds when forming their expectations.
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where only single issues are usually considered. An important reason for bounded ra-
tionality in political economics is that voters need to know a general economic theory
embracing not only many single economic problems but also the interaction between
economics and politics. Therefore learning within a misspecified model should always
be considered when looking for reasons for policy failures.17
To explain the learning scheme in our two-sector model we have to take into ac-
count two levels of bounded rationality. The first level is the non-awareness of general
equilibrium repercussions from one sector to the other. The second (level) is the non-
awareness of expectation errors over time, i.e., we have to explain why agents do not
reconsider their expectation-formation when their forecasts about the consequences of
a higher minimum wage are not confirmed.
With reference to non-awareness of general equilibrium effects, Saint-Paul (2000b) ob-
serves that voters “base their decision much more on the direct impact of the proposed
policy on their welfare than on its general equilibrium effects, which are much more
difficult to evaluate” (p. 919). The same kind of “misconception” is discussed in a
paper by Romer (2003), who analyzes the effects of voting decisions when voters indi-
vidually obtain misleading but correlated signals about the outcome of a certain policy.
The neglect of general equilibrium effects is also discussed in papers by Gersbach and
Schniewind. For example, Gersbach and Schniewind (2001) model a two-sector econ-
omy where labor unions and employers are not fully aware of all equilibrium effects
in their wage bargaining. Kinder and Mebane (1983) find empirical evidence that
most American voters tend to judge political decisions in isolation. For example, in
judging changes in tax rates they only see the changes themselves but do not inquire
whether these changes may be or may not be in accordance with the principles of the
tax system. Obviously, at least the tax system as a whole should be considered if
one wants to assess all the general equilibrium effects of a change in tax rates. Fur-
thermore, some behavioral observations presented in the previous section show that
non-awareness may play a role in voters’ decision-making. One point is the fact that
people tend to simplify decision problems. This may lead to the use of over-simplified
heuristics resulting in myopia. Other features are framing effects and the habit of
judging a problem with respect to the sphere it belongs to and not with respect to its
logical structure.
Nevertheless, even if one concedes non-awareness of general equilibrium effects, we
17The problem of model misspecification is central to the closely related literature on “temporary
equilibrium”. For both learning and temporary equilibrium, expectation-formation is crucial. But in
contrast to learning, the notion of temporary equilibrium focuses more on the states of the economy
reached over time, while the literature on learning usually focuses on the state the economy finally
converges to. For example, see Grandmont (1988) for an overview, or Grandmont (1998) on “self-
fulfilling expectations in socioeconomic systems.”
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still need a justification for why people do not change their learning scheme once they
have realized that their forecasts are not accurate. There is strong evidence that once
people have formed an opinion they will maintain it for as long as possible. Barberis
and Thaler (2002) identify two behavioral effects supporting this. “Belief persever-
ance” induces agents to refrain from searching for new evidence and adhering to an
established opinion even if they observe evidence to the contrary. An even stronger
psychological phenomenon is “confirmation bias”. People with confirmation bias not
only ignore contrary evidence they even interpret that evidence as supporting their
original hypothesis. This is in accordance with Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982),
who observe that agents are conservative in updating their beliefs, or with Brenner
(1996), who observes that people are sluggish and only change their behavior when
feedback is extremely negative (see previous section). In our context, this sluggishness
may be supported by the fact that people do not know whether erroneous expectations
are due to their own misconceptions or due to exogenous effects on the economy. For
example, when unemployment is higher than expected, agents may presume that this
is due to poor economic performance in other countries, leading to a fall in exports.
They may not consider the fact that they have neglected general equilibrium effects. A
further clue for conservatism or sluggishness is adduced by Kinder and Mebane (1983)
in their inquiry on how people build their theories about the economy. They observe
that agents judge new political problems in terms of a mental framework they have
used so far. When new events come up, they first try to interpret them within their
existing judgmental scheme, which is only gradually adapted to new circumstances.
2.2 Signaling and the Political Economy of Reform
through Crises
In Part II (Policy Reversal) we argue that crises can prompt agents to review their
patterns of thought concerning the economy. As a result, agents will revise misguided
economic views making it possible to overcome crises.18 This argument on how crises
induce reforms is complementary to others that can be found in literature and are
summarized by Drazen (2000).19
One proposal that has been advanced is that crises are needed to overcome the self-
ishness of powerful interest groups harming the welfare of society as a whole.20 For
18One example of a change in economic views is the move from a more Keynesian to a neo-classical
perspective more than 30 years ago.
19Drazen and Easterly (2001) test the hypothesis that crises induce reform with samples from over
120 countries and about 30 years. They find evidence for this assumption when economic conditions
have deteriorated heavily, as indicated by extreme inflation values and black-market premium.
20The fact that the power of interest groups can have detrimental effects on the economy as a whole
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example, Bernholz (2000) explains the power of interest groups by the existence of
rationally uninformed voters. Only when the crisis is severe enough will voters recog-
nize the detrimental role of interest groups and the government be forced to employ a
log-rolling agreement between these groups to improve the welfare of the majority of
voters.
Another line of argument rests on the ex-ante uncertainty of voters about who are the
losers and winners of reform. Although a reform is beneficial ex-post for a majority
of voters, it may not be adopted ex-ante because a majority of voters have negative
expected utility with respect to the post-reform environment. Vice versa, a reform
may be adopted although a majority is harmed ex-post. The reform may be reversed
because the majority believe that they will benefit from reversal. Collecting these two
effects we obtain what Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) call “status quo bias”.21
Our approach - a change in agents’ point of view leading to reform and triggered by
a crisis - can be modeled in different ways. One way would be to model the process
of change as a learning process leading to the correct view. A starting point for
such an approach might be the discussion by Hansen and Sargent (2001) about model
misspecifications policy-makers are confronted with in a learning process (see Section
2.1.1.2 “Rational Learning and Boundedly Rational Learning”).
We intend to describe the change as the overcoming of communication shortcomings
between voters and parties. In a signaling game, the crisis can be reversed if the
governing party communicates the correct view to voters.
In our model, there are two parties that run for office, the incumbent and the chal-
lenger. In the political sphere, two views about the functioning of the economy exist
and can be proposed by parties together with a corresponding policy measure. The
success of this measure depends on which view correctly describes the functioning of
the economy. The crisis has developed and persists, because so far policy measures
have been based on an incorrect “old” view. Policy measures based on the “new” cor-
rect view would lead out of the crisis. The problem is that neither parties nor voters
can verify without efforts what the correct view out of the two alternatives is.
We assume that agents do not necessarily deduce from the occurrence of a crisis
to an erroneous chosen policy since the economy appears too complex to analyze.
This assumption is supported by a variety of literature. For example, Rodrik (1996)
identifies “collective irrationality” as an important source of policy persistence leading
is well established, see e.g. Coate and Morris (1999), Olson (1982, 1995), or Rodrik (1993).
21In a similar model by La´ban and Sturzenegger (1994), an ex-post socially beneficial reform only
takes place when the severity of status quo conditions outweighs the uncertainty of voters about the
post-reform environment.
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to crises. Reform is delayed and detrimental policies persist because of “technical
uncertainty” about correct measures, not only on the part of the common people
but also on the part of governmental institutions. According to Saint-Paul (1996b),
uncertainty concerning the correct theory about the economy can even be found among
economists. Therefore there appears to be a strong connection between crises as a
result of bounded rationality (old view) and reform as a result of a switch to full
rationality (new view). In particular, the observation that policy is detrimental may
take time, since the effects of policy measures can frequently only be established ex-
post via econometric time-series analysis.
Nevertheless, we assume that the party in office can find out what the correct view is
because it has the governmental resources to do so. Only it has to incur information
costs. In contrast, voters and the opposition party never have the capabilities to find
the appropriate theory of the economy. Therefore, the challenging party adheres to
the old view, and voters have to rely on the governing party signaling credibly what
the correct policy is.22
A proposal’s credibility - or the probability from the voters’ standpoint that the party
has revealed the correct view - may be low because the incumbent party may want to
avoid information costs. Furthermore, the party’s policy proposal may be driven by
partisan concerns.
In our analysis, we will identify two features which support the revelation of the correct
view. Firstly, the governing party reveals the correct view if it is mainly driven by
office concerns, i.e., it behaves “opportunistically”. In this case, it just proposes the
policy the risk-averse voter approves with certainty. It is a small reform proposal of
the correct view which is less risky for voters since policy measures in accordance with
the old view are quite extensive. Secondly, the policy proposals are so large that the
party only can assure reelection if it informs with high probability and thus makes its
proposal very credible. In contrast, cautious policy proposals may lower the incentives
to inform, and hence support the persistence of detrimental policies. The discussion
of the model and the derivation of these results will be the content of Part II.
22Simon (1997) points out that agents’ opinions are frequently not derived from experience or
learning but by the recommendation of “authorities” like parties are.
22
Part I
Awareness
23
Chapter 3
Model
3.1 Introduction
In this part of the thesis we argue that difficulties voters have in recognizing general
equilibrium effects can trigger crises when a majoritarian political process determines
governmental regulation. But a crisis may help to promote the understanding of
general equilibrium effects on the voters’ part and this can reverse bad times.
The argument is developed for a two-sector economy in which in the first sector both
low- and high-skilled workers are employed. Consider the following democratic process
to regulate sector 1: Two political parties propose a minimum wage for low-skilled
workers in sector 1, where unemployment is financed by a tax on labor. If workers
take all direct and indirect effects into account when voting - called hereinafter General
Equilibrium Voting (GEV) - they anticipate that raising low-skilled wages in sector
1 will affect not only labor demand, wages for high skilled workers and prices in
sector 1, but also wages in sector 2 and taxes to finance unemployed individuals. The
latter general equilibrium effects imply that workers in sector 2 have single-peaked
preferences regarding wages for low-skilled workers in sector 1 with market-clearing
wages as their most preferred wage. Since high-skilled workers in sector 1 also prefer
market-clearing wages over any other wage, a Condorcet winner of the political game
exists in each period that is equal to the wage in the unregulated economy as long as the
share of low-skilled workers in the first sector is below one-half. As a consequence, there
is no unemployment and hence no tax burden. The democratic process implements
the free-market solution.
Suppose, however, that when they vote individuals do not take into account general
feedback effects in sector 2 connected with the minimum wage proposals in sector 1.
We refer to this as Partial Equilibrium Voting (PEV). PEV can be justified by rational
ignorance or learning and behavioral approaches related to misconceptions which we
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discussed in Chapter 2. Voters taking this view, assume that nothing will change in
sector 2 , including wages and output in this sector, and also that tax rates will remain
constant. If this is the case, workers in sector 2 perceive that - from a certain wage
level on - an increase in minimum wages will improve their utility. The following line
of reasoning explains this perception:
Aggregate demand for good 2 of the low-skilled workers would increase with a rising
minimum wage because unemployed workers would receive compensation. Since the
nominal wage of sector 2 workers appears to remain constant under PEV, the same
would be true of their real demand for good 2. Accordingly, goods-market clearing
in this sector would require a decline in real aggregate demand on the part of the
high-skilled workers of sector 1. But a decline in real aggregate demand for good
2 of high-skilled workers would be accompanied by a decline in nominal wages for
this group. In a competitive labor market, labor costs per unit of output remain
constant (market-clearing). Therefore, a decline in nominal wages would have to be
accompanied by a rise in the other components of labor costs. Hence, as the tax rate
on labor input is supposed to stay constant under PEV, the relative price of good 1
would have to decrease. With nominal wages constant, this in its turn would increase
the real wages of sector 2 workers. Therefore under PEV, their preferred wage is higher
than the market-clearing wage.
Together with the low-skilled workers in sector 1, sector 2 workers will vote for an
increase in wages, which results in a Condorcet winner higher than market-clearing
wages under the PEV view. Furthermore, the economic situation deteriorates over
time. After the Condorcet winner is set, a higher equilibrium tax rate is reached.
This causes workers in sector 2 to vote for further wage rises since on the basis of
the new situation they perceive real wage gains for themselves and no tax rise. As
a consequence, the political process will lead to perpetual incremental increases of
minimum wages, unemployment and taxes until the economy collapses. One of three
situations may occur: First, individuals are not willing to accept high marginal tax
rates and react by reducing labor supply or by moving into the shadow economy.
Second, the tax burden approaches 100% and employed workers lapse into poverty
due to the exploding welfare state. Third, at some time voters may recognize that
their PEV view is incorrect and learn GEV.
The general argument of Part I has several possible implications and is related to
different strands of the literature.
First, it advances a new argument explaining the production of structural unemploy-
ment in democracies in terms of insufficient recognition of general equilibrium effects
by voters. It also explains why such events will be reversed by a crisis. Wages that
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exceed the market-clearing level have been found to be one of the important factors
contributing to unemployment, e.g. in France and Germany. We offer a new explana-
tion for this phenomenon and hence our analysis is complementary to the large amount
of literature on European unemployment.1
Our analysis may also explain why crises in some countries such as Sweden or the
Netherlands have triggered a decline in unemployment, which we would interpret as
a reversal of detrimental developments due to the emerging wisdom about economic
relationships in crises.
Second, our arguments serve to explain why democracies might tend to weaken the
capitalist system by increasing amounts of regulations and share of government activity
in GDP. The seminal work by Olson (1965, 1982, 1995) has established that in societies
that have been stable for some time, firms and workers in many organizations and
industries will have been able to organize for collective action. Since societies are
not symmetrically organized and as more groups overcome the difficulties of collective
action, socially unproductive arrangements occur and welfare decreases. For instance,
the secular increase in European unemployment rates can be explained in this way, as
the organizational power of insiders increases over time while that of outsiders does
not (see Lindbeck and Snower (1988)). Bernholz (1982, 2000) has stressed that the
ever-increasing share of government is a consequence of political competition because
of the development of interest groups and the presence of rationally uninformed voters.
If we interpret PEV as rational ignorance, our arguments suggest that ignorance is
sufficient to explain secular increase in tax burdens or unemployment. Moreover,
reform projects to reduce market distortions will be implemented if voters recognize
the negative effects of regulations in a crisis and switch from PEV to GEV. This is
compatible with the arguments advanced by Bernholz (2000).
Moreover, we complement the work of Saint-Paul (2000a). He shows that the redis-
tributive goals motivating labor market institutions in Europe can be achieved at lower
cost by using tax and transfer instruments. We argue that insufficient recognition of
general equilibrium effects makes a democracy vulnerable to inefficient regulation.
Our analysis may also shed some light on the rise and fall of market distortions. We
hope it also provides a useful framework for other regulatory issues, such as protec-
tionism or competition policy. Furthermore, it is complementary to examinations on
1Surveys and detailed accounts of labor market factors as root causes of the unemployment problem
in Europe can be found in Blanchard and Katz (1997), Blanchard and Summers (1986), Burda
and Wyplosz (1994), Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991), Snower (1993), Bean (1994), Krugman
(1994), Franz (1995) , Minford (1995), OECD (1995), Paque (1995), Alogoskoufis, Bean, Bertola,
Cohen, Dolado, and Saint-Paul (1996), Saint-Paul (1996a, 1996c, 1999), Giersch (1996), Gersbach
and Sheldon (1996), Lindbeck (1996), Oswald (1996), Siebert (1997), Nickell (1997).
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how the awareness of general equilibrium effects affects wage negotiations by unions
and employer associations. Gersbach and Schniewind (2001) have established a non-
monotonic relationship between the degree of recognition of general equilibrium effects
and unemployment. Here we examine how awareness of specific general equilibrium
effects impacts on democratic processes.
Part I is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we set up the model and derive the market
equilibrium of the economy, which coincides with the perceived GEV equilibrium. The
dynamics of the political process are described in Section 3.3. We specify what GEV
and PEV exactly mean in terms of equations constituting the perceived equilibria. This
also leads us to the perceived PEV equilibrium. In Chapter 4, the utility functions
depending on the minimum wage of the low-skilled workers are derived for each view
and for each group of workers. This results in the different political equilibria, i.e.
the chosen minimum wages in each time period and in the long-run. We compare the
results from GEV with PEV and discuss how the political and economic system reacts
to the emerging crisis under PEV. We interpret the results economically by describing
the economic reasoning process of voters under each view. The complete analysis is
repeated in Chapter 5 for a slight variation in voters’ view compared to PEV. We call
the additionally discussed standpoint of voters PEV1. In Chapter 6 we shed some
light on the robustness of our results, make an overall comparison for the different
possible views, and conclude.
3.2 The Basic Economic Model
In this section, we introduce the model of the economy on which we base our exami-
nation of the voting processes on minimum wages. There are two sectors respectively
producing good 1 and good 2. The only input into production is labor.2 The produc-
tion functions are given by:
q1 = L
β
1lL
(1−β)
1h (3.1)
with β < 1 and
q2 = L2 (3.2)
Subscripts 1 and 2 denote the first and second sector, respectively. h stands for the
2In the long-run, there is no loss of generality associated with neglecting capital, provided that
capacity constraints are not binding and the long-run capital stock is determined by equating the
marginal product of capital with the real-world interest.
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high-skilled workers of sector 1, l for the low-skilled. In sector 2 we only have one skill
level for the whole work-force.
We assume perfectly competitive good markets and immobility of workers across in-
dustries and skill levels. Labor supply is assumed to be inelastic and is given by L1l
for the low-skilled labor market in sector 1, by L1h for the high-skilled labor market
in sector 1, and by L2 in sector 2. Firm owners are the high-skilled workers of sector 1
and the workers of sector 2. Each of them receives an equal share of the sum pi1 + pi2
of all the profits earned in both sectors.3
Furthermore, we assume that all types of workers have the same symmetric Cobb-
Douglas utility function:4
u = c
1
2
1 c
1
2
2 (3.3)
where c1 and c2 denote the consumption levels of good 1 and good 2.
In the political process involving all workers as voters, the minimum nominal wage w1l
for the low-skilled workers of sector 1 is set. In order that nominal wages have real
effects, we need a further price rigidity and we assume that the price in sector 2 is
constant.5
Thus, we can normalize p2 to one:
p2 = 1 (3.4)
The appropriate consumer price index is:
p = p
1
2
1 p
1
2
2 = p
1
2
1 (3.5)
This price index guarantees that changes in prices do not affect household utility as
long as real income remains constant.
Since p2 is fixed, the real wage can exceed the market-clearing wage for the low-skilled
workers.6 As a result, unemployment can occur in this market. We assume that
workers who have lost their jobs receive an exogenously given fraction s ∈ (0, 1] of the
3The assumed production technologies imply constant returns to scale. Therefore we have zero
profits as long as firms can satisfy their optimal labor demand.
4The symmetry assumption is made solely for ease of presentation. However, the assumption of
constant and equal elasticities of substitution across all individuals is essential.
5Alternatively, we could assume that real minimum wages are set directly in the political sphere.
6Since p2 = 1, w1l is the price of low-skilled labor in terms of good 2.
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minimum wage as unemployment benefits. In order to finance the benefits, labor is
taxed by a fraction τ of the nominal wages they pay, i.e., τ is a payroll tax.
Finally, we assume that each of the three types of workers is a fraction of the population
smaller than fifty percent:
Lf
L1l + L1h + L2
<
1
2
(3.6)
where f = 1l, 1h, 2.
First Order Conditions for the Market Equilibrium In the first step we derive
demand and supply for goods and labor. By utility maximization for an individual
worker we receive the following demand equations for consumption:
cf1 =
1
2
bf
p1
(3.7)
cf2 =
1
2
bf (3.8)
where f = 1l, 1h, 2 refers to the employed workers and f = un refers to the unem-
ployed. The budgets bf are wf +
pi1+pi2
L1h+L2
for f = 1h, 2. For the employed low-skilled
b1l equals w1l and for f = un we have:
bun = sw1l (3.9)
Profits of firms are sales minus costs and thus given as:
pi1 = p1q1 − w1l(1 + τ)L1l − w1h(1 + τ)L1h (3.10)
pi2 = q2 − w2(1 + τ)L2 (3.11)
Firms are price-takers in both sectors. We obtain the first-order conditions for profit
maximization in sector 1 and 2 as:
w1l(1 + τ) = p1β
(L1h
L1l
)(1−β)
(3.12)
w1h(1 + τ) = p1(1− β)
(L1l
L1h
)β
(3.13)
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w2(1 + τ) = 1 (3.14)
Labor demand in sector 2 is perfectly elastic as long as gross wages do not exceed the
value of 1. 7
Both unregulated labor markets clear:
L1h = L1h (3.15)
L2 = L2 (3.16)
The governmental budget constraint is given by:
(w1lL1l + w1hL1h + w2L2)τ = ∆bun (3.17)
where ∆ denotes the unemployed work-force:
∆ = L1l − L1l (3.18)
Using realized budgets we can apply Walras’ law to the goods markets.8 Therefore it
suffices to clear one of the two goods markets:
L1lc
1l
2 + L1hc
1h
2 + L2c
2
2 +∆c
un
2 = q2 (3.19)
The Market Equilibrium We obtain a system of eight equations for the eight
variables τ, w1h, w2, p1, L1l, L1h, L2,∆. The system consists of the equations for labor
demand ((3.12),(3.13), (3.14)), the governmental budget constraint ((3.17),(3.18)),
and the market-clearing conditions ((3.15),(3.16),(3.19)). Solving the system yields
the following equilibrium solution E(w1l):
7If gross wages do not exceed 1, profits are non-negative and independent of the employed labor
force. If gross wages are higher than 1, profits are negative and the firm closes down.
8As workers adjust their demand for goods to their actual realized budgets, goods markets clear
in spite of unemployment in one labor market.
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τ(w1l) =
s(βL2 − w1lL1l)
sw1lL1l − 2L2
(3.20)
w1h(w1l) =
(1− β
1 + τ
) L2
L1h
(3.21)
w2(w1l) =
1
1 + τ
(3.22)
p1(w1l) =
( L2
L1h
)1−β(w1l(1 + τ)
β
)β
(3.23)
L1l(w1l) = βL2
1
w1l(1 + τ)
(3.24)
L1h(w1l) = L1h (3.25)
L2(w1l) = L2 (3.26)
∆(w1l) = L1l − βL2 1
w1l(1 + τ)
(3.27)
Note that τ strictly increases in w1l.
9 In the absence of regulation, the low-skilled
labor market in sector 1 also clears. Then we have L1l = L1l with τ = 0 and from
equation (3.24) we determine the lowest possible minimum wage as:
wmin1l = β
L2
L1l
(3.28)
For the maximum value of w1l we have:
wmax1l =
2L2
sL1l
(3.29)
For w1l > w
max
1l we can verify that w1h, w2 and L1l become negative and that p1
becomes complex. Therefore they represent infeasible values. Furthermore, if w1l is
smaller than wmax1l and w1l → wmax1l , we obtain τ →∞.
3.3 The Political Process
3.3.1 Views
In this section, we will present the political process and the two alternative views
voters can obey. We call these views GEV and PEV. In each voting period and based
on their view, voters calculate their utility levels depending on the minimum wage
9The first derivative of τ with respect to w1l is
sL1lL2(2−sβ)
(sw1lL1l−2L2)2 > 0.
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w1l,t. In their short-run voting decision, i.e., in their voting decision in the particular
voting period t, they consider the level of w1l,t which maximizes their utility:
argmax
w1l,t
u(E˜vt (w1l,t))
where E˜vt denotes the perceived short-run market equilibrium connected with a partic-
ular view, i.e., v = GEV or v = PEV. As discussed later on in Section 3.3.2 “Dynamics
and Crisis”, the political process generates the Median-voter’s ideal wage as short-run
political equilibrium wˆ1l,t. If this equilibrium minimum wage is implemented the econ-
omy reaches the market equilibrium E(wˆ1l,t). In the following, we wish to discuss the
short-run equilibria under the two different views in detail.
3.3.1.1 Perceived Short-Run Political Equilibria under General Equilib-
rium Voting (GEV)
Under General Equilibrium Voting (GEV), voters consider all general equilibrium ef-
fects represented by equations (3.12)-(3.19). Therefore they correctly anticipate the
market equilibrium E(w1l,t). We denote the Median-voter’s ideal wage under GEV by
wˆGEV1l,t and the actually achieved equilibrium under GEV by E
GEV
t = Et(wˆ
GEV
1l,t ). As the
voters’ perceived equilibrium E˜GEVt equals the equilibrium E
GEV
t actually achieved,
the optimal wage before voting is still optimal after the new equilibrium has been
achieved and voters have no reason to change their ideal wages after casting their
votes the first time. Thus, under GEV, we have wˆGEV1l,t = ... = wˆ
GEV
1l,1 = wˆ
GEV
1l,0 as
short-run political equilibria as well as EGEVt = ... = E
GEV
1 = E
GEV
0 as short-run
market equilibria.
3.3.1.2 Perceived Short-Run Political Equilibria under Partial Equilib-
rium Voting (PEV)
Under Partial Equilibrium Voting (PEV), not all effects are taken into account by
voters. We assume that voters only consider changes in the regulated sector. They
proceed on the assumption that the variables in sector 2 and the tax rate τ do not
change, i.e. w2, L2 and τ are assumed to stay constant. Therefore under PEV voters
anticipate that changing wages in sector 1 will affect prices and output in this sector,
while they do not take into account general equilibrium repercussions from the econ-
omy on tax rate adjustments by the government. Thus, PEV represents the plausible
assumption that agents (can) only consider direct effects of regulatory changes when
they cast their votes.
There are various lines of justification to consider voting in the sense of partial equi-
librium voting (see also Chapter 2).
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First, the literature on what voters know and do not know (e.g. Lupia and McCubbins
(1998)) suggests that individuals often use a simplified framework to cast their votes.
Moreover, the lack of incentives of voters to search for more information and the
resulting rational ignorance has been a dominant theme in public choice (e.g. Mueller
(1995), Bernholz and Breyer (1994), Gersbach (1995)).
Second, the literature on learning summarized in Evans and Honkapohja (2001), Fu-
denberg and Levine (1998), and Sargent (1993) and the broad theme of behavioral
economics have identified a variety of reasons why agents may deviate from rational
expectations. For instance, voters assuming that higher wages in sector 1 does not
affect sector 2 might be interpreted as an overconfidence bias or as a misconception in
the sense of Mullainathan and Thaler (2000) or Romer (2003).
Third, the assumption that voters do not take into account the actual effects has
broad parallels that go back at least to Negishi’s subjective demand approach where
firms in oligopolies have subjective demands at the anticipation stage from which they
derive their reaction functions (Negishi (1961), Ginsburgh and Keyzer (1997)). In
our examination all agents are price takers and therefore have standard Cobb-Douglas
demand functions but may have subjective forecasts about general equilibrium effects
when they vote.
Formally, in period t under PEV voters apply equations (3.12), (3.13), (3.15) and
(3.18) which directly describe the behavior of agents in sector 1:
w1l,t(1 + τt) = p1,tβ
(L1h,t
L1l,t
)(1−β)
w1h,t(1 + τt) = p1,t(1− β)
(L1l,t
L1h,t
)β
L1h,t = L1h
∆t = L1l − L1l,t
From the voters’ point of view sector 2 is not affected at all. Therefore, they assume
clearance of the market for good 2 (3.19):
L1l,tc
1l
2,t + L1h,tc
1h
2,t + L2,tc
2
2,t +∆tc
un
2,t = q2,t
Voters base their considerations in period t on the realization of some variables in t−1
that are presumed to stay constant. We use wˆPEV1l,t to denote the Condorcet winner
under PEV in period t, which now depends on Et−1, i.e. wˆPEV1l,t (E
PEV
t−1 ), where E
PEV
t−1
is the equilibrium realized under PEV in period t − 1. Since voters only partially
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anticipate the resulting equilibrium under PEV, we use E˜PEVt (w1l,t) to denote the
equilibrium perceived by voters when they determine wˆPEV1l,t . To derive E˜
PEV
t (w1l,t)
we solve the system of 5 equations ((3.12),(3.13),(3.15),(3.18),(3.19)) for the perceived
equilibrium values denoted by w˜1h,t, p˜1,t, L˜1l,t, L˜1h,t and ∆˜t:
τ˜PEVt (w1l,t) = τ
PEV
t−1 (3.30)
w˜PEV1h,t (w1l,t) = (1− β)
²t(w1l,t)
L1h
(3.31)
w˜PEV2,t (w1l,t) =
1
1 + τPEVt−1
(3.32)
p˜PEV1,t (w1l,t) = (1 + τ
PEV
t−1 )
(²t(w1l,t)
L1h
)1−β(w1l,t
β
)β
(3.33)
L˜PEV1l,t (w1l,t) = β
²t(w1l,t)
w1l,t
(3.34)
L˜PEV1h,t (w1l,t) = L1h (3.35)
L˜PEV2,t (w1l,t) = L2 (3.36)
∆˜PEVt (w1l,t) = L1l − β
²t(w1l,t)
w1l,t
(3.37)
where
²t(w1l,t) =
L2 + τ
PEV
t−1 w
PEV
2,t−1L2 − sw1l,tL1l
1− sβ (3.38)
and τPEVt−1 and w
PEV
2,t−1 are the actual realized values of τ and w2 under PEV in period
t− 1.
Note that ²t(w1l,t) strictly decreases in w1l,t and that for the solution to be meaningful
²t(w1l,t) has to be non-negative. Therefore, under PEV the perceived maximum wage
for the low-skilled of sector 1 is:
w˜PEV,max1l,t =
L2 + τ
PEV
t−1 w
PEV
2,t−1L2
sL1l
(3.39)
If w1l,t = w˜
PEV,max
1l,t , then voters perceive that all low-skilled workers of sector 1 are
unemployed and thus, output in this sector is zero.
As can be seen from equations (3.30) to (3.38) the perceived equilibrium E˜PEVt (w1l,t)
in period t depends on the actually realized tax rate τPEVt−1 of the previous period.
Consequently, the optimal minimum wage each voter group prefers to be implemented
depends on the political equilibrium wˆPEV1l,t−1 of the previous period. Therefore, we can
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write for the short-run political equilibrium wˆPEV1l,t of period t:
wˆPEV1l,t = wˆ
PEV
1l,t (Et−1(wˆ
PEV
1l,t−1))
where Et−1 denotes the actually realized equilibrium solution in period t− 1.
3.3.2 Dynamics and Crisis
Figure 3.1: The political and economic process
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In this section we introduce the political process in detail. For that purpose we develop
a dynamic framework. There is an infinite number of time periods, indexed by t =
0, 1, .... In each period the static economy from the last section is at work and we
use E(w1l,t) or Et to denote the equilibrium realized in period t after w1l,t has been
determined. Within this framework the political process unfolds as follows: In each
period each agent acts as a voter. Voters determine the minimum wage w1l,t through
majority rule. Although we work directly with the Condorcet winner10, we have the
standard model of two-party competition in mind which generates the Median-voter
result.11 In every period, the preferred wage by the Median-voter, denoted by wˆ1l,t is
introduced in the economy. We use wˆ1l,t to refer to the short-run political equilibrium.
Since we have three different types of workers, we will in general also have three
different ideal wage levels. The political and economic process is summarized in Figure
3.1.
The long-run behavior of the equilibrium can exhibit two patterns. First, at some
point in time a wage wˆ1l,t is determined in the political sphere such that wˆ1l,t > w
max
1l ,
variables are not longer economically feasible, and the economy collapses. This means
that output in sector 1 is zero and the tax rate infinitely large. This is bound to lead
10This is the minimum wage that defeats all other values of w1l,t in pairwise majority voting
11As we will see in the next section, the Median-voter corresponds to the Condorcet winner despite
the fact that not all preferences are single-peaked.
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to a political crisis where voters as consumers and tax payers are no longer willing to
accept the economic situation. Therefore they may wish to return to former values of
the minimum wage or they may recognize that their view has been misleading so far
(see Section 4.4).
Second, no economic collapse occurs, i.e., wˆ1l,t ≤ wmax1l in all periods. If limt→∞ wˆ1l,t
and limt→∞E(wˆ1l,t) exist, we denote them by wˆ∗1l and E
∗ respectively and use wˆ∗1l to
refer to the long-run political equilibrium of the process.12
On its path, the political process may generate a crisis or a reversal. The concept of
a crisis can be defined by three cases:
In the first scenario, the sequence of wˆ1l,t converges to or reaches w
max
1l . Then, τ
becomes infinitely large and we observe a political and economic crisis. This is because
the real wages of the high-skilled of sector 1 and the workers of sector 2 are zero, as is
output in sector 1. Furthermore, all low-skilled workers have lost their jobs. We call
this a crisis with unlimited tax tolerance (CUTT), because voters then accept any tax
rate imposed by the government.
In the second scenario, the latter is not the case and a crisis with limited tax tolerance
(CLTT) occurs. In period T , the equilibrium tax rate exceeds a value τmax < ∞
that tax payers would accept.13 We assume that if τ > τmax tax payers will either
reduce labor supply or try to avoid taxes by moving into the shadow economy. Strictly
speaking, to rationalize the reduction of labor supply one has to assume that workers
receive utility from consuming leisure time. Then, our simplified assumption is that
the elasticity of labor supply is small for τ ≤ τmax and larger for τ > τmax. As a
consequence, the state’s budget constraint cannot be satisfied with a tax rate exceeding
τmax and a crisis emerges even before the equilibrium tax rate τ approaches infinity.
While we do not explicitly model the reaction of individuals where τ > τmax, it is
obvious that the budget constraints will be violated if the amount of taxable labor
income declines sufficiently.
Third, it could happen that voters, after experiencing a discrepancy between expected
and realized utility levels for a certain time, recognize that the PEV view is incorrect
and switch to GEV. Since that third scenario is qualitatively similar to the second
scenario, we shall focus on the first two cases.
We summarize our concept of a crisis in the following definition.
12If wˆ∗1l is reached in finite time, the wages and the equilibrium of the economy remain constant
thereafter.
13For example, if τ > 1 more than fifty percent of the gross wage would be taxed as described in
equation (3.22).
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Definition 1 (Crisis with Limited and Unlimited Tax Tolerance)
Suppose the sequence of short-run political equilibria wˆ1l,t converges to a long-run
equilibrium wˆ∗1l. Suppose further that all short-run equilibria are economically feasible,
i.e., wˆ1l,t ≤ wmax1l , where wmax1l denotes the maximal feasible wage level. Beyond
this maximum wage level the economy collapses with output zero in sector 1. We
distinguish two cases:
• Crisis with limited tax tolerance (CLTT): In some period T the short-run
political equilibrium in this period exceeds a level τmax <∞. Tax payers are not
willing to accept a tax rate higher than τmax. Workers as tax payers will reduce
labor supply or move into the shadow economy. The state’s budget constraint
cannot be satisfied any longer.
• Crisis with unlimited tax tolerance (CUTT): The sequence wˆ1l,t of short-
run political equilibria converges to wmax1l . Voters accept any tax rate imposed
by the government. The crisis realized in the long-run equilibrium wmax1l is char-
acterized by the fact that all low-skilled workers in sector 1 have lost their jobs,
and therefore output is zero in sector 1.
37
Chapter 4
Long-Run Political Equilibria
On the basis of our conceptual framework we can now derive the political equilibria
under GEV and PEV. For this, we need to identify the utility functions of voter groups,
their optimal minimum wages and the Condorcet winners.
4.1 Long-Run Political Equilibria under General
Equilibrium Voting (GEV)
Using a positive monotone transformation U = 2 ln u of utility function u (see equation
(3.3)), we obtain for the workers of sector 2 in period t:1
U˜GEV2,t = ln
(1
2
w˜GEV2,t
p˜GEV1,t
)
+ ln
(1
2
w˜GEV2,t
)
(4.1)
Given E˜GEVt = E
GEV
t = Et, the perceived variables equal the actual realized variables
and therefore, from now on, we dispense with the tilde for variables under GEV.
Using equations (3.22) and (3.23) and the fact that τGEVt strictly increases in w1l,t
we find that wGEV2,t strictly decreases and p
GEV
1,t strictly increases in w1l,t ∈ (0, wmax1l ).
Thus UGEV2,t strictly decreases in w1l,t ∈ (0, wmax1l ) and voters of sector 2 will prefer the
lowest possible wage wmin1l for the low- skilled of sector 1.
To illustrate this fact, we plot the utility functions of workers of sector 2 with the
following parameter values for the economy: s = 0.75, β = 0.4, L1l = 70, 000, L1h =
50, 000 and L2 = 100, 000. For these values we obtain w
min
1l = 0.57 and w
max
1l = 3.81.
Furthermore, unless otherwise indicated, we use these values for the illustrations of all
other functions in Part I.
1Since production technologies exhibit constant returns to scale profits are zero and workers’
budgets only consist of wages.
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Figure 4.1: UGEV2,t with s = 0.75 and β = 0.4
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For the high-skilled of sector 1 we obtain:
UGEV1h,t = ln
(1
2
wGEV1h,t
pGEV1,t
)
+ ln
(1
2
wGEV1h,t
)
(4.2)
Because of equations (3.21) and (3.23) and the fact that τGEVt strictly increases in
w1l,t, w
GEV
1h,t strictly decreases and p
GEV
1,t strictly increases in w1l,t ∈ (0, wmax1l ). Thus
UGEV1h,t strictly decreases in w1l,t ∈ (0, wmax1l ) and the high-skilled workers of sector 1
will also prefer wmin1l .
We can summarize our observations in the following lemma:
Lemma 1
UGEV2,t (w1l,t) and U
GEV
1h,t (w1l,t) have the following properties in w1l,t ∈ (0, wmax1l ):
(i) UGEV2,t (w1l,t) and U
GEV
1h,t (w1l,t) strictly decrease in w1l,t.
(ii) The workers of sector 2 and the high-skilled workers of sector 1 maximize their
utilities UGEV2,t (w1l,t) and U
GEV
1h,t (w1l,t) if they choose the lowest possible wage
wmin1l .
As two groups of workers always have a single majority of voters, the short-run political
equilibrium under GEV in each period is given by:
wˆGEV1l,t = w
min
1l = β
L2
L1l
(4.3)
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Figure 4.2: UGEV1h,t under GEV with s = 0.75 and β = 0.4
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Furthermore, at wmin1l all values are economically feasible and τ = 0. Thus, we can
conclude:
Proposition 1 (The Long-Run Political Equilibrium under GEV)
Under GEV, neither CLTT nor CUTT occurs and the long-run political equilibrium
of the voting process equals the short-run equilibria in each period. It is given by:
wˆGEV ∗1l = wˆ
GEV
1l,t = β
L2
L1l
There is no unemployment and the equilibrium is equal to the unregulated economy.
For completeness we also analyze the utility of the low-skilled workers in sector 1.
They have a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function:
UGEV1l,t =
LGEV1l,t
L1l
{
ln
(1
2
w1l,t
pGEV1,t
)
+ ln
(1
2
w1l,t
)}
+
∆GEVt
L1l
{
ln
(1
2
s
w1l,t
pGEV1,t
)
+ ln
(1
2
sw1l,t
)}
This can be simplified to:
UGEV1l,t = −2
LGEV1l,t
L1l
ln(s) + 2 ln(w1l,t)− ln(pGEV1,t ) + 2 ln(s)− 2 ln(2) (4.4)
Lemma 2
UGEV1l,t (w1l,t) has the following properties in w1l,t ∈ (0, wmax1l ):
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(i) limw1l,t→0 U
GEV
1l,t =∞ and limw1l,t→wmax1l UGEV1l,t = −∞.
(ii) Depending on s and β, the optimal wage for the low-skilled workers of sector 1
can exceed wmin1l .
The proof of (i) can be found in the appendix. To illustrate (ii) we can make the
following considerations and computations:
For ∂UGEV1l,t /∂w1l,t = 0 we obtain a polynomial of degree two in w1l,t. Consequently,
for w1l,t ∈ (0, wmax1l ) there can be two or less values of w1l,t satisfying the necessary
conditions for optimal points. They depend on the parameters s, β, L1l, and L2.
2
Considering the course of UGEV1l,t , which is a continuous and differentiable function for
w1l,t ∈ (0, wmax1l ), we can draw further conclusions: If there are two values satisfying
the necessary and sufficient conditions for local optima, the smaller must be a local
minimizer and the larger a local maximizer. In this case, if wmin1l is larger than the
local minimizer and smaller than the maximizer, the low-skilled workers of sector 1
will prefer a minimum wage that exceeds wmin1l . If w
min
1l is smaller than both optimal
points, it is possible that wmin1l will be the best choice. At all events, if w
min
1l exceeds
the local maximizer it is automatically the best choice. In all other conceivable cases
UGEV1l,t must depend negatively on w1l,t for w1l,t ∈ (0, wmax1l ) 3 and the low- skilled choose
wmin1l .
4 Figure 4.3, p. 42, shows UGEV1l,t for the parameter values given above with an
optimal wage exceeding wmin1l .
4.2 Long-Run Political Equilibria under Partial Equi-
librium Voting (PEV)
In the following, we derive the technical results under PEV. In Section 4.5 we provide
intuitive explanations of the results.
Before we look at the utility functions themselves, it is useful to analyze p˜PEV1,t (w1l,t)
in its meaningful range, i.e. for w1l,t ∈ [0, w˜PEV,max1l,t ]:
p˜PEV1,t = (1 + τ
PEV
t−1 )
(²t(w1l,t)
L1h
)1−β(w1l,t
β
)β
The first derivative of p˜PEV1,t (w1l,t) with respect to w1l,t is:
2We used the software package MAPLE to solve ∂UGEV1l,t /∂w1l,t = 0 for w1l,t. Whether the critical
points are larger or smaller than wmin1l depends solely on s and β.
3There are values of w1l,t ∈ (0, wmax1l ) which are critical points but neither of them is a local
minimizer or a local maximizer.
4Unfortunately, it is not possible to analyze UGEV1l,t analytically.
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Figure 4.3: UGEV1l,t with s = 0.75 and β = 0.4
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
w1l
min
=.57 1 2 3 w1l
max
=3.81 5
U
1l
,t
G
EV
w1l,t
∂p˜PEV1,t
∂w1l,t
= p˜PEV1,t
(
(1− β) −sL1l
L2 + τPEVt−1 w
PEV
2,t−1L2 − sw1l,tL1l
+
β
w1l,t
)
(4.5)
and for w1l,t ∈ [0, w˜PEV,max1l,t ] we find one value of w1l,t that satisfies ∂p˜PEV1,t /∂w1l,t = 0
as expressed in the next lemma.
Lemma 3
There exists a unique value w˜p11l,t that maximizes p˜
PEV
1,t for w1l,t ∈ [0, w˜PEV,max1l,t ]:
w˜p11l,t = βw˜
PEV,max
1l,t = β
L2 + τ
PEV
t−1 w
PEV
2,t−1L2
sL1l
(4.6)
The proof of Lemma 3 can be found in the appendix.
Figure 4.4 shows p˜PEV1,t (w1l,t) for the case where τ
PEV
t−1 = 0 and thus w
PEV
2,t−1 = 1.
5 We
use in this section the same parameter values as in the preceding section: s = 0.75, β =
0.4, L1l = 70, 000, L1h = 50, 000 and L2 = 100, 000. Then we have w˜
PEV,max
1l,t = 1.90
and w˜p11l,t = 0.76.
The utility of workers in sector 2 is:6
U˜PEV2,t (w1l,t) = ln
(1
2
w˜PEV2,t
p˜PEV1,t
)
+ ln
(1
2
w˜PEV2,t
)
5This is the case when there was no regulation in t− 1.
6Also under PEV, profits of firms are zero since firms are assumed to be price takers and do not
need to worry about equilibrium effects.
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Figure 4.4: The typical shape of p˜PEV1,t (w1l,t)
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As under PEV people consider the wage of workers in sector 2 to be fixed, the char-
acteristics of U˜PEV2,t (w1l,t) depend on p˜
PEV
1,t (w1l,t).
Lemma 4
U˜PEV2,t (w1l,t) has the following properties:
(i) limw1l,t→0 U˜
PEV
2,t (w1l,t) =∞ and limw1l,t→w˜PEV,max1l,t U˜
PEV
2,t (w1l,t) =∞.
(ii) The local maximizer w˜p11l,t for p˜
PEV
1,t (w1l,t) is a local minimizer of U˜
PEV
2,t (w1l,t) in
(0, w˜PEV,max1l,t ).
(iii) Workers in sector 2 maximize their utility U˜PEV2,t (w1l,t) if they choose the largest
possible wage w˜PEV,max1l,t .
The last point follows from the fact that p˜PEV1,t (w1l,t) is a continuous function in
[wmin1l , w˜
PEV,max
1l,t ).
Now we turn to the high-skilled workers of sector 1. Their utility function is:
U˜PEV1h,t (w1l,t) = ln
(1
2
w˜PEV1h,t
p˜PEV1,t
)
+ ln
(1
2
w˜PEV1h,t
)
Dividing w˜PEV1h,t by p˜
PEV
1,t we obtain:
w˜PEV1h,t
p˜PEV1,t
=
( 1− β
1 + τPEVt−1
)( β
w1l,t
)β(²t(w1l,t)
L1h
)β
(4.7)
43
Chapter 4. Long-Run Political Equilibria
Figure 4.5: U˜PEV2,t with τ
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from equations (3.31) and (4.7) we can conclude the following:
Lemma 5
U˜PEV1h,t (w1l,t) has the following properties:
(i) U˜PEV1h,t (w1l,t) is strictly decreasing in w1l,t ∈ (0, w˜PEV,max1l,t ).
(ii) The high-skilled workers of sector 1 maximize their utility U˜PEV1h,t (w1l,t) if they
choose the lowest possible wage wmin1l .
The utility function of the low-skilled workers of sector 1 is:
U˜PEV1l,t (w1l,t) = −2
L˜PEV1l,t
L1l
ln(s) + ln(w1l,t) + ln
( w1l,t
p˜PEV1,t
)
+ 2 ln(s)− 2 ln(2) (4.8)
We obtain the following lemma (for proof see appendix):
Lemma 6
U˜PEV1l,t (w1l,t) has the following properties:
(i) limw1l,t→0 U˜
PEV
1l,t (w1l,t) =∞ and limw1l,t→w˜PEV,max1l,t U˜
PEV
1l,t (w1l,t) =∞.
(ii) There is one local optimum - which is a minimum - in (0, w˜PEV,max1l,t ).
(iii) The low-skilled workers of sector 1 maximize their utility U˜PEV1l,t (w1l,t) if they
choose the largest possible wage w˜PEV,max1l,t .
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Figure 4.6: U˜PEV1h,t with τ
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Figure 4.7: U˜PEV1l,t with τ
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Now we can determine the equilibria under PEV. In each round of voting workers in
sector 2 and the low-skilled workers of sector 1 choose w˜PEV,max1l,t . Thus the short-run
equilibrium in period t is wˆPEV1l,t = w˜
PEV,max
1l,t . It depends on the tax rate that actually
satisfies the state’s budget constraint of the previous voting period. To derive the long-
run equilibrium we need a starting point for the economy characterized by E(w1l,r)
with the starting wage w1l,r ∈ [wmin1l , wmax1l ) and the corresponding tax rate τr. We
obtain the following proposition (for proof see appendix):
Proposition 2 (The Evolution of the Economy under PEV)
Under PEV, the economy evolves according to:
wˆPEV1l,t =
2L2 − 1(2−sβ)t(1+τr)L2
sL1l
(4.9)
wPEV2,t =
1
(2− sβ)t+1(1 + τr) (4.10)
τPEVt = (2− sβ)t+1(1 + τr)− 1, (4.11)
where τr <∞ is the tax rate that actually satisfies the state’s budget constraint before
period zero starts.
We next determine whether a crisis will occur in the long-run under PEV.
For w1l,r ∈ [wmin1l , wmax1l ), wˆPEV1l,t converges to wmax1l = 2L2sL1l as t goes to infinity. As
wˆPEV1l,t never exceeds the largest possible value w
max
1l , the variables w
PEV
1h,t , w
PEV
2,t , L
PEV
1l,t
and pPEV1,t are always economically feasible, no economic collapse occurs, and we can
determine an equilibrium EPEV ∗. Nevertheless, we observe CUTT as limt→∞ wˆPEV1l,t =
wmax1l .
Thus - starting with w1l,r - as t increases, τ
PEV
t will become larger than some critical
τmax. Therefore, in the case where the economic and political system cannot exceed
τmax, CLTT will occur if:
(2− sβ)t+1(1 + τr)− 1 > τmax
or if:
t >
ln
(
1+τmax
1+τr
)
ln(2− sβ) − 1
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Thus, the first voting period T where wˆPEV1l,t “produces” an infeasible tax rate is:
T =
⌊
ln
(
1+τmax
1+τr
)
ln(2− sβ)
⌋
(4.12)
where b c denotes the largest possible integer that is smaller than the expression under
consideration.
We can summarize our results under the PEV view by the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (The Long-Run Political Equilibrium under PEV)
(i) Under PEV and if CUTT holds, the long-run equilibrium for w1l,r ∈ [wmin1l , wmax1l )
is given by
wˆPEV ∗1l = lim
t→∞
wˆPEV1l,t = w
max
1l
and all low-skilled workers lose their jobs:
∆PEV ∗ = lim
t→∞
∆PEVt = L1l
(ii) If the tax rate is not allowed to exceed τmax, CLTT occurs and the Condorcet
winner of period T in which the crisis emerges is
wˆPEV1l,T =
2L2 − 1(2−sβ)T (1+τr)L2
sL1l
where
T =
⌊
ln
(
1+τmax
1+τr
)
ln(2− sβ)
⌋
and the number of unemployed workers is:
∆PEVT = L1l
2(2− sβ)2 − 2 1
(2−sβ)T−1(1+τr)
2(2− sβ)2 − 2 1
(2−sβ)T−1(1+τr) + sβ
1
(2−sβ)T−1(1+τr)
,
where τr <∞ is the tax rate that actually satisfies the state’s budget constraint
before period zero starts.
In Figure 4.8, T is plotted as a function of sβ (see equation (4.12)) in a range of
sβ = [0.50, 0.94]. We assume τmax = 1 and the market-clearing wage as starting
wage, which implies τr = 0. For sβ ≤ 0.58, T equals 1, i.e. the implementation of
the Condorcet winner in period 1 would require a tax rate that exceeds τmax. As sβ
increases, T also increases. The intervals for sβ in which T stays constant become
smaller. Eventually, T goes to infinity as sβ approaches 1.
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Figure 4.8: The collapse period T for τr = 0 and τmax = 1
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4.3 Comparing Long-Run Political Equilibria of Gen-
eral Equilibrium Voting (GEV) and Partial Equi-
librium Voting (PEV)
Proposition 4 summarizes our results and shows that in democracies where voters only
take direct effects of regulations into account, strong negative effects from regulations
will be experienced and eventually a crisis will occur.
Proposition 4
The Condorcet winner wages satisfy:
wmin1l = wˆ
GEV ∗
1l < wˆ
PEV
1l,T < wˆ
PEV ∗
1l ,
where wˆGEV ∗1l denotes the long-run political equilibrium under GEV, wˆ
PEV
1l,T the long-run
equilibrium under PEV with limited tax tolerance (CLTT), and wˆPEV ∗1l the long-run
equilibrium under PEV with unlimited tax tolerance (CUTT). Accordingly, unemploy-
ment rates satisfy:
0 = ∆GEV ∗ < ∆PEVT < ∆
PEV ∗,
i.e., there is no unemployment under GEV whereas PEV produces unemployment both
under CLTT and CUTT.
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4.4 Reaction to Crises
Under PEV, we assume first that voters do not learn that their view of the economy is
wrong although there is a discrepancy between their expected utility levels and those
actually achieved. Nevertheless, at some point in time society enters a crisis because
voters as tax payers will recognize that there are large negative general equilibrium
effects: Either τt approaches infinity and all low-skilled workers in sector 1 are unem-
ployed and production is zero, or the tax rate crosses τmax and workers reduce labor
supply or move into the shadow economy (see our concept of a crisis, Definition 1, p.
36). As the gap between gross wages and net wages becomes too large and real wages
become too small people will not be willing to accept this.
There are two conceivable reaction patterns to the crisis:
1. People perform ad-hoc measures and - for the moment - give up their assumption
of an unchanging tax rate and vote for historical values of wˆ1l,t or complementary
policy actions (e.g. a reduction of s). They would expect a lower tax rate
connected with these measures. But afterwards they return to their former
beliefs or other mistaken views about the functioning of the economy. As a
consequence, they could find themselves faced with the same crisis.
2. People learn that the principles of their former views are incorrect. They recog-
nize the discrepancy between their beliefs and the actual realized values of the
economy’s variables. They adopt a new mental framework for thinking about
the functioning of the economy and reverse their PEV view in favor of the GEV
view. In particular, sector 2 workers may switch to GEV as they become aware of
their tax burden and real-wage decline. If this happens, parties offering market-
clearing wages and a reduction in taxes will win and the wage in the unregulated
economy will emerge as Condorcet winner.
4.5 Interpretation of Results
In order to interpret our results it will be useful to discuss in detail the GEV view
first. Then it will become transparent how PEV differs to GEV.
4.5.1 General Equilibrium Voting (GEV)
Under GEV, voters have equations (3.7) to (3.19) in mind when they contemplate
about the consequences of the minimum wage’s value w1l,t for their utility levels. To
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achieve an economic understanding of the effects of a changing minimum wage w1l,t
on the variables of the model, they start with some w1l,t and consider what happens if
w1l,t increases by a certain amount. From this they obtain τ
GEV
t and p
GEV
1,t , such that
the market-clearing condition (3.19) and the governmental budget constraint (3.17)
are fulfilled simultaneously:
LGEV1l,t
bGEV1l,t
2
+ LGEV1h,t
bGEV1h,t
2
+ LGEV2,t
bGEV2,t
2
+ ∆GEVt
bGEVun,t
2
= qGEV2,t (4.13)
(w1l,tL
GEV
1l,t + w
GEV
1h,t L
GEV
1h,t + w
GEV
2,t L
GEV
2,t )τ
GEV
t = ∆
GEV
t b
GEV
un,t (4.14)
where
bGEV1l,t = w1l,t, b
GEV
1h,t = w
GEV
1h,t , b
GEV
2,t = w
GEV
2,t and b
GEV
un,t = sw1l,t
We now introduce relative labor costs, which will help to explain the functioning of
the economy. The tax rate and the price for good 1 determine the relative labor costs
w1l,t(1 + τt)/p1,t and w1h,t(1 + τt)/p1,t and therefore labor demand in sector 1. For
example, if w1l,t(1 + τt)/p1,t increases, labor demand for the low-skilled will decrease.
7 As the minimum wage is binding, the low-skilled labor force also decreases. Fur-
thermore, because low-skilled and high-skilled labor are complementary inputs, the
demand for high-skilled workers in sector 1 for a given wage level w1h,t decreases as
well.8 Consequently, as the high-skilled labor market in sector 1 is not regulated, the
wage level w1h,t declines so that the labor market for high-skilled workers will clear.
Of course, a change in (1 + τt)/p1,t itself changes labor demand for the high-skilled. If
(1+ τt)/p1,t goes down, w1h,t goes up and vice versa. Since p2 = 1, relative labor costs
in sector 2 are w2,t(1+ τt). Again, this labor market is not regulated and thus relative
labor costs remain constant, i.e., by the same proportion that (1 + τt) changes, w2,t
too has to change, but in the opposite direction.
We summarize the concept of relative labor costs in the following definition:
Definition 2 (Relative Labor Costs)
We define relative labor costs for workers in sector 1 as:
w1l,t · (1 + τt)
p1,t
and
w1h,t · (1 + τt)
p1,t
and in sector 2 as:
w2,t · (1 + τt)
p2,t
7This follows from the profit maximization condition with respect to L1l (see equation (3.12))and
the fact that the high-skilled labor market always clears and therefore L1h,t = L1h in all periods.
8Note that ∂2q1,t/(∂L1h,t∂L1l,t) > 0. If the use of L1l,t decreases, the marginal productivity of
L1h,t also decreases. Because ∂2q1,t/∂(L1h,t)2 < 0, the use of L1h,t has to decrease for a given wage
level if firms want to maximize their profits.
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Relative labor costs determine the labor demand of firms in the respective labor mar-
ket. In sector 1, labor demand of firms for one skill level additionally depends on
the other skill level’s employment. Furthermore, in sector 2 and for the high-skilled
workers of sector 1, relative labor costs always have to adapt for the clearance of the
respective labor market. That is, relative labor costs in this markets remain constant.
The perceived relative labor costs are defined accordingly.
We can draw the conclusions of Proposition 1 (The Long-Run Political Equilibrium
under GEV) mainly from equations (4.13) and (4.14) intuitively without explicitly
computing the results.
In equilibrium, unemployment increases if the minimum wage w1l,t goes up. To see
this, suppose that - starting from an equilibrium situation - unemployment would not
increase if w1l,t increased. Then L
GEV
1l,t would have to remain constant or increase.
Hence, (1 + τGEVt )/p
GEV
1,t would have to fall by at least the same proportion as w1l,t
increased. But if (1+τGEVt )/p
GEV
1,t declined while L
GEV
1l,t did not fall, aggregate demand
of the high-skilled for good 2 would increase and wGEV1h,t would have to rise as L
GEV
1h,t =
L1h. To complete the argument we have to distinguish two cases: First, a constant
or falling tax rate and second, an increasing tax rate. In the first case, i.e. in the
case of a constant or decreasing tax rate, wGEV2,t and therefore aggregate demand of
sector 2 workers for good 2 would at least remain constant but never fall, because
wGEV2,t = 1/(1+τ
GEV
t ). Furthermore, if an increasing w1l,t caused constant or decreasing
unemployment, aggregate demand for good 2 of all low-skilled would go up. Hence,
an increasing w1l,t would correspond to an increasing aggregate demand of all voter
groups for good 2 as long as τGEVt would not increase. Given that the right hand side
of (4.13) always equals qGEV2,t = L2, it follows that a situation where unemployment
decreases or remains constant while w1l,t increases and τ
GEV
t does not, cannot be an
equilibrium. In the second case, i.e. if τGEVt increased, p
GEV
1,t also would have to
increase since (1 + τGEVt )/p
GEV
1,t would have to decline in the case of not increasing
unemployment. If we look at the first goods market:(
LGEV1l,t
bGEV1l,t
2
+ LGEV1h,t
bGEV1h,t
2
+ LGEV2,t
bGEV2,t
2
+ ∆GEVt
bGEVun,t
2
)
/pGEV1,t = q
GEV
1,t (4.15)
we can recognize that an increasing pGEV1,t together with an increasing or constant q
GEV
1,t
(non-decreasing employment of the low-skilled workers) would imply an increasing
numerator on the left hand side of equation (4.15) to guarantee market-clearing in the
first goods market. Since qGEV2,t remains constant, equation (4.13) would not hold and
goods market 2 would not clear. Thus, a situation where a rising w1l,t corresponds to
non-increasing unemployment and an increasing tax rate cannot be an equilibrium, too.
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Therefore, independent of the changes in τGEVt , unemployment will always increase
when w1l,t goes up.
If unemployment increases when the minimum wage goes up, then output in sector 1
will decrease (see equations (3.1) and (3.15)), i.e., good 1 will become scarcer. Hence,
its price pGEV1,t must rise if w1l,t increases.
Furthermore, since unemployment increases when w1l,t rises and thus ∆
GEV
t
bGEVun,t
2
also
rises, the sum LGEV1l,t
bGEV1l,t
2
+ LGEV1h,t
bGEV1h,t
2
+ LGEV2,t
bGEV2,t
2
has to fall to satisfy equation
(4.13). But then (w1l,tL
GEV
1l,t + w
GEV
1h,t L
GEV
1h,t + w
GEV
2,t L
GEV
2,t ) also declines and therefore
τGEVt has to rise according to equation (4.14). Consequently, the tax rate increases
monotonically in w1l,t. Since relative labor costs w
GEV
2,t (1 + τ
GEV
t ) in sector 2 have
to remain constant as the labor market clears, this means that the nominal wage of
sector 2 workers declines when w1l,t increases.
The question arises whether w1l,t can become infeasible. If we look at equation (4.13),
we recognize that this must be the case from a certain value of w1l,t on, denoted by
wmax1l . The reason for this is that from this point on - as w1l,t is increased exogenously
- the demand of the low-skilled will exceed qGEV2,t = L2 even if all low-skilled are
unemployed since unemployed individuals receive sw1l,t.
9 Then the market for good
2 could only clear if LGEV1l,t was negative, which is not possible. Furthermore, at the
critical level wmax1l , the aggregate demand for good 2 of the high-skilled workers and
workers of sector 2 has to be zero because the goods market in sector 2 clears. Thus,
at wmax1l , w
GEV
1h,t and w
GEV
2,t have to be zero. For a given non-negative value of L
GEV
1l,t ,
wGEV1h,t = 0 can only hold if limw1l,t→wmax1l (1 + τ
GEV
t )/p
GEV
1,t = ∞ (see equation (3.13)).
The result is that, because of equation (3.12), the employment of the low-skilled is also
zero. We can conclude, therefore, that for w1l,t = w
max
1l , where all low-skilled alone
consume all of good 2, all low-skilled are unemployed and (1 + τGEVt )/p
GEV
1,t =∞.
Thus, output in sector 1 is zero, and for clearance of this good market demand has to be
zero, which implies limw1l,t→wmax1l p
GEV
1,t =∞. Since limw1l,t→wmax1l (1+τGEVt )/pGEV1,t =∞,
it follows that limw1l,t→wmax1l (1 + τ
GEV
t ) = ∞. The latter can also been seen from the
fact that wGEV2,t has to be zero and according to equation (3.14) w
GEV
2,t = 1/(1+ τ
GEV
t ).
Summarizing the analysis, we can say that an increasing minimum wage has two effects:
a negative effect on total wealth and a redistributive effect in favor of the low-skilled.
Increasing minimum wages increase unemployment, lower total output and therefore
reduce the total wealth of society. This is represented by an increasing price for good
1 such that real wages become less and less not only for the high-skilled of sector 1
and workers of sector 2 but also - at least when w1l,t is big enough - for the low-skilled
9For wmax1l the demand of the low-skilled for good 2 is equal to q
GEV
2,t = L2.
52
Chapter 4. Long-Run Political Equilibria
of sector 1. Furthermore, setting a higher minimum wage increasingly redistributes
the remaining wealth in favor of the low-skilled workers. This is represented by an
increasing tax rate. In the extreme case where all wealth is allocated to the low-skilled
workers, the tax rate must be infinitely large to ensure that all other groups channel
all their gross earnings to the low-skilled via the state’s tax regime.
The exact analytic result of voters’ reasoning processes is given by equations (3.20) to
(3.27). Clearly, workers of sector 2 and the high-skilled workers of sector 1 prefer the
lowest possible minimum wage because an increase in w1l,t monotonically lowers their
net wages and monotonically increases the price of good 1. The low-skilled have to
consider a trade-off between a higher pGEV1,t and increasing unemployment on the one
hand, and higher net wages and unemployment benefits on the other. Therefore for
some values of s and β they will prefer a minimum wage that exceeds wmin1l .
4.5.2 Partial Equilibrium Voting (PEV)
Under PEV, the same reasoning process by agents occurs, but with two important
differences. Both the nominal wage in sector 2 w˜PEV2,t and the tax rate τ˜
PEV
t are as-
sumed to stay constant, i.e., the governmental budget constraint (see equation (3.17))
is simply ignored.
Voters look at the second goods market and perform their computations concerning
the price of good 1 such that goods market 2 clears. From these considerations they
not only derive the price of good 1 but also their wages. This enables them to compute
their Marshallian demand functions, which they assume will be satisfied. Thus, voters
only indirectly observe output in sector 1 through the assumption that their Marshal-
lian demand resulting from perceived prices and wages can be satisfied. But under
PEV this assumption does not hold, since they do not take into account general equi-
librium repercussions from the economy resulting from higher unemployment and the
attendant change of the tax rate. This ignorance is represented by their assumption
of a constant tax rate.
The key insight is the following: As voters assume that w˜PEV2,t and τ˜
PEV
t remain con-
stant, the demand of workers of sector 2 for the second good would also remain con-
stant. If w1l,t rises, the demand of low-skilled workers for the second good must
increase from a certain value of w1l,t on. In order to obtain market-clearing in sector
2, the demand of high-skilled workers for the second good would have to decline in
the eyes of the voters, which would require a decline of w˜PEV1h,t . A lower w˜
PEV
1h,t would
have to be in turn be accompanied by a lower price for good 1. This follows from the
continuity of the price function and the arguments we present in the next paragraph.
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Since p˜PEV1,t would decline under PEV, workers in sector 2 perceive that their utility
increases with a rising w1l,t since their nominal net wages would remain constant. We
observe that workers in sector 2 do not anticipate that their own demand for sector
2 goods will decline since they assume w˜PEV2,t and τ˜
PEV
t to be constant. This failure
to recognize general equilibrium effects translates into a mistaken view about price
reactions through the market-clearing in sector 2 when w1l,t changes. An important
interpretation of these considerations is that, since w˜PEV2,t varies with τ˜
PEV
t and the
GEV outcome would result if τ˜PEVt was allowed to adjust, the only misconception on
the voters’ part is their ignorance concerning the governmental budget constraint.
Under GEV, an increase in w1l,t leads to higher unemployment and therefore to an
increasing tax rate. The increase in τ˜PEVt guarantees the necessary decrease in ag-
gregate demand for good 2 by the high-skilled in sector 1 and workers of sector 2
while w1l,t increases and leads to a growing demand for good 2 by low-skilled workers.
Since under PEV both τ˜PEVt and w˜
PEV
2,t are perceived to remain constant, the neces-
sary decrease in aggregate demand in favor of the low-skilled could only be secured
by decreasing demand by the high-skilled of sector 1. In the critical case where all
of good 2 would be allocated to the low- skilled and the workers of sector 2, w˜PEV1h,t
would have to be zero. The corresponding minimum wage would be w˜PEV,max1l . But if
w˜PEV1h,t was zero, this would mean according to equation (3.13) that either L˜
PEV
1l,t = 0
or (1 + τ˜PEVt )/p˜
PEV
1,t = ∞, which would be equivalent because the maximum value
w˜PEV,max1l of w1l,t would be finite (see equation (3.12)). Consequently, as τ˜
PEV
t is pre-
sumed to remain constant, p˜PEV1,t would have to decline from a certain value of w1l,t on
and would approach zero if w1l,t approached w˜
PEV,max
1l . Clearly, this would be the pre-
ferred minimum wage for the low- skilled workers of sector 1 and the workers of sector
2 since their real wages would approach infinity while the real wage of the high-skilled
would be zero.10 Note that the perceived price for good 1 does not reflect the scarcity
of good 1 correctly because with an unchanging τ˜PEVt it has to guarantee redistribu-
tion to the low-skilled in the second goods market. Furthermore, we can conclude that
w˜PEV,max1l is smaller than w
max
1l because under PEV the aggregate demand by workers
from sector 2 cannot diminish since w˜PEV2,t is assumed to remain constant.
If we look at the political outcome under PEV we find that the crisis is self-enforcing:
The higher the last period’s equilibrium tax rate is the higher the minimum wage the
Median-voters prefer in the present period. The short-run political equilibrium under
PEV, wˆPEV1l,t , strictly increases in the last period’s tax rate τ
PEV
t−1 = (2−sβ)t(1+τr)−1
(see Proposition 2 “The Evolution of the Economy under PEV”) which in turn strictly
10The high-skilled workers´ consumption of good 2 would be zero. Thus they would realize the
lowest possible utility level of zero (see equation (3.3)) and accordingly their real wages would have
to be zero.
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rises in t. One possible interpretation is that with an increasing tax rate the perceived
nominal wage in sector 2, w˜PEV2,t , decreases. Hence - in the perception of voters - more
wealth can be redistributed to the low-skilled workers before their real demand for
good 2 exceeds output in the second sector and the economy collapses. The maximum
value for the minimum wage would increase and therefore the value of the Condorcet
winner wˆPEV1l,t in the perspective period.
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Variation: Partial Equilibrium
Voting when the First Market is
Cleared (PEV1)
In this chapter we analyze the political outcomes when voters take the same view as
described in Section 3.3.1.2 (PEV) but with one difference. They assume clearance of
the first goods market, i.e., they clear the goods market of the regulated sector. We
refer to this view as PEV1.
The clearance of the first goods market can be justified by voters’ assumption that
nothing changes in the unregulated sector. Therefore, voters completely focus on the
first sector.
In this case, it can be shown that they correctly anticipate a rising price for good 1.
This assures market-clearing in spite of a decreasing output in sector 1. Under PEV1,
the high-skilled workers of sector 1 will favor a minimum wage as high as possible
since they perceive higher nominal wages whereas workers in sector 2 will prefer the
market-clearing minimum wage. The latter fact follows from higher prices in sector 1
that lower the real wages of voters in sector 2.
The following analysis will show that two voter groups, namely the low-skilled and the
high-skilled workers of sector 1, prefer a minimum wage as high as possible. There-
fore, the political process under PEV1 may also generate high unemployment and low
output and hence, may trigger a crisis.
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5.1 Perceived Market Equilibria under Partial Equi-
librium Voting 1 (PEV1)
As above, voters assume constancy of sector-2 variables and the tax rate. Therefore
they take into account the following equations describing sector-1 behavior of the
economy:
w1l,t(1 + τt) = p1,tβ
(L1h,t
L1l,t
)(1−β)
w1h,t(1 + τt) = p1,t(1− β)
(L1l,t
L1h,t
)β
L1h,t = L1h
∆t = L1l − L1l,t
Under PEV1 they clear goods market 1 to compute the market equilibrium:
L1l,tc
1l
1,t + L1h,tc
1h
1,t + L2,tc
2
1,t +∆tc
un
1,t = q1,t
Since the governmental budget constraint is ignored by voters, solving this system of
five equations yields their perceived equilibrium E˜PEV 1t (w1l,t):
τ˜PEV 1t (w1l,t) = τ
PEV 1
t−1 (5.1)
w˜PEV 11h,t (w1l,t) =
(1− β)(sw1l,tL1l + wPEV 12,t−1 L2)
(sβ + 2τPEV 1t−1 + 1)L1h
(5.2)
w˜PEV 12,t (w1l,t) =
1
1 + τPEV 1t−1
(5.3)
p˜PEV 11,t (w1l,t) =
( sw1l,tL1l + wPEV 12,t−1 L2
(sβ + 2τPEV 1t−1 + 1)w
PEV 1
2,t−1 L1h
)1−β((1 + τPEV 1t−1 )w1l,t
β
)β
(5.4)
L˜PEV 11l,t (w1l,t) =
β(sw1l,tL1l + w
PEV 1
2,t−1 L2)
(sβ + 2τPEV 1t−1 + 1)w1l,t
(5.5)
L˜PEV 11h,t (w1l,t) = L1h (5.6)
L˜PEV 12,t (w1l,t) = L2 (5.7)
∆˜PEV 1t (w1l,t) = L1l −
β(sw1l,tL1l + w
PEV 1
2,t−1 L2)
(sβ + 2τPEV 1t−1 + 1)w1l,t
(5.8)
Note that under PEV1 the solution is perceived to be economically feasible for every
value of w1l,t not smaller than w
min
1l .
57
Chapter 5. Variation: Partial Equilibrium Voting when the First Market is
Cleared (PEV1)
5.2 Political Equilibria under Partial Equilibrium
Voting 1 (PEV1)
5.2.1 Perceived Utility Functions
First it is useful to note that p˜PEV 11,t strictly increases in w1l,t, as can be seen directly
from equation (5.4). We illustrate our results using the same parameter values as
in Chapter 4: s = 0.75, β = 0.4, L1l = 70, 000, L1h = 50, 000, L2 = 100, 000 and
τPEV 1t−1 = 0. Figure 5.1 shows p˜
PEV 1
1,t for these values.
Figure 5.1: p˜PEV 11,t with τ
PEV 1
t−1 = 0
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The perceived utility function of workers in sector 2 is:
U˜PEV 12,t (w1l,t) = ln
(1
2
w˜PEV 12,t
p˜PEV 11,t
)
+ ln
(1
2
w˜PEV 12,t
)
Since wages of sector 2 workers are assumed to remain constant, the characteristics of
U˜PEV 12,t (w1l,t) depend on p˜
PEV 1
1,t (w1l,t).
Lemma 7
U˜PEV 12,t (w1l,t) has the following properties for w1l,t > 0:
(i) U˜PEV 12,t (w1l,t) strictly decreases in w1l,t.
(ii) Workers in sector 2 maximize their utility U˜PEV 12,t (w1l,t) if they choose the lowest
possible wage wmin1l .
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Figure 5.2: U˜PEV 12,t with τ
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As the high-skilled workers’ perceived utility function we have:
U˜PEV 11h,t (w1l,t) = ln
(1
2
w˜PEV 11h,t
p˜PEV 11,t
)
+ ln
(1
2
w˜PEV 11h,t
)
We obtain the following lemma (for proof see appendix):
Lemma 8
U˜PEV 11h,t (w1l,t) has the following properties for w1l,t > 0:
(i) limw1l,t→0 U˜
PEV 1
1h,t (w1l,t) =∞ and limw1l,t→∞ U˜PEV 11h,t (w1l,t) =∞.
(ii) There exists one local optimum. This optimum is a minimum and we denote the
minimizer by w˜PEV 1,min1h1l,t :
w˜PEV 1,min1h1l,t =
1
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )s
β
L2
L1l
=
1
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )s
wmin1l
This minimizer is larger than wmin1l if τ
PEV 1
t−1 <
1−s
s
.
Finally, we analyze the perceived utility functions of low-skilled workers in the first
sector:
U˜PEV 11l,t (w1l,t) = −2
L˜PEV 11l,t
L1l
ln(s) + ln(w1l,t) + ln
( w1l,t
p˜PEV 11,t
)
+ 2 ln(s)− 2 ln(2)
We obtain the following results (for proof see appendix):
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Figure 5.3: U˜PEV 11h,t with τ
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Lemma 9
U˜PEV 11l,t (w1l,t) has the following properties for w1l,t > 0 (see also Figure 5.4, p. 61):
(i) limw1l,t→0 U˜
PEV 1
1l,t (w1l,t) =∞ and limw1l,t→∞ U˜PEV 11l,t (w1l,t) =∞.
(ii) There exists one local optimum. This optimum is a minimum and we denote the
minimizer by w˜PEV 1,min1l1l,t . Depending on τ
PEV 1
t−1 , s, and β, w˜
PEV 1,min1l
1l,t can be
smaller or larger than wmin1l .
5.2.2 Short-Run Political Equilibria
Under PEV1 we observe that voters do not perceive the possibility of an economic
collapse. They expect economically feasible outcomes for all values of w1l,t exceeding
wmin1l . Without further restrictions the political process would immediately gener-
ate a crisis because the low-skilled and high-skilled workers of sector 1 would vote
for a minimum wage that is as high as possible. Note that there is no reason why
minimum wage proposals should be restricted to wages lower than wmax1l . Since
U˜PEV 11h,t (w1l,t) → ∞ and U˜PEV 11l,t (w1l,t) → ∞ for w1l,t → ∞ there will be a value wˆ1l,t
such that U˜PEV 11h,t (wˆ1l,t) > U˜
PEV 1
1h,t (w
min
1l ) and U˜
PEV 1
1l,t (wˆ1l,t) > U˜
PEV 1
1l,t (w
min
1l ).
In the following, we assume that voters have the right to appeal to a constitutional court
when they perceive an equilibrium with real wages that cannot satisfy their subjective
minimal consumption level. The constitutional court uses the GEV view to decide on
the appeal. According to the minimal consumption level the court wants to guarantee,
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Figure 5.4: U˜PEV 11l,t with τ
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it announces a maximum value w¯1l > w
min
1l for the minimum wage that cannot be
exceeded. Nevertheless, we assume that the judges will be unwilling to impose too
much of a restriction on the political process. Thus w¯1l will be large enough to generate
a crisis (CLTT). On the other hand, the court has to avoid an economic collapse and
therefore chooses a w¯1l that is smaller than w
max
1l .
Under PEV1, workers of sector 2 will appeal to the court since without restrictions all
other voter groups will vote for minimum wages that are as high as possible. Therefore,
the short-run equilibrium that occurs will depend on the announced level of w¯1l. In
the following, the short-run outcomes of the political process are discussed.
Market-Clearing Outcomes Since workers in sector 2 always prefer the market-
clearing wage (see Lemma 7), the market-clearing outcome obtains in the short-run if
just one group of sector 1 workers also votes for wmin1l . If we consider the properties
of U˜PEV 11h,t and U˜
PEV 1
1l,t (see Lemmas 8 and 9), we recognize that both utility functions
have the same structure in terms of optimal decisions. They are both U-shaped with a
minimizer that could be equal to wmin1l or smaller or larger than w
min
1l . Figures 5.3 and
5.4 represent the last two cases. Figure 5.3 shows the case where w˜PEV 1,min1h1l,t exceeds
wmin1l . Thus, we can find a critical level of w1l,t, denoted by w˜
crit,1h
1l,t , which satisfies
U˜PEV 11h,t (w˜
crit,1h
1l,t ) = U˜
PEV 1
1h,t (w
min
1l ) and w˜
crit,1h
1l,t > w
min
1l and for which a maximum value
w¯1l that is smaller than w˜
crit,1h
1l,t would generate the market-clearing outcome in the
short-run, because U˜PEV 11h,t (w
min
1l ) would be larger than U˜
PEV 1
1h,t (w¯1l). Figure 5.4 shows
the case where the utility minimizer is smaller than wmin1l . Therefore, the critical wage
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level is smaller than wmin1l and the corresponding voter group will vote for any wage
level exceeding the minimum wage.
The values of the critical wage levels for the high-skilled workers and low-skilled workers
of sector 1, w˜crit,1h1l,t and w˜
crit,1l
1l,t , are defined by U˜
PEV 1
i,t (w˜
crit,i
1l,t ) = U˜
PEV 1
i,t (w
min
1l ) and
w˜crit,i1l,t 6= wmin1l if w˜PEV 1,mini1l,t 6= wmin1l , and w˜crit,i1l,t = wmin1l if w˜PEV 1,mini1l,t = wmin1l (i =
1h, 1l). They depend on a vector of parameters which we will denote by ν. These
parameters are τPEV 1t−1 , s, β, L1l, L1h, and L2, where only τ
PEV 1
t−1 could vary in the
voting process. Therefore, we can define ν := (τPEV 1t−1 , ν¯) := (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , s, β, L1l, L1h, L2).
The set M of all possible parameter vectors is
M :=
{(
τPEV 1t−1 , s, β, L1l, L1h, L2
)∣∣∣τPEV 1t−1 ∈ [0,∞), s ∈ (0, 1], β ∈ (0, 1), Li/(∑
i
Li) < 1/2
}
.
Since the critical wage levels will be larger than wmin1l if and only if the utility mini-
mizers are larger than wmin1l , we obtain the following proposition from Lemmas 8 and
9.
Proposition 5
(i) For τPEV 1t−1 <
1−s
s
, the critical wage level w˜crit,1h1l,t (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , ν¯) is larger than w
min
1l .
Hence, if w¯1l < w˜
crit,1h
1l,t (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , ν¯), the market-clearing outcome w
min
1l obtains as
a short-run political equilibrium. 1
(ii) For some combinations of τPEV 1t−1 , s, and β, the critical wage level w˜
crit,1l
1l,t (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , ν¯)
is larger than wmin1l . Hence, if w¯1l < w˜
crit,1l
1l,t (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , ν¯), the market-clearing out-
come wmin1l obtains as a short-run political equilibrium.
Crisis Outcomes The necessary condition for the market-clearing outcome is that
for at least one group of sector 1 workers the utility minimizer is larger than wmin1l .
Additionally, to guarantee the market-clearing outcome, w¯1l has to be smaller than
the corresponding critical wage level.
If and only if w¯1l is larger than the critical levels for both groups in sector 1, the crisis
outcome w¯1l will obtain. The next proposition states that this can be the case for
some constellations ν.
Proposition 6
For some ν ∈M, w˜crit,1h1l,t (ν) < wmax1l and w˜crit,1l1l,t (ν) < wmax1l . Hence, if w¯1l ≥ w˜crit,1h1l,t (ν)
and w¯1l ≥ w˜crit,1l1l,t (ν), the crisis outcome w¯1l obtains in the short-run.
The crisis outcome will obtain independently of the level of w¯1l if w˜
PEV 1,min1h
1l,t ≤ wmin1l
and w˜PEV 1,min1l1l,t ≤ wmin1l .
1We assume that in the case of indifference voters will choose the larger value as minimum wage.
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Examples The following examples in Table 5.1 verify and illustrate Propositions
5 and 6.2 The numbers of workers we use are L1l = 60, 000, L1h = 50, 000 and
L2 = 90, 000. Furthermore, we assume s = 0.3 and β = 0.7. For these parameter
values we obtain wmin1l = 1.05 and w
max
1l = 10.00. Depending on τ
PEV 1
t−1 we obtain
different utility structures.
Table 5.1: Examples for Propositions 5 and 6
τPEV 1t−1 w
PEV 1,min1h
1l,t w˜
crit,1h
1l,t w
PEV 1,min1l
1l,t w˜
crit,1l
1l,t
1 0.1 3.18 9.02 1.32 1.70
2 0.5 2.33 5.00 0.61 0.38
3 2.5 1.00 0.95 0.09 0.02
In example 1, for both the utility functions of sector 1 high-skilled workers and sector
1 low-skilled workers, the utility minimizers 3.18 and 1.32, respectively, are larger than
wmin1l = 1.05. Thus, both cases can be represented by Figure 5.3. Their critical values
w˜crit,1h1l,t (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , ν¯) = 9.02 and w˜
crit,1l
1l,t (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , ν¯) = 1.70 exceed w
min
1l . If w¯1l < 1.70, both
sector 1 voter groups will prefer the market-clearing wage, which in this case obtains
as a short-run equilibrium. If 1.70 ≤ w¯1l < 9.02, the low-skilled workers will prefer w¯1l
but the high-skilled workers will still vote for wmin1l . Since sector 2 workers also prefer
the market-clearing outcome, it will prevail as Condorcet winner. Only if w¯1l ≥ 9.02
will all sector 1 workers choose w¯1l and the crisis outcome obtains.
In the second example, the utility functions of the high-skilled workers in sector 1 can
still be represented by Figure 5.3. However, the utility functions of the low-skilled
workers are represented by Figure 5.4 because the utilities’ minimizer is smaller than
the market-clearing wage and accordingly the critical wage level w˜crit,1l1l,t (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , ν¯) is
also smaller. Hence, the low-skilled will vote for any minimum wage exceeding wmin1l .
Nevertheless, as long as w¯1l < w˜
crit,1h
1l,t (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , ν¯) = 5.00, w
min
1l is the Condorcet winner.
Otherwise, w¯1l is also the preferred wage for the high-skilled workers and the crisis
outcome obtains.
In example 3, both utility functions can be represented by Figure 5.4. The crisis
outcome will obtain for any w¯1l.
5.2.3 Long-Run Political Equilibria
Stability Issues In period zero, voters in sector 1 obtain their critical wage levels
w˜crit,1h1l,0 (τr, ν¯) and w˜
crit,1l
1l,0 (τr, ν¯) depending on the initial tax rate τr (i.e., the tax rate
2For the calculations we used the MAPLE software package.
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that actually satisfies the state’s budget constraint before period zero starts). Then,
the maximum value w¯1l for the minimum wage determines the Condorcet winner in
period zero. The Condorcet winner is w¯1l if w¯1l is at least as large as the larger of the
two both critical wage levels. If it is smaller, the Condorcet winner is wmin1l . Therefore,
the tax rate on which voters base their decisions in period 1 is either τPEV 10 = 0 if
wˆPEV 11l,0 = w
min
1l or τ
PEV 1
0 = τw¯1l if wˆ
PEV 1
1l,0 = w¯1l, where τw¯1l denotes the equilibrium
tax rate if w¯1l is set as minimum wage. Depending on τ
PEV 1
0 , w˜
crit,1h
1l,1 (τ
PEV 1
0 , ν¯) and
w˜crit,1l1l,1 (τ
PEV 1
0 , ν¯) may have changed compared to period zero and thus the Condorcet
winner in period 1 may have changed, too. In the following, we discuss the stability
of this process, i.e., whether a long-run political equilibrium exists or not.
For the critical wage levels of the high-skilled workers of sector 1, we obtain the
following lemma (for proof see appendix).
Lemma 10
The critical wage level w˜crit,1h1l,t (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , ν¯) with w˜
crit,1h
1l,t (
1−s
s
, ν¯) = wmin1l is a continuous
function in τPEV 1t−1 for τ
PEV 1
t−1 ≥ 0 and decreases strictly in τPEV 1t−1 for τPEV 1t−1 6= 1−ss .
From this we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1
(i) If w¯1l and τ
PEV 1
t−1 > 0 such that w¯1l < w˜
crit,1h
1l,t (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , ν¯), then w¯1l < w˜
crit,1h
1l,t (0, ν¯).
(ii) If w¯1l and τ
PEV 1
t−1 < τw¯1l such that w¯1l ≥ w˜crit,1h1l,t (τPEV 1t−1 , ν¯), then w¯1l > w˜crit,1h1l,t (τw¯1l , ν¯).
Corollary 1 implies that the high-skilled workers of sector 1 will hold on to their original
choice in the subsequent period if their original choice was the Condorcet winner. If
they vote for wmin1l and w
min
1l is set, which results in τ
PEV 1
t−1 = 0, they will vote again
for wmin1l in the subsequent period. If they vote on the basis of τ
PEV 1
t−1 for w¯1l and w¯1l
becomes the Condorcet winner in that period, τw¯1l is realized as an equilibrium tax
rate. Then, in the next period, they will vote for w¯1l again.
Note that τPEV 1t−1 cannot exceed τw¯1l because if it did, the corresponding minimum
wage wˆPEV 11l,t−1 would have to be larger than w¯1l as the equilibrium tax rate τ(w1l)
strictly increases in w1l (see equation (3.20)). But a minimum wage wˆ
PEV 1
1l,t−1 > w¯1l is
ruled out by the constitutional court.
With Lemma 10 we obtain the following proposition (for proof see appendix), which
describes the long-run behavior of the economy.
Proposition 7
(i) If w¯1l < w˜
crit,1h
1l,t (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , ν¯), the market-clearing wage w
min
1l is the Condorcet win-
ner in each period from t on. Hence, the market-clearing wage wmin1l obtains as
long-run political equilibrium.
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(ii) If we define
Mnh := {ν | w˜crit,1l1l,t (ν) > w˜crit,1h1l,t (ν) ∧ w˜crit,1l1l,t (ν) > wmin1l }
and
Mh :=M\Mnh
the following holds:
If w¯1l ≥ w˜crit,1h1l,t (τPEV 1t−1 , ν¯) ,(τPEV 1t−1 , ν¯) ∈ Mh, and (τw¯1l , ν¯) ∈ Mh, then w¯1l is
the Condorcet winner in each period from t on. Hence, the crisis outcome w¯1l
obtains as long-run political equilibrium.
Proposition 7 (i) tells us that if the initial tax rate τr and w¯1l are such that w¯1l <
w˜crit,1h1l,t (τr, ν¯), then the market-clearing outcome obtains in all periods. From Proposi-
tion 5 (i) we know that this can be the case for τr <
1−s
s
.
We illustrate the stability of the crisis outcome according to Proposition 7 (ii) with an
example:
Suppose that (τr, ν¯) = (τr, s, β, L1l, L1h, L2
)
= (0.1, 0.3, 0.7, 60000, 50000, 90000). This
parameter vector corresponds to the example of the last section with the initial tax rate
0.1 as τPEV 1t−1 . We know that in this case w
min
1l = 1.05 and w
max
1l = 10.00. Furthermore,
w˜crit,1h1l,0 (τr, ν¯) = 9.02 and w˜
crit,1l
1l,0 (τr, ν¯) = 1.70 and thus (τr, ν¯) ∈ Mh. Suppose the
constitutional court announces that the maximum value for the minimum wage is
w¯1l = 9.5. Then the Condorcet winner in period zero is wˆ
PEV 1
1l,0 = w¯1l = 9.5. If
we insert this value in equation (3.20), we obtain the corresponding equilibrium tax
rate as τw¯1l = 16.9. For (τw¯1l , ν¯) = (16.9, ν¯) we obtain w˜
crit,1h
1l,1 (τw¯1l , ν¯) = 0.031 and
w˜crit,1l1l,1 (τw¯1l , ν¯) = 0.00041 and therefore (τw¯1l , ν¯) ∈ Mh. The maximum wage level w¯1l
is also the Condorcet winner in period 1, which obtains in all following periods since
ν = (τw¯1l , ν¯) does not change any more.
In extensive simulations we were unable to find parameter vectors inMnh.3 Therefore,
we can state the following conjecture:
Conjecture 1 (Long-Run Political Equilibria under PEV1)
The Mnh set is empty.
If so, the long-run equilibrium of the political process is already reached in period zero
and depends upon the critical wage level of the high-skilled workers in sector 1:
If w¯1l < w˜
crit,1h
1l,t (τr, ν¯), then wˆ
PEV 1∗
1l = w
min
1l and
If w¯1l ≥ w˜crit,1h1l,t (τr, ν¯), then wˆPEV 1∗1l = w¯1l,
3Even if Mnh is not empty, the range of parameter constellations in Mnh will be small.
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where τr <∞ is the tax rate that actually satisfies the state’s budget constraint before
period zero starts.
These results follow immediately from Proposition 7, since all ν ∈Mh.
On the other hand, if Mnh is not empty other outcomes could be possible, notably
cycles.
For example, suppose that w¯1l ≥ w˜crit,1h1l,0 (τr, ν¯) and (τr, ν¯) ∈ Mh. Then, wˆPEV 11l,0 = w¯1l
and τPEV 10 = τw¯1l . But if (τw¯1l , ν¯) ∈ Mnh, we cannot exclude the following situation:
w˜crit,1h1l,1 (τw¯1l , ν¯) < w¯1l < w˜
crit,1l
1l,1 (τw¯1l , ν¯). In this case, the Condorcet winner in period
1 is wˆPEV 11l,1 = w
min
1l . Hence, in period 2 voters base their decision on τ
PEV 1
1 = 0 and
we cannot exclude a constellation where w¯1l ≥ w˜crit,1h1l,2 (0, ν¯) and w¯1l ≥ w˜crit,1l1l,2 (0, ν¯). In
this case, we have wˆPEV 11l,2 = w¯1l and τ
PEV 1
2 = τw¯1l . This is the same situation as at the
end of period zero and the process repeats infinitely, i.e., wˆPEV 11l,3 = w
min
1l , wˆ
PEV 1
1l,4 = w¯1l,
wˆPEV 11l,5 = w
min
1l , wˆ
PEV 1
1l,6 = w¯1l, wˆ
PEV 1
1l,7 = w
min
1l , ...
Adjustment in Crises In the following, we analyze two scenarios in which crises
occur. In each scenario, we compare the crisis outcome with the free-market outcome.
We use the real income of voter groups as the measure of comparison. The results are
summarized in Table 5.2.
We analyze an economy with (β, L1l, L1h, L2) = (0.7, 60000, 50000, 90000). In scenario
1, unemployment benefits are 30% of the minimum wage for the low-skilled workers
in sector 1, i.e. s = 0.3. In scenario 2, we assume much higher unemployment benefits
with s = 0.65. The constitutional court announces a maximum wage level w¯1l for the
low-skilled workers guaranteeing a minimum real income of at least 0.09 for each voter
group.
We obtain real income by dividing the net nominal wage by the consumer price index√
p1. This guarantees that consumers with the same real income can realize the same
utility level. In the case of a Cobb-Douglas utility function u = cα1 · cβ2 with α+β = 1,
we can interpret the value of the real income, say 0.09, in the following way: The
utility level corresponding to a real income of 0.09 is reached by assigning α · 0.09
units of good 1 and β ·0.09 units of good 2 to the consumer. In our case, a real income
of 0.09 corresponds to the utility level the consumer can reach with 0.045 units of good
1 and 0.045 units of good 2.
In scenario 1, if the initial tax rate τr is zero, i.e. the market-clearing wage w
min
1l
for the low-skilled workers in sector 1 obtains and there is no unemployment, the
critical wage level for the high-skilled workers of sector 1 is w˜cit,1h1l,t = 10.79. Since
w¯1l = 5.53, the market-clearing wage w
min
1l obtains as long-run political equilibrium.
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Table 5.2: Adjustment in Crises
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
s = 0.3, w¯1l = 5.53 s = 0.65, w¯1l = 3.11
wmin1l = 1.05, w
max
1l = 10.00 w
min
1l = 1.05, w
max
1l = 4.62
w˜crit,1h1l,t w˜
crit,1l
1l,t w˜
crit,1h
1l,t w˜
crit,1l
1l,t
τr = 0.00 10.79 3.08 2.46 0.28
τr = 0.50 5.00 0.38 1.10 0.07
τw¯1l = 1.00 2.87 0.13
τw¯1l = 1.37 0.44 0.02
Voter Group Real Income with Real Income with
wˆPEV 1∗1l = w¯1l wˆ
PEV 1∗
1l = w
min
1l wˆ
PEV 1∗
1l = w¯1l wˆ
PEV 1∗
1l = w
min
1l
∆
L1l
= 0.91 ∆
L1l
= 0.00 ∆
L1l
= 0.86 ∆
L1l
= 0.00
p1 = 8.24 p1 = 1.58 p1 = 6.20 p1 = 1.58
employed low-skilled 1.93 0.83 1.25 0.83
unemployed low-skilled 0.58 0.81
low-skilled expected 0.71 0.83 0.87 0.83
high-skilled 0.09 0.43 0.09 0.43
sector 2 0.17 0.79 0.17 0.79
The constitutional court has set w¯1l = 5.53 as the highest minimum wage because a
slightly higher wage level would reduce at least the high-skilled workers’ real income
to below 0.09.
On the other hand, an initial tax rate of 0.5 generates a critical wage level below 5.53
for the high-skilled and the low-skilled workers in sector 1. In this case, w¯1l = 5.53 is
set as minimum wage and generates a tax rate τw¯1l = 1.00. Again, 5.53 exceeds both
critical wage levels and we have wˆPEV 1∗1l = 5.53 as long-run equilibrium. Under the
assumption that voters are not willing to accept a tax rate that reduces their gross
wages by fifty per cent or more, i.e. τw¯1l ≥ 1.00, a political crisis would occur. If
the political system adjusts to the crisis by reducing the minimum wage to wmin1l or
abolishes wage regulations, all voter groups except the employed low-skilled workers
are better off. The real income of the unemployed low-skilled workers rises from 0.58
to 0.83, the real income of the high-skilled workers from 0.09 to 0.43, and the real
income from workers in sector 2 from 0.17 to 0.79. Only the employed low-skilled
workers do not benefit from a policy change as their real income falls from 1.93 to
0.83. But this group of workers is relatively small because only 9 per cent of all
low-skilled workers are employed under wˆPEV 1∗1l = 5.53 . They lose “only” about one
half of their relatively high real income, whereas the high-skilled workers’ and sector
2 workers’ real incomes rise by about four times the incomes they earn with w¯1l as
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minimum wage. In this sense, a policy change generated by a crisis would lead to more
“distributional fairness” and would reduce unemployment from 91 per cent to zero per
cent. Furthermore, from an ex-ante standpoint (workers do not know whether they
belong to the employed or the unemployed) all low-skilled workers would prefer the
market-clearing wage because their expected real income would rise from 0.71 to 0.83.
In scenario 2, a higher share s from the minimum wage is granted in the form of
unemployment benefits. The minimum wage w¯1l generating the critical real income of
0.09 for at least one voter group is now 3.11. For this minimum wage, with Lemma
10 and Conjecture 1, wˆPEV 1∗1l = w¯1l for all initial tax rates, as 3.11 already exceeds
w˜crit,1h1l for τr = 0. Since τw¯1l = 1.37 exceeds 1.00, scenario 2 would also generate
a political crisis. Again, all voter groups except the employed low-skilled workers
benefit from a policy change to market-clearing minimum wages. Under scenario 2,
the employed low-skilled workers lose less than under scenario 1 because the long-run
outcome wˆPEV 1∗1l = w¯1l is smaller under scenario 2. The gain of the unemployed low-
skilled is relatively small, whereas the high-skilled workers and workers in sector 2 stand
to gain as much as under scenario 1.4 Furthermore, the low-skilled workers as a whole
lose, because their expected real income is somewhat higher with wˆPEV 1∗1l = w¯1l than
with wˆPEV 1∗1l = w
min
1l . Nevertheless, under scenario 2 we also have more distributional
fairness by a policy change from high minimum wages to market-clearing wages.
From the discussion of the actual utility functions, i.e. the perceived utility functions
under GEV, we know that under the given tax regime the high-skilled workers of
sector 1 and the workers of sector 2 always gain from lower minimum wages for the
low-skilled workers. Furthermore, any minimum wage decrease is pareto-superior and
wmin1l is pareto-optimal because the lower the minimum wage, the higher is total output.
The gains in total output could be distributed in such a way that any voter group is
better off compared to w¯1l.
5.3 Interpretation of Results
Under PEV1 voters look at the first goods market:
L˜PEV 11l,t
b˜PEV 11l,t
2p˜PEV 11,t
+ L˜PEV 11h,t
b˜PEV 11h,t
2p˜PEV 11,t
+ L˜PEV 12,t
b˜PEV 12,t
2p˜PEV 11,t
+ ∆˜PEV 1t
b˜PEV 1un,t
2p˜PEV 11,t
= q˜PEV 11,t
If we take into account the fact that the labor markets for the high-skilled workers
of sector 1 and the workers of sector 2 always clear this is equivalent to the following
4The change in real income for workers in sector 2 is very small. It is still about 0.17 in scenario
2.
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equation: (
(1− s)L˜PEV 11l,t + sL1l
) w1l,t
p˜PEV 11,t
+ L1h
w˜PEV 11h,t
p˜PEV 11,t
+ L2
w˜PEV 12,t
p˜PEV 11,t
= 2q˜PEV 11,t (5.9)
From equation (5.9) voters can draw the following qualitative conclusions:
Note first that not much can be said for small changes in w1l,t. Suppose that p˜
PEV 1
1,t
remains constant while w1l,t increases. Then we would have two opposite effects on
the aggregate demand of all low-skilled workers. On the one hand, relative labor costs
(see Definition 2, p. 50) of the low-skilled workers
(
w1l,t(1 + τ˜
PEV 1
t )
)
/p˜PEV 11,t would
increase and therefore L˜PEV 11l,t would decrease since firms’ demand for low-skilled labor
would decrease. On the other hand, real income for each low-skilled worker who would
not lose his job would increase. We do not know the net effect on aggregate demand
of the low-skilled workers without explicitly computing the results for a small change
in minimum wages. Furthermore, aggregate demand of high-skilled workers for good
1 would decrease. The reason is that high-skilled labor and low-skilled labor are com-
plementary inputs and thus - to guarantee clearance of the high-skilled labor market
- relative labor costs for the high-skilled workers
(
w˜PEV 11h,t (1 + τ˜
PEV 1
t )
)
/p˜PEV 11,t have to
decrease when the level of low-skilled labor force goes down. 5 Aggregate demand of
workers in sector 2 for good 1 would remain constant while output in sector 1 would
decrease because L˜PEV 11l,t would have decreased. Qualitatively, it is not clear how p˜
PEV 1
1,t
would have to change to equalize both sides of equation (5.9). A decreasing p˜PEV 11,t
would further increase the relative labor costs of the low-skilled workers. Therefore,
output in sector 1 would decrease even more as would the aggregate demand of high-
skilled workers for good 1. But the effect on the aggregate demand of the low-skilled
workers is unclear whereas aggregate demand of workers in sector 2 would increase.
An increasing p˜PEV 11,t would lead to opposite effects. Both scenarios are conceivable, as
long as the quantitative changes are not analyzed.
But for large changes in w1l,t we can draw some conclusions. Suppose that w1l,t in-
creased starting from wmin1l . Then, upward at least of some level of w1l,t, the price
for good 1, p˜PEV 11,t would have to increase relative to its initial level because otherwise
equation (5.9) would not hold. With constant or decreasing p˜PEV 11,t relative labor costs
of the low-skilled workers of sector 1,
(
w1l,t(1 + τ˜
PEV 1
t )
)
/p˜PEV 11,t would increase and
thus L˜PEV 11l,t would converge to zero. Hence, the output of good 1 would also converge
to zero. But the aggregate demand of the low-skilled workers would increase although
almost all of them would become unemployed. Hence, the left-hand side of equation
5If we know that
(
w˜PEV 11h,t (1+ τ˜
PEV 1
t )
)
/p˜PEV 11,t has to decrease, we know that w˜
PEV 1
1h,t /p˜
PEV 1
1,t will
decrease because τ˜PEV 1t equals τPEV 1t−1 , i.e. it is supposed to remain constant.
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(5.9) would increase more and more, while the right-hand side would converge to zero.
Therefore, upward of a certain level of w1l,t, p˜
PEV 1
1,t would have to increase to guaran-
tee market-clearing for good 1. The argument implies that there would have to be an
upper bound for
(
w1l,t(1 + τ˜
PEV 1
t )
)
/p˜PEV 11,t .
Now we can discuss the utility levels of voters for high values of w1l,t. Since there would
be an upper bound for relative labor costs of the low-skilled workers, the level of the
low-skilled work force could not fall below a certain value. Hence, there would be a
lower bound greater than zero for the relative labor costs of the high-skilled workers,
i.e.
(
w˜PEV 11h,t (1 + τ˜
PEV 1
t )
)
/p˜PEV 11,t could not fall below a certain level because of the
complementarity of labor inputs in sector 1 and market-clearing in the high-skilled
workers’ labor market. Furthermore, we know that p˜PEV 11,t would have to increase if
w1l,t increased at least upward of a certain value of w1l,t. Since relative labor costs
for the high-skilled workers would have a lower bound greater than zero, an infinitely
increasing p˜PEV 11,t would mean that w˜
PEV 1
1h,t also increases infinitely. Thus aggregate
demand of the high-skilled workers in sector 1 for good 2 would rise infinitely if w˜PEV 11h,t
went to infinity, since the nominal price level p˜PEV 12,t is supposed to remain constant at
1. 6 The crucial point here is that voters ignore the second goods market. Therefore,
they assume that each demand level in this market, L˜PEV 1i,t · (b˜PEV 1i,t /2) with i = 1l,
1h, 2, un, can be satisfied. Hence, the high-skilled workers of sector 1 would perceive
an infinite utility level for infinite levels of w1l,t, since the lower bound of
(
w˜PEV 11h,t (1 +
τ˜PEV 1t )
)
/p˜PEV 11,t would guarantee a finite level of aggregate consumption for good 1,
while aggregate demand of high-skilled workers for good 2 could be satisfied infinitely.
Note that this would not have to be the case if voters took into account general
equilibrium feedbacks in the way they perceived an increasing tax rate. Then, there
could be a lower bound greater than zero for
(
w˜PEV 11h,t (1 + τ˜
PEV 1
t )
)
/p˜PEV 11,t with a
decreasing nominal wage w˜PEV 11h,t . Hence, if
(
w˜PEV 11h,t (1 + τ˜
PEV 1
t )
)
/p˜PEV 11,t converged to
a lower bound utility of high-skilled workers would fall and not rise.
Since the wages of workers in sector 2 w˜PEV 12,t are supposed to remain constant and the
price of good 1 would rise infinitely, their perceived aggregate consumption for good
1 would converge to zero, while their aggregate consumption for good 2 would not
change. Hence - according to the relevant Cobb-Douglas utility function - their utility
level would converge to zero.
From equation (5.9) and considerations with relative labor costs, we cannot draw
conclusions for relative labor costs of the low-skilled work force for high values of w1l,t.
We cannot exclude a situation where
(
w1l,t(1+ τ˜
PEV 1
t )
)
/p˜PEV 11,t converges to zero when
6Voters “normalize” the price of good 2 to 1.
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w1l,t approaches infinity. If the relative labor costs of the low-skilled work force did,
we would have a trade-off between infinitely small values of w1l,t/p˜
PEV 1
1,t and infinitely
high values for L˜PEV 11l,t . It is not clear in this case whether aggregate demand of the
low-skilled workers for good 1 would decrease or increase in w1l,t. If it decreased, the
perceived consumption of good 1 for one low-skilled worker would converge to zero,
but on the other hand, the perceived consumption of good 2 would approach infinity.
The resulting effect on utility would be unclear.
But if voters assumed that relative labor costs would not fall below the value where
all L1l low-skilled workers were employed because it is not possible to employ more
low-skilled workers than actually exist, they would perceive that the low-skilled utility
level would approach infinity if w1l,t approaches infinity. The consumption of good 1
by all low-skilled workers would be finite because production of good 1 would be finite
and their consumption of good 2 would approach infinity.
Note that the assumption of a lower bound for the real wages of the low-skilled workers
- i.e. their relative labor costs cannot fall below the market-clearing level - helps to
explain the perceived economic outcomes, although it is not explicitly given under
PEV1. Nevertheless, it does not contradict the assumptions made under PEV1, i.e.
constancy of sector-2 variables, constancy of the tax rate and market-clearing in the
first goods market.
We have shown that the perceived utility levels of the high-skilled and low-skilled
workers of sector 1 would approach infinity if w1l,t approached infinity. But we also
know that both utility functions would have exactly one minimizer, which means that
for low levels of w1l,t the utility levels would decrease in w1l,t. If we take into account
the analytical results, the reason for this behavior could be that perceived employment
would be supposed to decrease if minimum wages increased (see equation 5.5). With
decreasing employment of low-skilled workers in sector 1, output in sector 1 decreases.
Hence, aggregate consumption of all voter groups has to decrease, too. Consequently,
we could have a negative effect on all utility levels from rising unemployment. Notably,
low-skilled workers who lose their jobs receive less money. Furthermore, a decrease in
the low-skilled labor force has a negative effect on labor demand for high-skilled workers
and thus a negative effect on their nominal wage. But if minimum wages increased
further, these negative effects would be balanced out at some point by increasing
nominal wage levels w1l,t and w˜
PEV 1
1h,t . They generate increasing perceived demand
levels in goods market 2 which are assumed to be satisfied. On the other hand - as
shown above - perceived aggregate demand of high-skilled and low-skilled workers in
goods market 1 could not fall below some finite level and thus utility levels would rise
infinitely.
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This argument can also help to explain Conjecture 1 (Long-Run Political Equilibria
under PEV1). The critical wage level of the low-skilled workers could be smaller than
that of the high-skilled workers because the negative effects of decreasing employment
on the utility functions of low-skilled workers are reduced by unemployment benefits.
Therefore, smaller values of w1l,t than those for the high-skilled workers may suffice to
balance out the negative effect of decreasing employment on the perceived consumption
of good 1.
Intuitively, the argument with negative effects caused by decreasing employment could
also explain the falling critical wage level of high-skilled workers w˜crit,1h1l,t for increasing
tax rates τPEV 1t−1 : The higher the initial tax rate in a given period, the higher initial
unemployment will be. Thus, additional unemployment could not cause much addi-
tional “damage” to the high-skilled workers’ utility levels. The negative effects would
have been balanced out for relatively low levels of w1l,t if initial unemployment had
already been relatively high.
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6.1 Robustness
We have seen that under each misleading view - PEV and PEV1 - two groups of voters
always prefer a minimum wage that exceeds the market-clearing wage. Depending
on wmax1l and constitutional rules, this can lead to political outcomes which do not
correspond to the free-market outcome and hence are not efficient. The question
arises whether this result - i.e., the political process can lead to inefficient economic
outcomes - is also achieved from other views.
In the following we look at three additional views. Views 1 and 2 correspond to PEV
and PEV1 respectively but voters assume that the nominal price level in the first
sector does not change while p˜2,t varies in w1l,t. Under View 3, voters assume that the
relative price of good 1 and 2 does not change.
We discuss our considerations for the same parameter values as in the preceding sec-
tions for GEV, PEV and PEV1: s = 0.75, β = 0.4, L1l = 70, 000, L1h = 50, 000,
L2 = 100, 000 and τt−1 = 0.
Under View 1 and 2, voters “normalize” the price for good 1, p˜1,t = 1, and let p˜2,t
change with the minimum wage. In this case, perceived profits in the second sector
no longer have to be zero because they are given by:
p˜i2,t = p˜2,tq˜2,t − w˜2,t(1 + τ˜t)L˜2,t
= p˜2,tL2 − 1
1 + τt−1
(1 + τt−1)L2
= p˜2,tL2 − L2 (6.1)
Clearly, if p˜2,t 6= 1 profits would not be zero. Under PEV and PEV1, profits were
always zero since voters assumed p˜2,t = 1.
Under Views 1 and 2, perceived profits in the first sector are still zero, since firms
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are perceived to be able to adapt their labor demands to the corresponding first-order
conditions (see equations 3.12 and 3.13) with p˜1,t = 1.
1
Under View 1, voters assume p˜1,t = 1 and clear the second goods market. We observe
that the utility functions of all voter groups and the price function for good 2 are
U-shaped. All voters would prefer a minimum wage w1l,t that would be as high as
possible.
The reason is the following: Upward of some level of w1l,t, p˜2,t would have to increase
to diminish real aggregate demand of the low-skilled workers for good 2. Otherwise
their demand would be higher than q˜2,t = L2. On the other hand, aggregate real
demand of the high-skilled workers in sector 1 and workers in sector 2 resulting from
profits would amount to 1
2
p˜i2,t
p˜2,t
= 1
2
(L2− L2p˜2,t ). Since the upper bound in real aggregate
demand of high-skilled workers and workers of sector 2 would be less than q˜2,t = L2
2, real aggregate demand of all low-skilled workers for good 2 would be greater than
zero. Thus real aggregate demand of each voter group for good 2 would be greater than
zero. Furthermore, at least aggregate demand for good 1 for all low-skilled workers of
sector 1 and workers of sector 2 would increase if w1l,t increased, because w2,t remains
constant and p˜i2,t
p˜2,t
would strictly increase. Hence, these groups would always prefer
a higher minimum wage. Note that this only holds because voters wrongly assume
that their demand for good 1 can be satisfied, which is actually not the case. Note
furthermore that these considerations do not depend on parameter values.
Under View 2, we have p˜1,t = 1 and clearance of the first goods market. For the
parameter values given above, this results in a U-shaped utility function for the low-
skilled workers of sector 1 and workers of sector 2. Both approach infinity for a value
of w1l,t that is greater than w
min
1l but smaller than w
max
1l . U˜1h,t strictly decreases as p˜2,t
does. The price for good 2 reaches zero for a value of w1l,t between w
min
1l and w
max
1l .
How can we explain this behavior? Voters look at the first goods market. An increasing
w1l,t with constant τ˜t and p˜1,t would lead to a decreasing output of good 1 and - at
least upward of some level of w1l,t - to an increasing aggregate real demand of all
low-skilled workers for good 1. Obviously, this contradictory effect concerning goods
market-clearing would lead to a maximum value of w1l,t beyond which the economy
would collapse, since the first goods market could not be cleared with positive prices.
The price for good 2 would have to diminish to reduce profits and therefore the real
aggregate demand of all high-skilled workers and sector 2 workers for good 1. Real
aggregate demand of all low-skilled workers and workers of sector 2 for good 1 would
1The production technology exhibits constant returns to scale.
2If w1l,t rises, the perceived nominal wage for the high-skilled workers, w˜1h,t, will diminish since
employment of the low-skilled workers will decrease.
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be positive. The latter would hold because the sector 2 workers’ budget would equal
L2
(
w˜2,t +
p˜i2,t
L1h+L2
)
and the costs that would reduce profits for sector 2 workers as
firm owners are channeled back to them as wages. Hence, as long as p˜2,t > 0 their
budget would be strictly positive. On the other hand, since p˜2,t would approach zero
and budgets are strictly positive, perceived aggregate consumption of the low-skilled
workers and sector 2 workers for good 2 would approach infinity. Thus, their utility
levels would do so too. The high-skilled workers of sector 1 would lose if minimum
wages increased, because profits would become negative and w˜1h,t would approach
zero. This is because employment of the low-skilled workers would approach zero and
both labor factors are complementary. Again, these considerations do not depend on
parameter values.
Under View 3 voters assume that relative prices between good 1 and good 2 will remain
constant, together with w˜2,t and τ˜t. Voters assume that all goods markets are cleared
automatically and do not look at them for their considerations. For our computations
we take the free-market solution for goods prices, p˜1,t = 1.58 and p˜2,t = 1. Then,
profits would be zero and we obtain the following outcome: The utility function of
the low-skilled workers is U-shaped, the utility function of the high-skilled workers
strictly decreases and the utility level of sector 2 workers is constant. Sector 1 low-
skilled workers would clearly gain from rising minimum wages, because prices would
be constant. They prefer a minimum wage that is as high as possible. The high-skilled
workers would lose, since employment of the low-skilled workers would decrease and
thus the firms’ demand for their labor would also decrease. Consequently, w˜1h,t would
decrease if employment decreased with rising minimum wages. The utility of sector 2
workers would be completely unaffected, since goods prices and w˜2,t are perceived to
remain constant.
Summing up the results we find that, in four out of five misleading views, at least
two voter groups prefer a minimum wage that is as high as possible, as long as they
consider the level of w1l,t to be economically feasible. Hence, in these cases political
outcomes can occur that may lead to crises. In the case with fixed relative good prices,
the outcome depends upon whether there are more low-skilled workers or high-skilled
workers or what sector 2 workers will vote for in the case of indifference.
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6.2 Overall Comparison
6.2.1 Economic Results
In the following, we derive some conclusions that illustrate the structure of misleading
beliefs that voters entertain.
Under the assumptions of a constant tax rate, constant nominal wages for workers in
sector 2 and a constant nominal price level for one good, voters consider how economic
variables have to behave to secure clearance of the respective market, e.g. goods market
2 under PEV. Given the minimum wage for the low-skilled workers, they have to adapt
the perceived demand functions of voter groups in the market analyzed. The crucial
point is that they assume that their demand for goods in the market they do not
look at is completely satisfied. But this is actually not true because their assumptions
are wrong, i.e., they do not take into account all general equilibrium effects.3 Only
if voters looked at both markets could they recognize contradictory effects resulting
from their assumptions and perhaps revise their views.
Under PEV, clearance of the second goods market and redistribution to the low-
skilled workers would require a decreasing demand of high-skilled workers for good 2
and thus a decreasing price p˜PEV1,t for good 1: Voters only look indirectly at the first
goods market via the demand of high-skilled workers for good 2, which would have
to diminish. This can only be accomplished by a decrease in w˜PEV1h,t . Consequently,
p˜PEV1,t also has to decrease, since clearance of the high-skilled labor market requires
constant relative labor costs (see Definition 2, p. 50). Since the nominal wage of
workers in sector 2 is assumed to remain constant, this leads to the perception of an
ever-increasing utility level for workers in sector 2. As w˜PEV2,t would remain constant
while p˜PEV1,t would converge to zero, the perceived satisfied demand for good 1 rises
infinitely.
In contrast, under PEV1, voters perceive that output of good 1 decreases if minimum
wages for the low-skilled workers increase. Therefore, they also perceive (correctly) a
rising price level for good 1. Hence, workers in sector 2 are assumed to lose wealth
if the minimum wage is increased, as their nominal wage level w˜PEV 12,t is assumed to
remain constant. But to guarantee market-clearing under the PEV1 assumptions,
employment of the low-skilled workers must not converge to zero.4 Since low-skilled
and high-skilled labor are complementary inputs, high-skilled workers in sector 1 are
3Under GEV they take into account all general equilibrium repercussions. Hence the view of only
one market is not misleading.
4If employment of low-skilled workers converged to zero, output would also converge to zero, while
real wages of the low-skilled would approach infinity. This cannot be a market equilibrium.
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perceived to have a finite consumption level of good 1 and - as w˜PEV 11h,t would increase
- an infinite consumption level for good 2.5 Hence, under PEV1 they would gain from
rising minimum wages.
Similarly, under Views 1 and 2, two voter groups perceive increasing utility levels with
a rising minimum wage w1l,t because they assume that the demand on the markets
they do not observe is satisfied. The same holds for low-skilled workers under View 3.
They are the only group that is always perceived to gain from higher minimum wages
(except under GEV).
A further observation is that voters perceive a maximum value for w1l,t beyond which
the economy will collapse if they analyze the goods market for which the price is
assumed to remain constant. These are PEV and View 1. The reason is that only an
increasing price level could guarantee market-clearing if nominal budgets of the low-
skilled workers rose with rising minimum wages. But if the price is assumed to remain
constant, market-clearing will be impossible upward of some level of w1l,t, because the
low-skilled workers’ real budget will exceed the output of the respective good.
6.2.2 Political Results
If we look at the political outcomes under PEV and PEV1, we find that crises can
be self-increasing. The higher the last period’s equilibrium tax rate, the more likely
voters are to vote for higher minimum wages.
The short-run political equilibrium under PEV, wˆPEV1l,t strictly increases in the last
period’s tax rate τPEVt−1 = (2− sβ)t(1+ τr)− 1 (see Proposition 2), which itself strictly
increases in t. One possible interpretation is that with an increasing tax rate the
perceived nominal wage in sector 2, w˜PEV2,t decreases. Hence - in the perception of
voters - more wealth can be redistributed to the low-skilled workers before their real
demand for good 2 exceeds output in the second sector and the economy collapses.
The maximum value for the minimum wage would increase and with it the value of
the Condorcet winner wˆPEV1l,t in the perspective period.
Under PEV1, we observe that w˜crit,1h1l,t falls if τ
PEV
t−1 rises, i.e., the higher the last period’s
tax rate, the more “likely” the highest possible minimum wage w¯1l is to exceed w˜
crit,1h
1l,t .
Thus the inefficient outcome w¯1l obtains. We could explain this voting behavior as
a kind of fatalism. Since the last period’s unemployment is already high together
with high tax rates, voters cannot lose much more if unemployment increases further.
They would vote for the highest possible minimum wage because benefits from more
5Because p˜PEV 11,t would increase, the perceived nominal wage w˜
PEV 1
1h,t has to increase in order to
guarantee clearance of the high-skilled workers’ labor market.
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redistribution to the low-skilled workers are perceived to be higher than the losses
connected with higher unemployment.
6.3 Conclusions
In this part of the thesis we gave an additional explanation for the persistence of
inefficient regulations and the emergence of crises in democracies. Inefficiencies in
market regulations can arise because voters have incorrect views about the economy.
We showed that neglecting general equilibrium repercussions from the regulated sector
on the rest of the economy (i.e., the unregulated sector and the tax rate) can lead
voters to set regulations that are not only detrimental to the economy as a whole
(total output) but also damage their own welfare. Even if a crisis occurs, reforms that
result in efficient regulations can only take place with certainty if people anticipate
general equilibrium effects correctly. However, crises can induce a better recognition of
general equilibrium effects which will trigger a reversal of bad times. If this argument
is significant enough, the question emerges whether it is possible for democracies to
adopt GEV early on and thus avoid the painful cleansing effect caused by crises.
Whether institutional frameworks for democracies exist that can trigger GEV is the
question we will try to answer in Part II.
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7.1 Introduction
We have shown in Part I that neglecting general equilibrium effects can lead to in-
efficient political decisions concerning governmental regulations. The reason is that
voters’ ignorance causes them to draw wrong conclusions from the degree of regulation
to outcomes.
Our main focus in the first part has been the non-awareness of general equilibrium
repercussions by the decision makers which can actually result in inefficient outcomes.
We have not focused on the political process itself. Therefore, we have simply assumed
a direct translation of economic viewpoints into political outcomes: The Median-voter
announces his ideal point which is immediately proposed and implemented by parties.
If we asked for institutional remedies of the crisis problem within this simple political
framework we would have to solve a very difficult problem: We would have to find a
way to make the voter use “rational” devices of decision-making. An economic crisis
could certainly promote efforts in doing so but the reverse could also be true, i.e.,
because of bad economic conditions voters wouldn’t have enough time and money to
gather the relevant information and make complex decisions.
In the following, we will take a mental process which generates a special view as given.
We assume that some views exist exogenously and the problem of an efficient decision
is a political one in selecting a correct view. We will interpret the persistence of a
crisis as a possible outcome of a voting game in which the existence of a misleading
economic view is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for persistence: The crisis
is driven by a combination of a misleading view and the specific characteristics of the
decision process we will analyze. On the other hand, the reversal of a detrimental
development is due to the adoption of a correct viewpoint. This view emerges in
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response to the observation of economic problems. Whether this view is adopted by
voters is a question of the political process itself.
The crisis arises since economic conditions have changed, but economic policy is still
orientated towards an economic view that has led to high output under the economic
conditions of the past. Although the correct viewpoint on the present conditions exists,
agents are uncertain about which theory of the economy is the appropriate one.
There is much empirical evidence for the possible persistence of a policy that has be-
come inappropriate due to a change in economic environment. For example, Ljungqvist
and Sargent (1998) explain the high European unemployment rates by an increasing
“welfare state”. Although economic conditions have changed rapidly from the mid
1970s on, many Western European countries have continued with their policy of rising
unemployment benefits. Ljungqvist and Sargent argue that this policy together with
the effects of “globalization”1 are a main cause for the persistent rise in European
unemployment after there had been low rates until the 1970s. In contrast, the United
States have been much more restrictive in granting unemployment benefits, and, at
the same time, have much lower unemployment rates. Another example is presented
by Rodrik (1996), who observes that many countries in Latin America responded to
a severe debt crisis in the 1980s by tightening already existing trade restrictions. The
market-oriented reforms adequate to the changed economic environment were endorsed
only after a time lag of several years.
In the following analysis, our concern will be under which conditions incorrect views
prevail, as well as under which conditions and by which means they can be removed
by a correct viewpoint. For this, we discuss a voting game in which the incumbent
party has office concerns but also has partisan concerns. The latter concerns favor
the detrimental policy of the past. Voters are not only uncertain about the correct
state of the world but also about the actual economic goals of the incumbent party,
i.e., whether it supports its partisans primarily, or rather the interests of the Median-
voter who suffers from the crisis. Therefore and because information is costly for the
incumbent party, the party’s platform may not reveal the correct view, even though the
party in office is able to discover this view since it has the corresponding governmental
resources. Hence, information transmission from the incumbent party via its political
platform is subject to a signaling game.
It results that even if the governmental party reveals its information, this may not be
fully recognized by voters. Nevertheless, if the proposed platform is ”credible”enough
to voters, they may approve it. Thus, a policy reversal may occur without fully
1These effects are for example the adoption of information technologies, increasing international
trade, or the restructuring from manufacturing to the service industry.
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recognized information revelation or even with an uninformed party. We find two
possible scenarios that can lead to a policy reversal.
Firstly, when the costs of information for the incumbent party are large relative to
maximal losses of voters from a wrong policy, opportunistic behavior of the incumbent
party “accidentally” induces it to propose the correct policy when the crisis is severe
enough. The party has no incentive to gather information and just proposes the policy
risk-averse voters approve with higher probability. This is the opposite policy to that
which has been implemented so far.
Secondly, the probability of reversal is higher, the higher the probability that the gov-
ernmental party informs. The incentive to inform increases when information costs
are low relative to maximal voter losses of reform and when the possible reform pro-
posals are very risky since they are very large. One intuitive result is that when the
governmental party proposes a very large reform which is in opposition to its partisan
interests, voters know with certainty that the party is informed and proposes the cor-
rect state of the world. In this case of information being revealed, a reversal occurs
with certainty.
In the remainder of this chapter we formalize the idea of two competing viewpoints
in the political sphere, where both claim to explain the economy in the correct way.
Two parties run for office, each of them proposing a political platform which consists
of a theory about the functioning of the economy (viewpoint) and a corresponding
economic policy proposal. The outcome of this voting game determines whether a
policy that supports a crisis persists or whether a policy reversal occurs. We describe
the equilibrium concept and derive the equilibria of the game in Chapters 8 and 9.
A discussion of the equilibria’s characteristics can be found in Sections 10.1 to 10.3.
Sections 10.4 to 10.6 consist of extensions of the model and a concrete analysis con-
cerning the conditions of policy reversal. In Section 10.7, we relax some assumptions
and analyze the robustness of our model. Section 10.8 concludes.
7.2 Model
7.2.1 Agents, Views and Preferences
We adapt our model from Part I. There are three voter groups, L, M and R with
policy preferences which can differ from each other. Again, each voter group has less
than fifty per cent of votes. Therefore, to gain a majority of votes, a proposal must
be supported by at least two voter groups.
Economic conditions are related to some forms of regulation, e.g., a minimum wage.
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The regulation is represented by a “regulation parameter” w ∈ [0, 1]. This parameter
represents the relative size of regulation. If w = 0 there is no regulation, e.g. the
minimum wage level equals the market-clearing wage level. If w = 1 we have maxi-
mum regulation, e.g. the minimum wage has the highest economically feasible level.
There is a direct relationship between total consumption and the parameter. There-
fore, total consumption of voter groups can be represented by consumption functions
cL(w), cM(w), and cR(w), which depend on regulation w. We assume a Cobb-Douglas
utility function and thus risk aversion of voters
Ui(ci(w)) =
√
ci(w) (7.1)
where i = L,M,R.
Agents are ex-ante uncertain about the consequences of regulation. In the political
sphere, there are two different views v - or theories - about the mapping of policies
into outcomes.2 We call them P and G (, i.e., v ∈ {P,G}) and assume that each
of them suggests consumption functions with a linear relationship between regulation
and consumption level. We denote the functions by cPi (w) and c
G
i (w). The highest
consumption level for each group is c¯ and the lowest level is c, where c¯ > c > 0. For the
L-group, the relationship between regulation and consumption is strictly positive. Ac-
cording to both views, L-voters reach their maximal consumption level c¯ with maximal
regulation w = 1, i.e. cPL(1) = c
G
L(1) = c¯, and their minimal consumption level with
w = 0, i.e. cPL(0) = c
G
L(0) = c. The opposite holds for the R-group. Both P and G
suggest a strictly negative relationship between regulation and consumption. R-voters
always maximize their consumption with minimal regulation, i.e. cPR(0) = c
G
R(0) = c¯.
Only group M ′s ideal point depends on views P and G. According to P , voter group
M ′s highest consumption level c¯ is reached if w = 1, whereas, according to G, group
M would like to have no regulation at all, i.e. w = 0. Denoting the difference between
maximum and minimum consumption as ∆c = c¯ − c, the described relationships can
be summarized by the following equations (see also Figures 7.1 and 7.2):
cPL(w) = c + w∆c
cPM(w) = c + w∆c (7.2)
cPR(w) = c¯− w∆c
and
cGL(w) = c + w∆c
cGM(w) = c¯− w∆c (7.3)
cGR(w) = c¯− w∆c
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Figure 7.1: Consumption of voter groups when θ = P
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Figure 7.2: Consumption of voter groups when θ = G
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The public consists of voter groups L, M , R and two competing parties j, where j =
l, r. One of the two views v corresponds to the real state of the world θ ∈ Θ = {P,G},
i.e., either θ = G, if G is the correct view, or θ = P , if P is the correct view. Agents
assign each view a subjective probability of 1
2
to represent the actual state of the world.
We assume that ex-ante - without any additional information - no public group can
decide which view is correct. Only the party in government is able to find the real
state if it is willing to incur information costs k > 0. The party that holds office has
the ability to find the correct view with certainty because the government has access
to information resources which the other public groups (opposition party and voters)
usually do not have.3
From now on, we will assume that the l-party is currently in office and runs for
reelection.
The l-party has both office and economic concerns.4 The latter may coincide with
its partisans’ interests. We assume that it adheres to the L-group (partisan group).
Additionally, the l-party cares about voter group M ′s interests. The weight that
the party assigns the interests of M relative to the adhered L-group’s interests is
represented by the factor αl ∈ {[0, 1] \ 12}. This factor measures the impact which
the consumption levels of the respective voter groups have on the party’s utility level.
Furthermore, the benefit of holding office if reelected is Bαl = B, with B > 0. If
l is not reelected, then Bαl = 0. If l acquires information it has to incur costs of
kαl = k, with k > 0. If l does not acquire information then kαl = 0. All in all, the
state-dependent (θ = P or θ = G) utility level U θl (αl) of the l-party after elections can
be described as
U θl (αl) = Bαl + αlc
θ
M + (1− αl)cθL − kαl (7.4)
In the following, we take Bαl and kαl as given and examine which policy w the l-party
prefers depending on the real state of the world θ. This means that we focus on the
party’s economic concerns and assume that it makes no strategic considerations.
Firstly, suppose that θ was P . If we apply equations (7.2) to (7.4), we can conclude
that the party would realize the following utility level:
UPl (αl) = Bαl + c + w∆c− kαl (7.5)
If l knew that θ = P , it would always prefer w = 1.
2For models about political decision processes where there is uncertainty about the consequences
of policies, see e.g. Austen-Smith (1990, 1993) or Roemer (1994).
3For example, Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) or Lupia (1992) use this type of information
asymmetry in their models of information transmission between voters and agenda setters.
4That the utility functions of parties can have both office and economic policy components is
widely discussed and used in literature, see e.g. Alesina (1987) or Rogoff and Sibert (1988).
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In the case of θ = G, we obtain
UGl (αl) = Bαl + c + αl∆c− (2αl − 1)w∆c− kαl (7.6)
In this case, l would choose w = 1 if αl <
1
2
, and w = 0 if αl >
1
2
.
Thus, with respect to equations (7.5) and (7.6), we can conclude:
If αl <
1
2
, the party’s economic preferences always coincide with the preferences of
its partisans. If αl >
1
2
, its economic preferences always coincide with the preferences
of M . Thus, we can interpret αl as the weight the party assigns to the M -group’s
consumption level. In the case of αl >
1
2
, the weight is in favor of M , otherwise it is
in favor of the partisan group, L.
Henceforth, we will say that the l-party has “economic concerns” when we generally
refer to the components of l’s utility function consisting of voter groups’ consumption
level.
7.2.2 The Voting Game
The l-party is currently in office and runs for reelection. So far, it has implemented
policy w = wsq >
1
2
.
In the election campaign parties announce their view v and a corresponding value
of the regulation parameter w. Therefore, a party’s proposal is a pair (v, w). For
convenience, we denote it wv.5
Since M is the only group for which its ideal regulation w depends on θ (see equations
(7.2) and (7.3)), whereas L always prefers w = 1 and R always wants w = 0, M is the
decisive voter group. Therefore, to gain a majority of voters, a party must convince
the M -group that its view v is the correct one. M -voters are the only group that
represents the Median-voter in both possible states of the world.
If a party claims P to be the correct view, the party can only be convincing if it
proposes a regulation value wP that is higher than wsq. The opposite holds if a party
proposes G. In that case wG has to be smaller than wsq.
Since only the incumbent party can know with certainty what the correct view is, only
l′s announcement is considered by voters although they cannot observe whether l has
actually informed. If M accepts l′s proposed view, l is reelected.
If M does not find l′s proposal convincing, M -voters prefer a change in government
and the challenger, the r-party, gains power. One might think of this as a kind of
5Roemer (1994) analyzes a voting game where the platform of parties consists of a policy and a
theory about the economy, i.e., ”the function that maps policies into economic outcomes”.
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punishment of l for not being convincing as a potentially well informed governmental
party. Therefore, M votes for r even if r proposes the same view as l.
We assume that the r-party does not behave strategically. No matter what l announces,
the r-party proposes a small P -reform. We denote this proposal by wPr , where w
P
r >
wsq.
6 In the next section, we will give the reasons for this behavior of r.
Furthermore, there are four reform proposals in the political sphere which the govern-
mental l-party can choose from during its campaign: A large G-reform, denoted by
wGb , a small G-reform, w
G
s , where w
G
b < w
G
s < wsq, and a large and a small P -reform,
where wPb > w
P
s > wsq. The order of all possible proposals in the political sphere will
be presented and discussed in the next section, Section 7.2.3, as well as in Section 8.2
(Assumption 5 “Order of Proposals”, p. 95).
After elections, the winning party actually implements its announced policy proposal.
In addition to the uncertainty of voters concerning the real state of the world, they
are also uncertain about the l-party’s real preferences, i.e., the parameter αl. They
do not know whether l values higher the interests of its partisans, the L-voters, or
the interests of the Median-voters, the M -group. Hence, there are two types of l with
different values of αl. One type which we denote α
L
l favors the L-group, whereas the
second type, αMl favors M . Therefore, we assume that α
L
l <
1
2
and αMl >
1
2
. (For
convenience, we use αLl and α
M
l to denote both, the type of l but also the corresponding
value of αl.) The l-party knows its type but all other agents do not. They correctly
assign probabilities λ to αLl and (1− λ) to αMl , where 0 < λ < 1.
In the following, we will describe timing and strategies in detail. The relevant players
are only l and M because r, L and R do not behave strategically, i.e, their actions do
not depend on the actions of the other public groups. We distinguish six stages (the
game tree is illustrated in Figure C.1, p. 206):
Stage 1 Nature chooses l′s type with probabilities Prob(αLl ) = λ and Prob(α
M
l ) =
1− λ. The type is only known to l.
Stage 2 The l-party decides whether to inform about the real state of the world. If
l informs, it incurs costs of k. Voters cannot observe whether l gathers information.
Stage 3 Only if l has informed, does it learn the real state of the world with certainty.
If it is not informed, l does not learn about θ and assigns subjective probabilities of 1
2
6In Section 10.4, we will analyze the case where r proposes G.
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to each possible state (nature draws the correct state). M also assigns Prob(P ) = 1
2
and Prob(G) = 1
2
.
Stage 4 Given the information of stage 3, l makes a proposal wv to the electorate.
It can make four proposals: wGb , w
G
s , w
P
s , or w
P
b .
Stage 5 M decides whether to accept the proposal. If it is accepted, l is reelected
and implements wv. If M does not accept, r gains power and implements its small
reform proposal wPr .
Stage 6 The payoff for l is realized. Payoffs for M -voters from consumption are
realized.
For their strategic considerations,M -voters and the l-party calculate their (subjective)
expected payoffs by equations (7.1), (7.2), (7.3), (7.5), and with Prob(P ) = Prob(G) =
1
2
.
At stage 2, depending on its type αl ∈ Al = {αLl , αMl }, l has to decide whether to
gather information. More precisely, it has to decide about its probability of gathering
information. The l-party chooses the action ı ∈ I = {i, i¯}, where i stands for “inform”
and i¯ for “not inform”. A (behavior) strategy for the l-party must specify a function,
we denote it by σIl (αl), which assigns each type αl of l a probability distribution
σl(· | αl) over I: σIl (αl) = σl(· | αl). The probability distribution σl(· | αl) assigns
probabilities to each possible action ı. Formally, we can write
σIl : αl 7−→ σl(· | αl) (7.7)
where ∑
ı∈I
σl(ı | αl) = 1
∀ αl ∈ Al.
At stage 4, the l-party makes a proposal wv ∈ Π = {wGb , wGs , wPs , wPb }. The proposal
wv which the l-party makes depends on its type, whether it has informed or not, and
- if it has informed - on the observed state of the world θ. The l-party defines a
function σΠl (αl, ı, θ) which assigns each vector (αl, ı, θ) ∈ Al×I×Θ = P a probability
distribution σl(· | αl, ı, θ) over Π: σΠl (αl, ı, θ) = σl(· | αl, ı, θ). This means that
σΠl : (αl, ı, θ) 7−→ σl(· | αl, ı, θ) (7.8)
where ∑
wv∈Π
σl(w
v | αl, ı, θ) = 1
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∀ (αl, ı, θ) ∈ P .
For example, if σl(w
P
b | αLl , i, P )) = 23 and σl(wPs | αLl , i, P )) = 13 then l′s strategy at
stage 4 is to play wv = wPb with probability
2
3
and wv = wPs with probability
1
3
when
it has type αLl , and, after it has informed, it learns that θ = P .
After l has announced wv, the election process is over for the l-party. Hence, a strategy
for l can be completely described as a pair (σIl , σ
Π
l ).
At stage 5, M must decide whether it accepts l′s proposal wv. M takes the action
e ∈ E = {a, a¯}, where a means “accept the proposal” and a¯ means “do not accept
the proposal”. Stage 5 marks the end of the game. Therefore, M ′s strategy can be
completely defined by a function σEM(w
v) which assigns each possible proposal wv ∈ Π
of the l-party a probability distribution σM(· | wv) over E :
σEM : w
v 7−→ σM(· | wv) (7.9)
where ∑
e∈E
σM(e | wv) = 1
∀ wv ∈ Π.
7.2.3 The Starting Point: Crisis and Reform Proposals
In order to analyze the phenomenon of a crisis we have to specify the basic conditions
in which a crisis can occur. We start with the fundamental assumption of our model.
Assumption 1 (The Real State of the World is G)
From now on, we assume that the real state of the world is G. The correct state G
is only known to an informed outside observer. In contrast, agents within the voting
model, i.e., voters and political parties, ex-ante do not know what the correct state of
the world is. Therefore, the voting game has to be analyzed as if nature drew θ during
the game with probabilities Prob(P ) = 1
2
and Prob(G) = 1
2
.
Economic conditions deteriorate because in the last periods w has been set “according
to P”, the incorrect view. Meanwhile, the status quo regulation parameter wsq is
assumed to be larger than 1
2
, i.e., wsq >
1
2
.
If we say “according to P” we mean that policy is set as if all public groups believed
that P was the real state of the world and therefore the optimal regulation for a
majority of voters (in this caseM and L) would have been implemented. This situation
is equivalent to a situation where the M -group alone could decide which regulation
parameter is implemented under the assumption that M -voters believed that the real
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state of the world was P . In this sense, the M -group is representative for a majority
of voters because it is the decisive group: R-voters always vote for w = 0, i.e., minimal
regulation, and L-voters always vote for w = 1, i.e., maximal regulation (see equations
(7.2) and (7.3)). Only the optimal choice for M depends on what M believes is the
correct view of the economy.
If policy is set according to P but the real state of the world is G, a crisis can occur
since a majority of voters, the R-group and the M -group, experiences a reduction
in their consumption levels, which they wouldn’t have suffered if policy was made in
accordance with the correct view, i.e., G. In a crisis, not all groups have to be worse
off. Even in difficult economic situations there may always be a subgroup of society
that gains from the deterioration, although this group may be relatively small.
We interpret P as a longstanding viewpoint which has developed over a large period of
time. It could prevail because it was the correct view in the past. Recently however,
basic conditions, economically, politically or both, have changed.7 As a consequence,
P is no longer an appropriate description of reality, and thus, suggests the wrong
policy. This is not clear to society ex-ante. The public observes economic problems
and starts a debate over whether P is still correct. Under these conditions, the G-view
emerges as an alternative in the public discussion.
We assume that information about the actual state of the world is uncertain for voters
because the economic situation is so complex that most people are not able to in-
form themselves, e.g., because of time or budget restrictions. Therefore, society needs
people who specialize in gaining knowledge about the economy. We call these people
“experts”. But even experts are not able to communicate “hard information” about
economic facts. The reason is twofold. Firstly, the information is not verifiable by
voters in the end. Experts are valuable since they can reduce the space of possible
policy alternatives but the remaining alternatives are still too complex to be verified
per se. Secondly, the goals of experts on the one hand and voters on the other hand
may diverge. Experts may be interest-driven, and hence, their proposals have limited
credibility. Nevertheless, we assume that voters and parties do not take into account
strategic considerations of experts. They take the policy proposals of experts as an
exogenous set of possible reforms which contains the actual state of the world with
certainty. Therefore, the incumbent party is restricted to experts’ proposals. Although
the party in office can learn the correct state of the world if it wants to, the correct view
can only be transmitted via signaling to voters, since the party also has self-interests.8
7One might think of the implications of the so-called “globalization” or the change from a central
planned economy to a capitalist system in Eastern Europe.
8Gilligan (1993) discusses the role of experts when legislators have to acquire complex information
for their decisions. Information transmission between experts and legislators can be imperfect because
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Besides self-interests some experts may propose the wrong policy, because the com-
plexity makes it difficult to decide whether the detrimental economic development
stems from a wrongly chosen value of a regulation parameter or from exogenous fac-
tors that are change-inherent. Some experts may argue that P -policy was right, and
things would improve if exogenous conditions improve. G-policy could even worsen
the situation.
Furthermore, experts not only argue about P or G, they also argue about the appro-
priate size of reform that could end the crisis. On both sides we have proponents for a
small reform and proponents for a large reform. Experts that favor P together with a
small reform propose a regulation parameter wPs , whereas large reform proponents call
for wPb , where w
P
b > w
P
s > wsq. The small reform supporters of the G-view propose
wGs , the large reform supporters announce w
G
b to be the best way out of crisis. The
G-proposals are ordered in the following way: wGb < w
G
s < wsq.
Several reasons for reform proposals of experts which differ from wG = 0 or wP = 1
are conceivable. Although an expert believes that equations (7.2) or (7.3) are correct
he could favor a smaller reform on strategic grounds: It could be more likely to be
implemented than the largest possible reforms wG = 0 or wP = 1 because of voters’
risk aversion. Experts could also have some idea of social fairness that excludes a
policy where one voter group has the minimum consumption level while the other two
enjoy the maximum. Furthermore, some experts may not be really confident about
their announced view and thus may make a careful proposal.
Voters, like some experts, cannot distinguish between possible effects of regulation and
exogenous factors. They have a short memory, and usually do not contemplate eco-
nomic theories. Instead, they delegate this task to the party in office, and contemplate
the credibility9 of the incumbent party’s proposals.
In contrast, the opposition party is not able to learn of the correct view since it
does not have the information resources the governmental party has. Therefore, we
assume that the challenger adheres to the policies of the past. This behavior can be
easily explained by behavioral phenomena like conservatism or sluggishness discussed
in Chapter 2 “Conceptual Issues”.
of different preferences and un-verifiability of the information. Hahn (2002) uses this type of soft
information in models involving information transmission between central banks and the public. In
contrast, hard information is verifiable or the sender and receiver have the same preferences.
9Exactly what we mean by credibility is discussed in Section 8.3.2, Definition 10, p. 101.
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Equilibrium Concept and Best
Responses
8.1 Equilibrium Concept
The described voting game is an extensive form game with incomplete information.
The appropriate solution concept is that of a sequential equilibrium developed by
Kreps and Wilson (1982). For convenience, we make the following definition:
Definition 3 (Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium)
Henceforth, we use both terms “sequential equilibrium” or just “equilibrium” to de-
note an equilibrium derived by the Nash solution concept of a sequential equilibrium
introduced by Kreps and Wilson (1982).
The concept of a sequential equilibrium assures subgame perfection and “reasonable”
out-off-equilibrium beliefs. A sequential equilibrium is a pair (σ∗, µ∗) of strategies σ∗
and beliefs µ∗ that requires:
Firstly, a player’s actions are sequentially rational given a system of beliefs µ∗. This
means that a player’s actions are optimal at each information set he could reach, given
what the player believes has already occurred (according to µ∗) and given the further
actions of all other players. It is important to note that sequential rationality requires
optimal behavior at any possible information set, no matter whether it is on or off the
equilibrium path.
Secondly, the system of beliefs µ∗ is the limit of a sequence of beliefs {µk}∞k=1 which
are derived by Bayes’ rule from a sequence of totally mixed strategies {σk}∞k=1 with
limk→∞ σk = σ∗. This requirement assures that beliefs are consistent with strategies
and beliefs are reasonable even off the equilibrium path.
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If we apply these conditions to our game, an equilibrium strategy ((σIl )
∗, (σΠl )
∗) for
l has to be optimal given the strategy σEM of M . Because l always knows what it
has done before (perfect recall), and all its actions are completed when M makes its
first (and last) move, l does not have to create beliefs.1 On the other hand, when M
observes l′s proposal, for example wGb , theM -voter has to form a belief about the node
belonging to the “wGb -information set” where he has to act (see Figure C.1 “The game
tree”, p. 206). The belief µ∗ is the posteriori probability distribution over P , given
wv. In particular, M assigns a probability to a proposed view that it obtains from a
corresponding “correct” node of l, i.e. that l′s proposed view reflects the real state of
the world. This is what we can interpret as credibility of a proposal: Credibility is the
probability according to M of a proposed view being correct given l′s strategy.
The belief that M creates is derived from a sequence of strategies from l which con-
verge to l′s equilibrium strategy. We will see below that as long as wv corresponds
to l′s equilibrium strategy, beliefs can be created directly from this equilibrium strat-
egy. On the equilibrium path, the concept of sequential equilibrium coincides with
that of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. But in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, no re-
strictions are placed on beliefs off the equilibrium path, i.e., at information sets that
are not reached with strictly positive probability by playing the equilibrium strate-
gies. M could assign any belief to an unexpected proposal wv of l. However, in a
sequential equilibrium these beliefs have to be justified by some “story” that leads
to the unexpected proposal. This story is incorporated by {(σIl )k, (σΠl )k}∞k=1, where
limk→∞((σIl )
k, (σΠl )
k) = ((σIl )
∗, (σΠl )
∗). If wv is unexpected, M could ask how l comes
to wv. The answer could be that l made a mistake in the sense of a small perturbation
((σIl )
k, (σΠl )
k) of the equilibrium strategy.
By using backward induction for l, we can assure optimal action at any possible
information set. A sequential equilibrium ((σIl )
∗, (σΠl )
∗, (σEM)
∗, µ∗) of the voting game
requires for the equilibrium strategies ((σIl )
∗, (σΠl )
∗) of the l-party that
(i) at stage 4 ∀ (αl, ı, θ) ∈ P :
σ∗l (· | αl, ı, θ) ∈ argmax
σl(·|αl,ı,θ)
E
[
Ul
(
σl(· | αl, ı, θ), (σEM)∗
)]
(8.1)
and
(ii) at stage 2 ∀ αl ∈ Al :
σ∗l (· | αl) ∈ argmax
σl(·|αl)
E
[
Ul
(
σl(· | αl), (σΠl )∗, (σEM)∗
)]
(8.2)
1The subjective probability about the real state of the world can be interpreted as a given belief.
93
Chapter 8. Equilibrium Concept and Best Responses
The equilibrium strategy (σEM)
∗ for M -voters in a sequential equilibrium must satisfy
(iii) at stage 5 ∀ wv ∈ Π :
σ∗M(· | wv) ∈ argmax
σM (·|wv)
E
[
UM
(
(σIl )
∗, (σΠl )
∗, σM(· | wv)
)]
=
argmax
σM (·|wv)
∑
(αl,ı,θ)∈P
µ∗(αl, ı, θ | wv) · UM
(
σM(· | wv)
)
(8.3)
where
µ∗(αl, ı, θ | wv) =
lim
k→∞
Prob(αl) · σkl (ı | αl) · Prob(θ) · σkl (wv | αl, ı, θ)∑
(α′l,ı′,θ′)∈P
Prob(α′l) · σkl (ı′ | α′l) · Prob(θ′) · σkl (wv | α′l, ı′, θ′)
(8.4)
If wv is played in equilibrium, there exists at least one (αl, ı, θ) ∈ P such that
lim
k→∞
σkl (ı | αl) · σkl (wv | αl, ı, θ) =
σ∗l (ı | αl) · σ∗l (wv | αl, ı, θ) > 0
Thus, if wv is proposed in equilibrium, (8.4) simplifies to
µ∗(αl, ı, θ | wv) =
Prob(αl) · σ∗l (ı | αl) · Prob(θ) · σ∗l (wv | αl, ı, θ)∑
(α′l,ı′,θ′)∈P
Prob(α′l) · σ∗l (ı′ | α′l) · Prob(θ′) · σ∗l (wv | α′l, ı′, θ′)
(8.5)
8.2 Equilibrium Selection Criteria and other As-
sumptions
In this section we make some assumptions concerning the selection of sequential equi-
libria and parameter values. We will discuss the relaxation of these assumptions in
Section 10.7. Most of them do not change the basic results we obtain.
Firstly, we will make the following assumption:
Assumption 2
We will only consider equilibria where σM(a | wv) > 0 for at least one proposal.
As will be discussed in Section 10.7, equilibria where all proposals are rejected with
certainty are not very plausible since at least the small G-proposal should be credible
enough to be approved.
Furthermore, we assume that ifM accepts both a small and a large reform of a certain
view with strictly positive probability,M accepts them with the same probability. The
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interpretation of our assumption is that, for example,M could make an announcement
in the following way: “If I am willing to accept (with positive probability) both a small
and a large P -reform, I do not differentiate between a regulation parameter of, say 0.6
or 0.8, because I am not an expert and I trust the governing party to find the best
value.”
Assumption 3
We will only consider equilibria where σM(a | wvs) = σM(a | wvb ), if σM(a | wv) > 0 for
both the large and the small reform of view v, i.e., for wvs and w
v
b , .
Additionally, we assume that the l-party does not mix its proposals in equilibrium.
Assumption 4
We will only consider equilibria with best response proposals in pure strategies.
Finally, in subsequent sections, we will make assumptions concerning which proposals
l will make in the case of indifference and assumptions concerning out-off-equilibrium
beliefs.
For the values of proposals, we firstly assume, that a small G-reform is “very” small,
i.e. wGs >
1
2
, and a large G-reform is “very” large, i.e wGb <
1
2
. Secondly, r′s small
reform proposal is more careful than l′s small reform proposal. This is in accordance
with intuition since it is not possible for the r-party to learn about θ. We summarize
the relations between the values of proposals in the following assumption.
Assumption 5 (Order of Proposals)
0 ≤ wGb < 12 < wGs < wsq < wPr < wPs < wPb ≤ 1
As we will also see in further analysis, the assumption of only two parameter values
for each view does not lower insights into the model. More than two possible values
would not change l’s best response to a given strategy of M .2
Our last assumption in this section refers to B, the benefit the party obtains from
holding office. We assume that B is larger than the maximal possible change in
voters’ consumption level by reform. This reflects the empirical fact that office holders,
e.g., prime ministers, usually earn much more than the average citizen. Additionally,
this assumption excludes the possibility that the l-party sacrifices reelection just for
economic concerns. A further discussion of this point can be found in Section 10.7.
Assumption 6
B > ∆c ·max
wv
|wv − wPr |.
2The l-party almost always chooses the highest wv-values thatM accepts with positive probability.
It would never respond with a wv-value that lies in the middle of the parameter area that M accepts
with positive probability.
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For ease of presentation, we now introduce wG,u, wG,o, wP,u, and wP,o as strategic
variables of M . We denote by wG,o the higher value of a G-proposal which M would
accept with strictly positive probability, by wG,u we denote the lower value which M
would accept with strictly positive probability. For example, if M accepts both G-
proposals, wG,o corresponds to the small G-reform which has the higher parameter
value wGs . If M does not accept any G-proposal, w
G,o is the higher value l can choose,
and wG,u the lower. The variables wP,o and wP,u are defined accordingly. This can be
summarized in the following definition.
Definition 4
Suppose M plays strategy σEM . We define for M the strategic variables w
G,u, wG,o,
wP,u, and wP,o in the following way:
• If σM(a | wGb ) = σM(a | wGs ) > 0 or σM(a | wGb ) = σM(a | wGs ) = 0, then
wG,o = wGs and w
G,u = wGb .
If σM(a | wPb ) = σM(a | wPs ) > 0 or σM(a | wPb ) = σM(a | wPs ) = 0, then
wP,o = wPb and w
P,u = wPs .
• If σM(a | wGb ) > 0 and σM(a | wGs ) = 0, then wG,o = wG,u = wGb .
If σM(a | wPb ) > 0 and σM(a | wPs ) = 0, then wP,o = wP,u = wPb .
• If σM(a | wGb ) = 0 and σM(a | wGs ) > 0, then wG,o = wG,u = wGs .
If σM(a | wPb ) = 0 and σM(a | wPs ) > 0, then wP,o = wP,u = wPs .
If we combine Definition 4 and Assumption 3 it always holds that σM(a | wG,u) =
σM(a | wG,o) and that σM(a | wP,u) = σM(a | wP,o). Therefore, we can make the
following definition for convenience:
Definition 5
σGM := σM(a | wG,u) = σM(a | wG,o)
σPM := σM(a | wP,u) = σM(a | wP,o)
Note that with Assumption 3 and Definitions 4 and 5, a strategy of M can be com-
pletely described by wG,u, wG,o, σGM , w
P,u, wP,o, and σPM .
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8.3 Best Responses and Beliefs
8.3.1 The l-Party’s Best Responses
The fundamental question for the l-party is which view it should propose. For its
decision, l has to take into account the two components of its utility function: The
economic component, represented by consumption levels of L and M , and the office
component, represented by benefit B from holding office.
Firstly, we consider best responses of the αLl -type. This type’s economic policy pref-
erences coincide in each state of the world with the prefernces of the L-group (see
equations (7.5) and (7.6)). On economic concerns, it will always choose a regulation
parameter as high as possible, i.e. it will choose wP,o and not wP,u (if they differ) or
wG,o and not wG,u (if they differ).
As long as σPM ≥ σGM , αLl will always choose the highest value M is willing to accept,
i.e., αLl will choose w
P,o. Because the probability of being elected is at least as large
with a P -proposal as with a G-proposal, αLl has no reason to propose G. Furthermore,
αLl will not inform since there is no reason to incur information costs if α
L
l proposes
wP,o even if it knew that θ = G.
In the case of σPM < σ
G
M there is a trade-off between economic and office concerns. If
σGM is large enough, α
L
l could choose w
G,o and not wP,o since the value B of reelection
could be very high relative to the value of L-consumption. In this case, information
could have a value for αLl . If α
L
l knew that θ = P , then better chances of reelection by
proposing wG,o would not be worthwhile. The loss of implementing wG,o could be high
because M would also lose. Furthermore, a P -policy would be implemented by the
r-party anyway. On the other hand, if αLl knew that θ = G the net economic policy
loss would be relatively small since the M -group would gain from implementing wG,o.
To sum up, the l-party could gain from proposing wG,o, since it increases chances of
being reelected.
Economic policy preferences of the αMl -type depend on the real state of the world,
since this type favors M -interests in each case. Therefore, information can always be
valuable for αMl .
If αMl does not inform, it will always choose the higher level of regulation independent
of its proposed view. We can see this if we compute the expected utility level for αMl
according to equations (7.5) and (7.6) if αMl proposes w
v. Because we want to focus
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on economic concerns we assume that σPM = σ
G
M = 1.
E
[
Ul
(
σl(w
v | αMl , i¯, θ) = 1, σPM = 1, σGM = 1
)]
=
1
2
UPl (α
M
l ) +
1
2
UGl (α
M
l )
=
1
2
(
B + c + wv∆c
)
+
1
2
(
B + c + αMl ∆c− (2αMl − 1)wv∆c
)
(8.6)
= B + c+
1
2
αMl ∆c+ (1− αMl )wv∆c (8.7)
If αMl chooses the higher regulation level instead of the lower level then the weighted
aggregate consumption level increases more in the case of θ = P than it decreases
in the case of θ = G (see (8.6): w∆c if θ = P versus (2αMl − 1)w∆c if θ = G and
αMl >
1
2
). Because of the party’s risk neutrality it maximizes the expected utility level
if it proposes the highest possible regulation level. Intuitively, even the αMl -type tends
towards proposing more regulation if it has not informed because L always prefers
more regulation whereas M prefers less regulation only if θ = G.
In the case of σPM ≥ σGM , αMl will choose wP,o if it does not inform because of both
reelection concerns and economic concerns (see equation (8.6)). The αMl -type will only
inform if learning θ = G and proposing G not only outweigh information costs k but
also outweigh lower chances of being reelected. Obviously, in the case of informing,
and if αMl learns that the real state of the world is G, it will propose on economic
grounds wG,u.
If σPM < σ
G
M and α
M
l does not inform then there is a trade-off between office and
economic policy concerns. With respect to economic concerns αMl would propose w
P,o
(equation (8.7)) but with respect to chances of reelection αMl would propose w
G,o. This
type has a lot more incentives to inform than the αLl -type in the case of σ
P
M < σ
G
M
because if αMl learned that θ = G it would gain and not lose economically by proposing
and implementing G. Of course, if αMl knows that θ = G it will choose the lowest
possible regulation level, i.e. wG,u. On the other hand, if αMl learned that θ = P much
higher chances of reelection could outweigh economic concerns and αMl would choose
to propose wG,o.
In Tables C.1 and C.2, we give an exact overview of l′s best responses depending on
M ’s strategy and parameter values B, k, αLl , α
M
l ,∆c, and w
P
r . The derivation of l
′s
best responses can be found in Appendix B.1. There, and in all subsequent analysis,
we will use the following definitions for ease of presentation:
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Definition 6
βL := |2αLl − 1|
βM := |2αMl − 1|
∆wv := |wv − wPr |
Definition 7
∆σM := σ
G
M − σPM
ΣuM := σ
G
M∆w
G,u + σPM∆w
P,u
ΣoM := σ
G
M∆w
G,o + σPM∆w
P,o
Definition 8
σiL := σl(i | αLl )
σiM := σl(i | αMl )
Definition 9
Suppose M plays strategy σEM .
We define the vector σ˜Πl (αl) of best response proposals in pure strategies for l: It is a
triple consisting of proposals wv satisfying(
σl(· | αl, i, G) = 1, σl(· | αl, i, P ) = 1, σl(· | αl, i¯, θ) = 1
)
For example, if(
σl(w
G,u | αMl , i, G) = 1, σl(wP,o | αMl , i, P ) = 1, σl(wG,o | αMl , i¯, θ) = 1
)
,
then
σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wP,o, wG,o)
That is, if αMl informs and learns that θ = G, it will propose w
G,u, if it informs and
learns that θ = P , it will propose wP,o, and if αMl does not inform, it will propose
wG,o.
Proposition 8 (The l-Party’s Best Responses)
Suppose M plays strategy σEM described by w
G,u, wG,o, σGM , w
P,u, wP,o, and σPM . In
this case, the l-party’s best responses are given by Tables C.1 and C.2.
The tables’ entries follow from Lemmas 21 to 28 (see Appendix B.1.2).
The tables describe the l-party’s best responses depending on parameter constellations
and M ’s strategy. There are 7 different regions of parameter and strategy constella-
tions - called Areas I to VII - with different best response proposals. The areas refer
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to the level of B∆σM . In the 2nd column are the corresponding conditions. The 3rd
column names best response proposals belonging to these constellations. The 4th col-
umn gives the conditions under which l will inform, i.e. decides that the best response
to M ’s strategy would be to enter the state of information. If these conditions are
fulfilled with equality, e.g. for Area I, if αMl =
1
2
+ k
σGM∆c(w
G,o−wG,u) , the α
M
l -type is
indifferent concerning its information decision. If αMl <
1
2
+ k
σGM∆c(w
G,o−wG,u) , it will
never gather information.
If B∆σM equals the areas’ borders, and best response proposals for a type of l are
different for the two areas next to each other, the corresponding type is indifferent
concerning which proposal to play. In the tables we assume that both types of l play
the higher value of w in the case of indifference. In Section 10.7, we will discuss the
consequences when we allow both possible proposals to be played. We will see that
there will be no substantial effects on the results of our analysis. Finally, note that
in the case of indifference between proposals, both information conditions are valid.
They lead to the same information decision.
Furthermore, Tables C.1 and C.2 tell us the following facts:
• The areas’ borders depend on the relationship between αLl and αMl , i.e. whether
(1 − αMl ) is at least as large as (1 − 2αLl ) or not. This is relevant in Areas III,
IV, and V. The first lines in the 2nd column of the corresponding Areas give the
conditions for the named best response proposals if (1− αMl ) ≥ (1− 2αLl ). The
second line gives the areas’ borders if the opposite holds. But only in Area IV do
best response proposals depend on this relationship. If (1−αMl ) ≥ (1−2αLl ), best
responses are given in IVa. Otherwise they are given in IVb. In the following
analyses we will skip the notation “a” and “b” for Areas III to V if they are
irrelevant for argumentation.
• For a given σGM and as long as σGM > σPM ≥ 0, the Roman number of the relevant
area increases if σPM increases, because B∆σM decreases and ∆cΣ
o
M increases
for a larger σPM . We can see from the column of best response proposals, that l
makes a G-proposal only if the relative advantage of being reelected by proposing
G instead of P is large enough. If σGM and σ
P
M are close enough (Area V), only an
informed αMl -type will continue to propose a G-policy. In the case of σ
P
M ≥ σGM
and if σPM is too large, even the informed α
M
l -type will not propose G (Area VII).
8.3.2 The M-Group’s Best Responses and Beliefs
In this section we discuss the M -group’s beliefs and the corresponding best responses.
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Before its decision whether to approve a proposal wv, theM -group has to build beliefs
about the correctness of the proposed view. Depending on the l-party’s strategy
(σIl , σ
Π
l ) and the resulting beliefs, M chooses its best response, i.e. σM(a | wv).
For M , the expected utility of playing σM(a | wv) given a strategy (σIl , σΠl ) with
proposal wv is (see (8.3)):
E
[
UM
(
σIl , σ
Π
l , σM(a | wv)
)]
=∑
(αl,ı,θ)∈P
µ(αl, ı, θ | wv) · UM
(
σM(a | wv)
)
=
∑
(αl,ı,G)∈P
µ(αl, ı, G | wv)
(
σM(a | wv)
√
c¯− wv∆c+ (1− σM(a | wv))√c¯− wPr ∆c)+∑
(αl,ı,P )∈P
µ(αl, ı, P | wv)
(
σM(a | wv)
√
c+ wv∆c+
(
1− σM(a | wv)
)√
c+ wPr ∆c
)
=
σM(a | wv)
 ∑
(αl,ı,G)∈P
µ(αl, ı, G | wv)
{√c¯− wv∆c−√c¯− wPr ∆c}+ ∑
(αl,ı,P )∈P
µ(αl, ı, P | wv)
{√c+ wv∆c−√c+ wPr ∆c}
+
 ∑
(αl,ı,G)∈P
µ(αl, ı, G | wv)
√c¯− wPr ∆c+
 ∑
(αl,ı,P )∈P
µ(αl, ı, P | wv)
√c+ wPr ∆c
(8.8)
Firstly, we define the credibility of a proposal v as the total sum of beliefs µ(αl, ı, θ | wv)
with θ = v.
Definition 10 (Credibility of a Proposal)
The credibility µ(θ = v | wv) of a proposal wv is the a posteriori probabilityM assigns
this proposal, so that it represents the correct state of the world.
µ(θ = v | wv) :=
∑
(αl,ı,θ=v)∈P
µ(αl, ı, θ = v | wv)
For example, observing proposal wv,
∑
(αl,ı,G)∈P µ(αl, ı, G | wv) is the total probability
M assigns to the possibility that the real state of the world is G. If the proposal is a
G-proposal, this sum represents the credibility of this proposal.
Furthermore, if v was a G-proposal,
√
c¯− wG∆c − √c¯− wPr ∆c in (8.8) would be
positive because wG < wPr . On the other hand,
√
c+ wG∆c−√c+ wPr ∆c would be
negative. M would accept the proposal if the whole expression in square brackets of
(8.8) was positive.
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In general, M would be indifferent in accepting a wv-proposal if ∑
(αl,ı,G)∈P
µ(αl, ı, G | wv)
{√c¯− wv∆c−√c¯− wPr ∆c}+ ∑
(αl,ı,P )∈P
µ(αl, ı, P | wv)
{√c+ wv∆c−√c+ wPr ∆c} = 0 (8.9)
We define µ˜G(w
G) as the minimum credibilityM must assign a wG-proposal to approve
it, i.e. µ˜G(w
G) :=
∑
(αl,ı,G)∈P µ(αl, ı, G | wG), where
∑
(αl,ı,G)∈P µ(αl, ı, G | wG) satis-
fies (8.9). (Note, that
∑
(αl,ı,P )∈P µ(αl, ı, P | wG) = 1 −
∑
(αl,ı,G)∈P µ(αl, ı, G | wG).)
Defining µ˜P (w
P ) accordingly we obtain
Definition 11 (Minimum Credibility Requirements)
The minimum credibility M must assign a G-proposal to approve it is µ˜G(w
G) where
µ˜G(w
G) =
√
c+ wG∆c−√c+ wPr ∆c√
c+ wG∆c−√c+ wPr ∆c−√c¯− wG∆c+√c¯− wPr ∆c.
The minimum credibility M must assign a P -proposal to approve it is µ˜P (w
P ) where
µ˜P (w
P ) =
√
c¯− wPr ∆c−
√
c¯− wP∆c√
c+ wP∆c−√c+ wPr ∆c−√c¯− wP∆c+√c¯− wPr ∆c.
The characteristics of these functions are summarized in the following proposition (for
proof see Appendix B.2, a sketch of the functions can be found in Figure 8.1). We
state the characteristics not only for the current case, wPr >
1
2
, but also for the case
that we analyze in a later section (Section 10.5) where we assume that wPr <
1
2
.
Proposition 9 (Characteristics of Minimum Credibility Requirements)
µ˜G(w
G) is continuous in wG ∈ {[0, 1]\wPr }. µ˜P (wP ) is continuous in wP ∈ {[0, 1]\wPr }.
(i) If wPr >
1
2
, we obtain:
µ˜G(w
G∗) <
1
2
for any wG∗ ∈ (1
2
, wPr ) and
µ˜P (w
P∗) >
1
2
for any wP∗ ∈ (wPr , 1].
(ii) If 0 < wPr <
1
2
, we obtain:
µ˜G(w
G∗) >
1
2
for any wG∗ ∈ [0, wPr ) and
µ˜P (w
P∗) <
1
2
for any wP∗ ∈ (wPr ,
1
2
).
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(iii)
∂µ˜G
∂wG
(wG) < 0 for any wG ∈ [0, 1] \ wPr and
∂µ˜P
∂wP
(wP ) > 0 for any wP ∈ [0, 1] \ wPr .
Figure 8.1: Minimum credibility requirements: µ˜G(w
G) for wG < wPr , µ˜P (w
P ) for
wP > wPr , and w
P
r >
1
2
.
 





	







ﬀﬁ
ﬂ
ﬃ
  
!#"
$
%#&
' (#)* +#,
-
.#/
0
1
2
The proposition reflects the risk aversion of voters: The derivative of µ˜G(w
G) with
respect to wG is negative and the derivative of µ˜P (w
P ) with respect to wP positive. The
further the proposal from its alternative, wPr , the higher the requirements a proposal
must fulfill to be accepted instead of wPr . Since a proposal is only approved if µ(θ =
v | wv) ≥ µ˜v(wv), the large reforms need higher credibility to be accepted than the
small reforms.
Since 1
2
< wGs < wsq, parts (i) and (iii) of Proposition 9 imply that the small G-
reform needs less credibility to be accepted than the small P -reform (µ˜G(w
G
s ) <
1
2
and
µ˜P (w
P
s ) >
1
2
). This is also due to risk aversion: Since the alternative, wPr , is set in
accordance with a P -policy, i.e. larger than 1
2
, the gain of implementing a P -reform
wPs > w
P
r in the case of θ = P is smaller than the loss of implementing this P -policy in
the case of θ = G. This follows directly from the concavity of the utility function. On
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the other hand, the loss of implementing the small G-reform in the case of θ = P is
smaller than the gain if G was the real state of the world. In part (ii) the proposition
shows that the opposite holds if wPr <
1
2
. In this case, a small P -reform needs less
credibility to be accepted than a small G-reform.
In general, as long as wPr >
1
2
, we can say that, due to risk aversion, the loss of a
small P -reform relative to the implementation of wPr in the case of θ = G is larger
than the gain of implementing this reform in the case of θ = P . Thus, credibility of a
small P -reform has to be larger than 1
2
to be accepted. The opposite holds if wPr <
1
2
:
P -reforms are less “risky”.
The credibility of proposals is derived from M -group’s beliefs. If the l-party plays
its equilibrium strategy, it is straightforward for M to calculate its beliefs. It is not
clear which beliefs M should assign a proposal if l deviates from equilibrium. For a
sequential equilibrium, M must have a “theory” about how the mistake could occur.
Before we can discuss this theory it will be helpful to define the following terms:
Definition 12 (Equilibrium-, Non-Equilibrium-, and Out-Off-Equilibrium Proposals)
• An “equilibrium proposal” is an l-type best response proposal in equilibrium even
if it is not played with strictly positive probability when l plays its equilibrium
strategy.
• A “non-equilibrium proposal” is defined accordingly.
• An “out-off-equilibrium proposal” is any proposal which is not played with
strictly positive probability in equilibrium. This means that an equilibrium pro-
posal can be an out-off-equilibrium proposal, but any non-equilibrium proposal
will always be an out-off-equilibrium proposal.
Concerning the theoryM uses to build its beliefs when it observes an out-off-equilibrium
proposal, we assume:
Assumption 7
(i) Suppose l plays a non-equilibrium proposal wv. In this case, deviation probabil-
ities from any equilibrium proposal to wv are equal.
(ii) Suppose l plays an equilibrium proposal wv∗ that is out-off-equilibrium. In this
case, deviation probabilities from any other equilibrium proposal to wv∗ are
equal. Furthermore, they equal the probability that wv∗ is not played if it would
be played when l deviates from its equilibrium information decision.
(iii) Deviation probabilities from the equilibrium information decision are very small
relative to the deviation probabilities from an equilibrium proposal.
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The following example illustrates Assumption 7 (i): Suppose αLl does not inform and
plays in equilibrium wPb while α
M
l does inform and plays in equilibrium w
G
b if θ = G,
and wPb if θ = P . Furthermore, if α
L
l informed it would play w
G
s if θ = G, and w
P
b
if θ = P ; αMl would play w
G
s if it did not inform (σ˜
Π
l (α
L
l ) = (w
G
s , w
P
b , w
P
b ), σ˜
Π
l (α
M
l ) =
(wGb , w
P
b , w
G
s ), σiL = 0, σiM = 1 ). Suddenly, M observes the non-equilibrium proposal
wPs . In this case, Assumption 7 (i) tells us that l deviates from w
P
b to w
P
s with the
same probability as deviating from wGs or w
G
b to w
P
s . We assume that non-equilibrium
proposals (“mistakes”) and equilibrium proposals are uncorrelated. Consequently, if a
mistake occurs, any information that is included in an equilibrium proposal gets lost.
For example, ifM observes wGb , it knows with certainty that the real state of the world
is G. If M observes wPs , it could stem from any path of the game. Therefore, M will
assign the unexpected proposal the a priori belief of 1
2
to represent the correct state
of the world.
Assumptions 7 (ii) and (iii) become relevant when an equilibrium proposal is out-off-
equilibrium. That is, this proposal occurs with zero probability if l plays its equilibrium
strategy, because it only would be played if l changed its information decision.3
Assumption 7 (ii) corresponds to (i) in that we assume that not expected proposals
are uncorrelated with the path l has taken until it makes the unexpected proposal (see
Appendix B.2 for an example). Concerning Assumption 7 (iii), suppose neither type
of l informs but proposes wGs . But if a type did inform it would propose w
G
s under
θ = G and wPs under θ = P (σ˜
Π
l (α
L
l ) = (w
G
s , w
P
s , w
G
s ), σ˜
Π
l (α
M
l ) = (w
G
s , w
P
s , w
G
s ), σiL =
0, σiM = 0 ). If this was an equilibrium strategy of l, the w
P
s -proposal would be
out-off-equilibrium since information would have probability zero in equilibrium. Now
we assume that when M observes wPs , it believes that this deviation stems with very
high probability from an uninformed type. M believes that the deviation probability
from no information to information is so small that M still assigns credibility 1
2
to
this out-off-equilibrium proposal. Clearly, if M considered it very likely that the
out-off-equilibrium proposal stemmed from an informed type it would assign a higher
credibility to it, since both types propose wPs in equilibrium once they have informed.
Nevertheless, we consider it plausible that even in this case M is very careful in
assigning high credibilities and sticks to its assumption that any information gets lost
once l has deviated from its equilibrium behavior.
Overall, this means that the credibility of any out-off-equilibrium proposal is 1
2
. In the
next section and in Appendix B.2 we will derive this belief explicitly for two examples.
3When a non-equilibrium proposal is played, Assumption 7 (i) obviously leads to a credibility of 12
for this proposal since the information decision does not matter. Furthermore, when an equilibrium
proposal is played with positive probability in equilibrium, M assumes that this proposal does not
stem from a non-equilibrium information decision.
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It turns out that this out-off-equilibrium belief can be justified for all best responses
of l.
Proposition 10 (Out-Off-Equilibrium Beliefs)
Suppose that Assumption 7 holds and that deviation probabilities from equilibrium
information decisions are “small enough” relative to the deviation probabilities from
equilibrium proposals. Thus, the credibility of any out-off-equilibrium proposal is 1
2
.
In Section 10.7, we will discuss the consequences when Assumption 7 is relaxed.
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9.1 Derivation of Sequential Equilibria
9.1.1 Preliminary Considerations
In this section we will derive and discuss some general characteristics of the game’s
sequential equilibria. They will be useful for the derivation of all possible sequential
equilibria in Section 9.2.
First of all note that the assumptions we made concerning out-off-equilibrium beliefs
(see previous section, Section 8.3.2) restrict the set of possible equilibria.
Suppose M would play wG,u = wG,o = wGb , i.e. σM(a | wGb ) > 0 and σM(a | wGs ) = 0.
In this case, according to Proposition 8, l would never play wGs as best response. But
then playing wG,u = wG,o = wGb cannot be an equilibrium strategy for M , because the
strategy has to be consistent even out-off-equilibrium: If l made a mistake and played
wGs it would have to be approved by M , since each out-off-equilibrium proposal has
credibility 1
2
, whereas the minimum credibility requirement for wGs is smaller than
1
2
(see Proposition 9 (i)).
Lemma 11
In a sequential equilibrium, M will never play wG,u = wG,o = wGb , i.e. if M accepts
the large G-reform it will also accept the small one.
This fact can be intuitively explained by voters’ risk aversion: The credibility require-
ments for a small G-reform are very low (smaller than 1
2
). Consequently, it would
in any case be accepted as an out-off-equilibrium proposal. Therefore, for beliefs to
be consistent, σM(a | wGs ) = 0 is not possible. If voters are willing to accept a large
G-reform they are even more willing to accept a small one.
Additionally, M will always accept one G-proposal with positive probability. To ob-
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serve this, suppose that σGM = 0. In this case, B∆σM would be in Areas VI or VII
(see Table C.2). In Area VI, the l-party’s best responses are such that a G-reform is
proposed in equilibrium only if αMl has informed and learned that θ = G. This means
thatM knows with certainty that G is the real state of the world if the equilibrium G-
proposal occurs. Therefore,M will approve the proposal. If wG,u = wGb and w
G,o = wGs
and the out-off-equilibrium proposal wGs occurs, M will accept this proposal as well,
because it has credibility 1
2
. Consequently, for Area VI, σGM = 0 is not possible in
equilibrium. In Area VII, the l-party never plays G in equilibrium. Nevertheless, M
would approve at least a small G-reform since it would have credibility 1
2
, and thus
σGM = 1 and not σ
G
M = 0.
Lemma 12
In a sequential equilibrium, M will always play σGM > 0, i.e. it will always accept at
least the small G-reform with positive probability.
Looking in all areas at all possible best responses of l, we recognize that if M accepts
both G-reforms, i.e., wG,u = wGb and w
G,o = wGs , w
G
b is only proposed if l knows with
certainty that the correct state of the world is G. Thus, we can state the following
Lemma:
Lemma 13
In a sequential equilibrium, if αMl informs with positive probability, and M is willing
to accept both G-reforms, the credibility of a wGb proposal is 1.
The l-party proposes a policy which is the most unfavorable one for its partisans, only
if it knows with certainty that θ = G. This observation is in accordance with intuition:
If a party makes a policy which is in opposition to its own partisans, this policy can
only be a very credible one. Therefore, the M -group, if it is willing to accept both
reforms, will choose σM(a | wG,u) = 1.
Furthermore, M will never accept both P -reforms with positive probability. Suppose,
M would play wP,u = wPs and w
P,o = wPb with σM(a | wPs ) = σM(a | wPb ) > 0. In
this case, the l-party’s best responses in Areas I to VI would be to propose wPb . If l
made a mistake and proposed wPs , M would have to reject the proposal, since out-off-
equilibrium credibility is only 1
2
whereas the minimum credibility of wPs to be accepted
is larger than 1
2
(see Proposition 9 (i) and (iv), p. 102). In Area VII, wP,u = wPs
would not be accepted because M knew that in this case θ = G and wPs would have
credibility 0.
Lemma 14
In a sequential equilibrium, M will accept at the most one P -reform with positive
probability.
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9.1.2 An Example: Sequential Equilibria in Area III
In the following, we will derive exemplarily some sequential equilibria which could be in
Area III. All other equilibria can be derived analogously. The results are summarized in
Propositions 11 to 15 (Section 9.2), and Table C.4. Whether these equilibria actually
exist with respect to parameter constellations will be discussed in a later section.
Nevertheless, we will gain important insights into the nature of the game if we first
derive all potential equilibria.
Suppose the strategy of M , given by wG,u, wG,o, σGM , w
P,u, wP,o, and σPM , is such
that the l-party’s best response is to play σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wP,o, wP,o) and σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) =
(wG,u, wP,o, wG,o) (Area III a/b). If we want to derive the potential sequential equilibria
in this area we have to consider all possible information structures, i.e. all combinations
of information decisions αLl and α
M
l can make. They can decide to become informed
(σl(i | αl) = 1), to stay uninformed (σl(i | αl) = 0) or to be indifferent (σl(i | αl) ∈
[0, 1]).
For ease of presentation, we use the following definition:
Definition 13 (The l-Party’s Information Structure)
Suppose M plays strategy σΠl . We define the compound vector σ˜
I
l as a pair of best
response “information states” for both types of l. The first entry is the αLl -type’s best
response information state, the second is that of αMl . We use info, if the best response
is to gather information with certainty, we use ninfo for the uninformed state, and
ind, if the l-type is in the state of indifference concerning its information decision. For
example, if the αlL-type’s best response is to stay uninformed, and α
M
l is indifferent,
we write:
σ˜Il = (ninfo, ind)
We call σ˜Il the “information structure” of l. It depends on M ’s strategy and can be
found in Tables C.1 and C.2 (Conditions for σiL = 1 and σiM = 1).
Note that, if σiM = 1, we still say we have an equilibrium with information structure
σ˜Il = (ninfo, ind) and not σ˜
I
l = (ninfo, info). The term information structure is
chosen with respect to l-party’s best responses givenM ’s strategy. Only in equilibrium,
σiM takes a certain value which can be 1.
To sum up, together with Definition 9 (p. 99), a best response of l can be described
by σ˜Πl (α
L
l ), σ˜
Π
l (α
M
l ), and σ˜
I
l .
1
In a first step, we assume that wG,u = wGb and w
G,o = wGs , and turn to the case
where both αLl and α
M
l are indifferent as to whether to inform or not to inform, i.e.
1Remember that we restrict ourselves to pure strategies with respect to proposals.
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σ˜Il = (ind, ind).
We use equation (8.5) to derive credibilities for all proposals which are made with
positive probability in equilibrium. The proposal wP,o is made from αLl if it has not
informed, from αLl if it has informed and learned that θ = P , and from α
M
l if it has
informed and learned that θ = P . Therefore, the credibility of this proposal is:
µ(θ = P | wP,o) =
∑
(αl,ı,θ=P )∈P
µ(αl, ı, θ = P | wP,o) =
λ·(σiL· 12 ·1+(1−σiL)· 12 ·1)+(1−λ)·(σiM · 12 ·1+(1−σiM )· 12 ·0)
λ·(σiL·( 12 ·1+ 12 ·0)+(1−σiL)·( 12 ·1+ 12 ·1))+(1−λ)·(σiM ·( 12 ·1+ 12 ·0)+(1−σiM )·( 12 ·0+ 12 ·0))
=
λ+ (1− λ)σiM
λ(2− σiL) + (1− λ)σiM ∈ [
1
2
, 1] (9.1)
According to the Zwischenwertsatz [intermediate value theorem], for a given λ, the
credibility of a wP,o-proposal can take any value between 1
2
(σiL = σiM = 0) and 1
(σiL = σiM = 1). If the l-party’s best responses are those of Area III, the credibility
cannot be smaller than the a priori credibility of 1
2
, because l informs with a certain
probability and it will always propose the correct state of the world if it is informed. It
will never play wP,o if it learns that θ = G, i.e., it will never “lie”. Only this behavior
could reduce the credibility of the wP,o-proposal below the a priori credibility of 1
2
.
Analogously, we obtain the credibility of a wG,o-proposal:
µ(θ = G | wG,o) = λσiL + (1− λ)(1− σiM)
λσiL + 2(1− λ)(1− σiM) ∈ [
1
2
, 1] (9.2)
We assumed that wG,u = wGb and w
G,o = wGs . Therefore, the credibility of the w
G,u =
wGb proposal is 1, since this proposal is only made up of α
M
l if it has learned that θ = G
(see Lemma 13).
µ(θ = G | wG,u) = 1 (9.3)
Furthermore, the derivation of equilibria also requires to determine out-off-equilibrium
beliefs. Proposition 10 states that credibility is 1
2
for any out-off-equilibrium proposal.
Now we will verify this statement for a non-equilibrium wP 6= wP,u = wP,o.23 In a
sequential equilibrium, out-off-equilibrium beliefs have to be derived from a sequence
of totally mixed strategies that converge to the equilibrium strategy. This sequence
can be any sequence of strategies that converges. We define the following one:
2For the definition of a non-equilibrium proposal, see Definition 12, p. 104.
3According to Lemma 14, there is only one P -proposal in equilibrium that is accepted with positive
probability. Thus, we have wP,u = wP,o.
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Let {σkiL} and {σkiM} be sequences of information probabilities which converge to equi-
librium probabilities σ∗iL and σ
∗
iM :
lim
k→∞
σkiL = σ
∗
iL and
lim
k→∞
σkiM = σ
∗
iM .
Furthermore, let {ψkP} be the sequence of deviation probabilities from wP,u = wP,o to
wP and let {ψkG} be the sequence of deviation probabilities from wG,u and wG,o to wP .
Because the sequence of strategies has to converge to the equilibrium strategy and
{ψkP} and {ψkG} are deviation probabilities it must hold that:
lim
k→∞
ψkG = 0 and
lim
k→∞
ψkP = 0.
Now, we can calculate the credibility of a non-equilibrium P -proposal:
µ(θ = P | wP ) =
lim
k→∞
λ
(
σkiL
1
2
ψkP + (1− σkiL)12ψkP
)
+ (1− λ) (σkiM 12ψkP + (1− σkiM)12ψkG)
λ
(
σkiL(
1
2
ψkG +
1
2
ψkP ) + (1− σkiL)ψkP
)
+ (1− λ) (σkiM(12ψkG + 12ψkP ) + (1− σkiM)ψkG)
Because we assume that deviation probabilities from equilibrium G- and P -proposals
are all equal (ψkG = ψ
k
P , Assumption 7 (i), p. 104), by dividing numerator and denom-
inator by ψkG or ψ
k
P we obtain:
µ(θ = P | wP ) =
lim
k→∞
λ
(
σkiL
1
2
+ (1− σkiL)12
)
+ (1− λ) (σkiM 12 + (1− σkiM)12)
λ
(
σkiL + (1− σkiL)
)
+ (1− λ) (σkiM + (1− σkiM)) = 12
This is a general result that we obtain for any out-off-equilibrium belief. In the ap-
pendix we make general statements and give an example for the case where an equi-
librium proposal is out-off-equilibrium.
After deriving beliefs, we are able to determine potential sequential equilibria with
σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wP,o, wP,o), σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wP,o, wG,o), and σ˜Il = (ind, ind).
If wG,u = wGb , and w
G,o = wGs , the credibility of the w
G,o = wGs proposal is at least
1
2
(see equation (9.2)). Because we assume that wGs >
1
2
, Proposition 9 (i) implies
that the minimum credibility requirement to approve this proposal is less than 1
2
(see
p. 102). Therefore, M will accept wGs with certainty. The same holds for the large
G-reform: M knows with certainty that the real state of the world is G, if l proposes
wGb . Its credibility is 1 (see equation (9.3)). Consequently,M will accept any G-reform
with σGM = 1.
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So far we have assumed that wG,u 6= wG,o. In a next step, we will analyze whether
wG,u = wG,o = wGs can also be an equilibrium.
4 In this case, the credibility of proposing
the small G-reform is still at least 1
2
because with information, l will always propose the
correct state of the world (does not lie). Therefore, M will approve the small reform
with σGM = 1. On the other hand, proposing the large G-reform is out-off-equilibrium.
Therefore, it has credibility 1
2
. The strategy to reject the large G-reform is consistent
with beliefs only if µ˜G(w
G
b ) ≥ 12 . If µ˜G(wGb ) < 12 , M would have to approve both
G-reforms and hence, wG,u = wG,o = wGs with σ
G
M = 1 would not be an equilibrium.
In summary, we have to distinguish two cases. Firstly, if the large G-reform is “very
large”, i.e. µ˜G(w
G
b ) ≥ 12 , there are two possibilities in equilibrium: wG,u = wGe,b and
wG,o = wGs with σ
G
M = 1 or w
G,u = wG,o = wGs with σ
G
M = 1. Secondly, if the large G-
reform is “moderate”, i.e. µ˜G(w
G
b ) <
1
2
, then there is only one possibility: wG,u = wGe,b
and wG,o = wGs with σ
G
M = 1.
According to Lemma 14, M will accept at the most one P -proposal. If µ(θ = P |
wP,o) > µ˜P (w
P,o), M will accept the proposal with probability 1. In this case, the l-
party’s best responses are those of Area VI, because σGM is also 1 and thus B∆σM = 0.
Hence, there is no equilibrium of this kind in Area III. If µ(θ = P | wP,o) < µ˜P (wP,o),
M will reject the proposal, i.e. σPM = 0. Again, there cannot be an equilibrium of this
kind in Area III, since we assume that B > ∆cmaxwv ∆w
v (Assumption 6). Therefore,
B∆σM = B · (1− 0) is also larger than ∆cmaxwv ∆wv whereas an equilibrium in Area
III would require that B∆σM = B · (1− 0) is equal or smaller than (1− αLl )∆cΣoM =
(1−αLl )∆c∆wG,o. In the case of µ(θ = P | wP,o) = µ˜P (wP,o),M is indifferent, i.e. σPM ∈
[0, 1]. If there is a σPM ∈ (0, 1) which fulfills the information indifference conditions of
Area III for both l-types 5, we have found a σPM constituting a potential sequential
equilibrium in this area. Note that, given the information indifference conditions can
be fulfilled, a sequential equilibrium of this kind always exists because there is always
a combination (σiL, σiM) of information probabilities that satisfies µ(θ = P | wP,o) =
µ˜P (w
P,o) for any value of wP,o ∈ (wPr , 1](see equation (9.1)).
Now, we are able to summarize our considerations. A potential sequential equilibrium
in Area III where both types of l are indifferent with respect to their information
decisions can be characterized by the following strategies: The l-party makes propos-
als according to its best responses in Area III, i.e σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wP,o, wP,o) and
σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wP,o, wG,o). The information probabilities (σiL, σiM) of the two l-
types are given by the minimum credibility requirement of the single P -proposal, M is
willing to accept. TheM -group approves this P -proposal with probability σPM ∈ (0, 1)
4Remember that wG,u = wG,o = wGb can never be an equilibrium (Lemma 11, p. 107).
5These conditions are: 12B∆σM − k = ( 12 − αLl )∆cΣoM and 12B∆σM + k = 12σPM∆c∆wP,o +
σGM∆c
[(
αMl − 12
)
∆wG,u +
(
1− αMl
)
∆wG,o
]
(see Table C.1).
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which is determined by the information conditions of both l-types (see Table C.1). If
a G-proposal is made, it is accepted with certainty, i.e. σGM = 1. M approves either
both possible G-reforms or just the small G-reform. The last strategy is only possible,
if the large G-reform is “too” large. The credibility of the small G-proposal is always
at least 1
2
, credibilities of out-off-equilibrium proposals are always exactly 1
2
.
The next information structure we want to analyze in Area III is σ˜Il = (ind, info). We
can use equation (9.1) with σiM = 1 to determine the credibility of the w
P,o-proposal:
µ(θ = P | wP,o) = 1
1 + λ(1− σiL) ∈ [
1
1 + λ
, 1] (9.4)
If we choose σiL accordingly, the credibility of the w
P,o-proposal can take any value
between 1
1+λ
and 1. A value smaller than 1
1+λ
is not possible.
Obviously, given the information structure (ind, info), and σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wP,o, wP,o),
σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wP,o, wG,o), both wG,o and wG,u are only proposed, if l knows with
certainty that θ = G. Hence, we obtain:
µ(θ = G | wG,o) = µ(θ = G | wG,u) = 1.
There is no difference between the case where wG,u 6= wG,o and wG,u = wG,o = wGs .
As always, if l makes the out-off-equilibrium P -proposal, the credibility of this proposal
is:
µ(θ = P | wP ) = 1
2
.
In a potential equilibrium of Area III, and with σ˜Il = (ind, info), M takes the same
actions concerning G-proposals as above with σ˜Il = (ind, ind). The same holds for
P -proposals except for two differences. Firstly, σPM ∈ (0, 1) is such that αMl is
not indifferent concerning its information decision (see Table C.1: 1
2
B∆σM + k <
1
2
σPM∆c∆w
P,o + σGM∆c
[(
αMl − 12
)
∆wG,u +
(
1− αMl
)
∆wG,o
]
). Secondly, not all P -
proposals with wP,o ∈ (wPr , 1] can constitute an equilibrium of this kind. The wP,o-
proposal has to be large enough, i.e. this equilibrium only exists if µ˜P (w
P,o) ≥ 1
1+λ
.
On the other hand, if the latter condition holds, there will always be a value of σiL
that satisfies µ(θ = P | wP,o) = µ˜P (wP,o) (see equation (9.4)).
There will not be an equilibrium, if credibility of the P -proposal is too large, i.e µ(θ =
P | wP,o) > µ˜P (1). In this case, M would accept the P -proposal with certainty, and
l’s best responses would not be those of Area III. Instead, l would respond according
to Area VI. In the case of σPM = 1, the α
L
l -type would lose any incentive to gather
information. It would never inform and always propose the best policy for its partisans,
i.e. wP,o. In particular, there will not be an equilibrium in Area III with information
structure (ind, info) if σiL = 1 since then, both types would inform with certainty and
the P -proposal would have credibility 1.
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For σ˜Il = (ninfo, ind) in Area III, we obtain:
µ(θ = P | wP,o) = λ+ (1− λ)σiM
2λ+ (1− λ)σiM ∈ [
1
2
,
1
1 + λ
]
In this case, credibility can take any value between 1
2
(σiM = 0) and
1
1+λ
(σiM = 1),
but never larger than 1
1+λ
. Therefore, an equilibrium in this area can only exist if at
least one P -reform is not too large, i.e. µ˜P (w
P,o) ≤ 1
1+λ
.
In the case of wG,u 6= wG,o, i.e. wG,u = wGb and wG,o = wGs , beliefs are:
µ(θ = G | wG,o) = 1
2
µ(θ = G | wG,u) = 1
On the other hand, if wG,u = wG,o = wGs , credibility of the w
G,o-proposal can be higher
than 1
2
, because it represents with probability σiM the correct state of the world:
µ(θ = G | wG,o) ≥ 1
2
Therefore, in a potential equilibrium with σ˜Il = (ninfo, ind),M takes the same actions
concerning G-proposals as above (σ˜Il = (ind, ind), and σ˜
I
l = (ind, info)).
Finally, we discuss potential equilibria in Area III with information structure σ˜Il =
(ninfo, ninfo). In this case, we clearly obtain the following beliefs:
µ(θ = P | wP,o) = µ(θ = G | wG,o) = 1
2
According to Proposition 9, (i) and (iv), the minimum credibility requirements for
P -proposals are larger than 1
2
(see p. 102). Thus, M will reject any P -proposal, i.e.
σPM = 0. Hence, there is no equilibrium with σ˜
I
l = (ninfo, ninfo), since benefits from
holding office are too large (Assumption 6, p. 95). With σPM = 0, B∆σM never lies in
Area III.
9.2 Potential Sequential Equilibria
In this section, we will name and discuss the sequential equilibria of the voting game.
To be precise, we will use the term “potential sequential equilibria” for sequential
equilibria that may exist on the basis of strategic considerations like those that we
made in the last section. Whether these equilibria actually exist, depends on parameter
constellations. These are l’s conditions for the named best response proposals and
conditions for its best response information states (Tables C.1 and C.2). Furthermore,
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the existence of equilibria depends on the relationship between M -group’s beliefs and
credibility requirements for proposals.
The problem of existence will be explicitly discussed in Section 10.1 “Existence”.
We will summarize the general characteristics of sequential equilibria in the next sec-
tion, Section 9.3 “Summary: General Characteristics of Sequential Equilibria”. There-
fore, the reader may skip the discussion of potential sequential equilibria in the current
section. Nevertheless, we will frequently refer to the named equilibrium strategies in
all subsequent discussions.
We obtain all potential sequential equilibria by considering the possible best response
proposals according to Tables C.1 and C.2 for given σGM , σ
P
M , w
G,u, wG,o, and wP,o.6
For each area, we have to consider 9 possible information structures, i.e. 9 combina-
tions of information states info, ind, and ninfo. Thereafter, given these best response
proposals and information structures of l, we derive credibilities (beliefs) for propos-
als and derive the corresponding best responses of M , which - in turn - have to be
consistent with the originally given σGM , σ
P
M , w
G,u, wG,o, and wP,o.
All potential sequential equilibria of the game can be derived analogously to those
we have derived above. In the following, we name the equilibrium strategies and
introduce GI, GII, PI, PII, and PIII to denote the different types of behavior for M
in equilibrium.
9.2.1 Discussion of Area-I-Equilibria
Proposition 11
The following strategies constitute potential sequential equilibria in Area I:
σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wG,o, wG,o), σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wG,o, wG,o)
αLl will never inform; α
M
l will inform if α
M
l >
1
2
+ k
σGM∆c(w
G,o−wG,u)
• σ˜Il = (ninfo, ninfo):
– If µ˜G(w
G
b ) ≤ 12 :
GI: wG,u = wGb and w
G,o = wGs with σ
G
M = 1
µ∗(θ = G | wGb ) = 12 , µ∗(θ = G | wGs ) = 12
PI: wP,u = wPs and w
P,o = wPb with σ
P
M = 0
µ∗(θ = P | wPs ) = 12 , µ∗(θ = P | wPb ) = 12
6Remember that, according to Lemma 14, M will accept at the most one P -reform. Therefore,
we only have to consider the case where wP,u = wP,o.
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– If µ˜G(w
G
b ) ≥ 12 :
GII: wG,u = wG,o = wGs with σ
G
M = 1
µ∗(θ = G | wGb ) = 12 , µ∗(θ = G | wGs ) = 12
PI: wP,u = wPs and w
P,o = wPb with σ
P
M = 0
µ∗(θ = P | wPs ) = 12 , µ∗(θ = P | wPb ) = 12
• σ˜Il = (ninfo, ind):
– For any wGs >
1
2
:
GI: wG,u = wGb and w
G,o = wGs with σ
G
M = 1
µ∗(θ = G | wGb ) = 1, µ˜G(wGs ) ≤ µ∗(θ = G | wGs ) = 1−(1−λ)σiM2−(1−λ)σiM ∈ [ λ1+λ , 12 ]
PI: wP,u = wPs and w
P,o = wPb with σ
P
M = 0
µ∗(θ = P | wPs ) = 12 , µ∗(θ = P | wPb ) = 12
• σ˜Il = (ninfo, info):
– If µ˜G(w
G
s ) ≤ λ1+λ :
GI: wG,u = wGb and w
G,o = wGs with σ
G
M = 1
µ∗(θ = G | wGb ) = 1, µ∗(θ = G | wGs ) = λ1+λ ≤ 12
PI: wP,u = wPs and w
P,o = wPb with σ
P
M = 0
µ∗(θ = P | wPs ) = 12 , µ∗(θ = P | wPb ) = 12
Firstly, we look at sequential equilibria with information structure (ninfo, ninfo). If
µ˜G(w
G
b ) ≤ 12 , and M approves both the small and the large G-reform with certainty,
neither type of l will inform in the case of αMl <
1
2
+ k
∆c(wG,o−wG,u) and σ
P
M = 0. Behavior
GI with σGM = 1 and PI with σ
P
M = 0 constitute an equilibrium strategy of M given
l plays the corresponding strategies. The equilibrium beliefs are µ∗(θ = G | wGb ) = 12 ,
µ∗(θ = G | wGs ) = 12 , µ∗(θ = P | wPs ) = 12 , and µ∗(θ = P | wPb ) = 12 . Both, αLl and
αMl will propose w
G,o in equilibrium. If l makes a “mistake”, and wants to implement
wG,u = wGb , which is out-off-equilibrium, this proposal is also approved since it is not
too risky, i.e. µ˜G(w
G
b ) ≤ 12 , and the large G-reform is not too large. If the large G-
reform is too large, i.e. µ˜G(w
G
b ) >
1
2
, M is only willing to accept the small G-reform.
Then, GII with σGM = 1 and PI with σ
P
M = 0 constitute equilibrium strategies for M .
Note that, in this case wG,u = wG,o and thus the information condition for l is not
fulfilled (1
2
+ k
σGM∆c(w
G,o−wG,u) → ∞). The reason is that l always proposes wGs , and
therefore has no incentives to gather information.
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A sequential equilibrium where αMl informs is only possible if µ˜G(w
G
s ) ≤ λ1+λ . If the
small G-reform is too large, i.e. µ˜G(w
G
s ) >
λ
1+λ
, the small G-reform becomes too risky
for voters. The reason is that αMl proposes a G-reform even if it knows that θ = P ,
i.e., this type “lies”. Therefore, such an equilibrium only exists if the occurrence
probability λ for the αLl -type is high enough. This type does actually not inform but
at the same time it never “lies” unlike αMl .
Furthermore, if µ˜G(w
G
s ) >
λ
1+λ
, µ˜G(w
G
b ) <
1
2
, and αMl >
1
2
+ k
σGM∆c(wGs −wGb )
, then
σGM must be at least larger than zero and no sequential equilibrium in Area I will
exist: Suppose M would play wG,u = wGb , w
G,o = wGs with 0 < σ
G
M ≤ 1. In this
case, since αMl >
1
2
+ k
σGM∆c(wGs −wGb )
, αMl would inform and if l played w
G
s , credibility
of this proposal would be λ
1+λ
. Therefore, this proposal would have to be rejected
since minimum credibility requirement µ˜G(w
G
s ) is larger than
λ
1+λ
. Hence, playing
σM(a | wGs ) = σGM > 0 cannot be an equilibrium strategy for M . On the other hand,
if M played wG,u = wG,o = wGs , l would never inform and always propose w
G
s . But if
l made the out-off-equilibrium proposal wGb , it would have to be accepted by M since
µ˜G(w
G
b ) <
1
2
. Therefore, playing σM(a | wGb ) = 0 cannot be an equilibrium either.
Eventually, according to Lemma 11 (p. 107), we can exclude wG,u = wG,o = wGb to
constitute an equilibrium. In summary, we can conclude that no equilibrium in Area
I will exist if µ˜G(w
G
s ) >
λ
1+λ
, µ˜G(w
G
b ) <
1
2
, and αMl >
1
2
+ k
∆c(wGs −wGb )
. The reason is
that, according to Proposition 11, any potential equilibrium in this area has to be an
equilibrium with σGM = 1.
Note that, in any potential sequential equilibrium of Area I at least one G-proposal
is approved with certainty, i.e. σGM = 1, and no P -proposal is accepted, i.e. σ
P
M = 0.
The reason is that any P -proposal is out-off-equilibrium, and thus only has credibility
1
2
, whereas even the small P -reforms require a higher credibility to be accepted.
9.2.2 Discussion of Area-II-Equilibria
In the next step, we discuss potential sequential equilibria in Area II. Best response
proposals there are σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wP,o, wG,o) and σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wP,o, wG,o). Sup-
pose neither type informs. In this case, both types propose wG,o. This proposal has
credibility 1
2
, and thus σGM = 1. A P -proposal is out-off-equilibrium and also has cred-
ibility 1
2
. Therefore, it is rejected by M , i.e. σPM = 0. In this case, B∆σM = B and
∆cΣoM = ∆c∆w
G,o. According to Assumption 6 (p. 95), we know that B > ∆c∆wG,o,
and thus an equilibrium with σGM = 1 and σ
P
M = 0 cannot lie in Area II, where
B∆σM ≤ ∆cΣoM . Furthermore, suppose one or both types of l inform with positive
probability. Thus, the credibility of the wP,o-proposal is 1 and M will approve this
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proposal with certainty. In this case, ∆σM ≤ 0, and l’s best responses to this behavior
of M would not be that of Area II. In fact, if σPM ≥ σGM , at least the αLl -type never
has an incentive to propose G even if it knew that θ = P . To sum up, there is no
sequential equilibrium in Area II.
Proposition 12
There are no potential sequential equilibria in Area II, i.e. there are no equilibria where
the l-party proposes σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wP,o, wG,o) and σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wP,o, wG,o).
9.2.3 Discussion of Equilibria in Areas III to V
The characteristics of sequential equilibria in Areas III, IVa, IVb, and V are summa-
rized in the following proposition:
Proposition 13
The following strategies constitute potential sequential equilibria in Areas III, IVa,
IVb, and V:
The following proposals σ˜Πl (α
L
l ), σ˜
Π
l (α
M
l ) and information structures σ˜
I
l are possible:
• Area III: σ˜Πl (αLl ) = (wG,o, wP,o, wP,o), σ˜Πl (αMl ) = (wG,u, wP,o, wG,o)
(ninfo, info), (ninfo, ind), (ind, info), (ind, ind)
• Area IVa: σ˜Πl (αLl ) = (wG,o, wP,o, wP,o), σ˜Πl (αMl ) = (wG,u, wP,o, wP,o)
(ninfo, info), (ninfo, ind), (ind, info)
• Area IVb: σ˜Πl (αLl ) = (wP,o, wP,o, wP,o), σ˜Πl (αMl ) = (wG,u, wP,o, wG,o)
(ninfo, info), (ninfo, ind)
• Area V: σ˜Πl (αLl ) = (wP,o, wP,o, wP,o), σ˜Πl (αMl ) = (wG,u, wP,o, wP,o)
(ninfo, info), (ninfo, ind)
Information conditions are named in Table C.1.
The following strategies of M are conceivable:
• For G-proposals and if αMl informs with strictly positive probability:
– For any wGb :
GI: wG,u = wGb and w
G,o = wGs with σ
G
M = 1
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µ∗(θ = G | wGb ) = 1, µ∗(θ = G | wGs ) ≥ 12
– If µ˜G(w
G
b ) ≥ 12 :
GII: wG,u = wG,o = wGs with σ
G
M = 1
µ∗(θ = G | wGb ) = 12 , µ∗(θ = G | wGs ) ≥ 12
• ForG-proposals and if αMl does not inform. This is only possible for III (ind, ind):
– If µ˜G(w
G
b ) ≥ 12 :
GII: wG,u = wG,o = wGs with σ
G
M = 1
µ∗(θ = G | wGb ) = 12 , µ∗(θ = G | wGs ) ≥ 12
• For P -proposals:
– PII: wP,u = wP,o = wPs with σ
P
M ∈ (0, 1)
µ∗(θ = P | wPs ) = µ˜P (wPs ), µ∗(θ = P | wPb ) = 12
– PIII: wP,u = wP,o = wPb with σ
P
M ∈ (0, 1)
µ∗(θ = P | wPs ) = 12 , µ∗(θ = P | wPb ) = µ˜P (wPb )
The exact values of credibilities can be found in Table C.3.
In all potential sequential equilibria of Areas III to V the strategies of the l-party
imply information probabilities (σiL, σiM) that generate beliefs µ(θ = P | wP,o) with
µ(θ = P | wP,o) = µ˜P (wP,o).
From the table of credibilities (Table C.3), we can conclude:
• Potential equilibria in Areas III, IVa, IVb, and V with (ninfo, ind) exist if
µ˜P (w
P,o) ≤ 1
1+λ
.
• Potential equilibria in Areas III and IVa with (ind, info) exist if µ˜P (wP,o) ≥ 11+λ .
• Potential equilibria in Areas III, IVa, IVb, and V with (ninfo, info) exist if
µ˜P (w
P,o) = 1
1+λ
.
• Potential equilibria in Area III with (ind, ind) always exist with respect to cred-
ibility requirements.
Firstly, we analyze which information structures are possible in Areas III to V.
There is no sequential equilibrium with (ninfo, ninfo). The reason is that in such a
case credibility of any proposal would be 1
2
. Therefore, σGM = 1, whereas no P -proposal
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would be accepted, and hence σPM = 0. According to Assumption 6(p. 95), no such
equilibrium can exist in Areas III to V.
Furthermore, there is no sequential equilibrium with (info, info). If both types of l
inform and make proposals according to Areas III and IVa, each equilibrium proposal
would have credibility 1. Therefore, σPM = 1, and best responses of l would not be
those of Area III and IVa, e.g. the αLl -type would lose any incentive to propose G with
information. The latter is the case in Areas IVb and V anyway. In these areas, αLl
always proposes wP,o and thus, this type will never inform. The reason is that in these
areas the value of σPM which constitutes an equilibrium is relatively high (Areas IVb
and V versus Area III) or αLl is relatively small (Area IVb versus Area IVa). Therefore,
the αLl -type’s incentives to propose G because of reelection (σ
G
M = 1) are lower. They
are so low, that the only possible information structures of Areas IVb and V are those
where αLl does not inform.
In Area III, we can also exclude equilibria with information structure (info, ind) and
(info, ninfo). In these cases, the equilibrium P -proposal would have credibility 1
and responses of Area III are no more best responses. Furthermore, we can also ex-
clude information structure (ind, ninfo). Information structure (ind, ind) only exists if
B∆σM = (1−αLl )∆cΣoM and wG,u = wG,o. This and the non-existence of (ind, ninfo)
is proved in Appendix B.2.
In Area IVa, the information condition for αLl is
1
2
B∆σM−k > (12−αLl )∆cΣoM , and αMl
informs with certainty if 1
2
B∆σM − k >
(
1
2
− αMl
)
∆c
(
σGM∆w
G,u + σPM∆w
P,o
)
. Since
αLl ≤ 12 , the right hand side of its information condition implies that the αLl -type only
informs, or is indifferent concerning its information decision, if 1
2
B∆σM − k ≥ 0. On
the other hand, because αMl >
1
2
, the right hand side of αMl ’s information condition
implies that 1
2
B∆σM − k < 0, if αMl is indifferent or does not inform. Thus, we can
exclude for IVa information structures with (info, ind), (info, ninfo), (ind, ind), and
(ind, ninfo). In Area IVa, σPM is high and thus, α
L
l has less incentives to inform.
Therefore, if αLl informed or was indifferent, α
M
l would inform all the more. Hence,
the latter information structures are not possible.
All potential sequential equilibria in Proposition 13 are characterized by σGM = 1 and
σPM ∈ (0, 1). Except in the single case where αMl does not inform, it is always possible
that M accepts both G-reforms. If M is willing to do so and does observe wG,u = wGb ,
i.e. l proposes the large G-reform, M knows for sure that this reform represents the
correct state of the world. In equilibrium, this proposal can only stem from an informed
αMl -type which will never “lie” in Areas III to V, i.e. which will never propose the
incorrect state of the world if it is informed about the correct state.
120
Chapter 9. Equilibria
In any potential sequential equilibrium of Areas III to V, exactly one P -reform is pro-
posed by the l-party and only this one is accepted with probability σPM ∈ (0, 1) by the
M -group. According to Lemma 14 (p. 108), in all potential sequential equilibria of the
game at the most one P -reform is accepted with positive probability. Furthermore, in
the areas of Proposition 13, no equilibria with σPM = 0 can exist because the benefits
of holding office are assumed to be relatively high (Assumption 6, p. 95). Conse-
quently, in equilibrium, there can only be exactly one P -proposal which is accepted
with positive probability.
In all potential sequential equilibria named in Proposition 13, M is indifferent in ac-
cepting the P -proposal, i.e. in all these equilibria the credibility of a P -proposal equals
its minimum credibility requirement to be approved (µ(θ = P | wP,o) = µ˜P (wP,o)).
Obviously, for a given information structure, credibilities of all P -proposals increase
in information probabilities σiL and σiM (see Table C.3)
7. Furthermore, the higher
the value of the P -proposal, wP,o, the higher its minimum credibility requirement is.
Therefore, the higher wP,o is, the higher credibilities of P -proposals, and thus the
higher information probabilities σiL and σiM have to be in equilibrium for a given in-
formation structure. We observe the same conditions if we compare information struc-
tures (ninfo, ind) and (ind, info). Both types of l inform with a higher probability
in (ind, info) than in (ninfo, ind)8. Accordingly, for a high wP,o, i.e. µ˜P (w
P,o) > 1
1+λ
,
sequential equilibria with information structure (ind, info) can constitute but not with
(ninfo, ind). The converse is true for µ˜P (w
P,o) < 1
1+λ
.
These results are due to voters’ risk aversion. High wP,o-proposals are only accepted,
if information probabilities are high, and therefore the probability that the proposed
view is correct. If wP,o is small, potential sequential equilibria with (ind, info) do
not constitute because this information structure implies a credibility which is too
“high” for equilibria in Areas III and IVa. In the case of a small wP,o and (ind, info),
the P -proposal would have a credibility that is higher then its minimum credibility
requirement. Thus, M would accept the proposal with certainty and best responses
of l would no longer be that of Areas III and IVa.
9.2.4 Discussion of Area-VI-Equilibria
The next area we want to consider is Area VI.
7In the cases of (ninfo, ind) and (ind, ind), this can be shown by differentiating µ∗(θ = P | wP,o)
with respect to σiM .
8An exception is the case of µ˜P (wP,o) = 11+λ . There, both information structures are equivalent
concerning information probabilities.
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Proposition 14
The following strategies constitute potential sequential equilibria in Area VI:
σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
P,o, wP,o, wP,o), σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wP,o, wP,o)
αLl will never inform; α
M
l will inform if α
M
l >
1
2
+ k
∆c(wP,o−wG,u)
• σ˜Il = (ninfo, ind):
– For G-proposals:
∗ For any wGb :
GI: wG,u = wGb and w
G,o = wGs with σ
G
M = 1
µ∗(θ = G | wGb ) = 1, µ∗(θ = G | wGs ) = 12
∗ If µ˜G(wGb ) ≥ 12 :
GII: wG,u = wG,o = wGs with σ
G
M = 1
µ∗(θ = G | wGb ) = 12 , µ∗(θ = G | wGs ) = 1
– For P -proposals:
∗ If µ˜P (wPs ) ≤ 11+λ :
PII: wP,u = wP,o = wPs with σ
P
M = 1
µ˜P (w
P
s ) ≤ µ∗(θ = P | wPs ) = 12−(1−λ)σiM ∈ [12 , 11+λ ], µ∗(θ = P | wPb ) = 12
∗ If µ˜P (wPb ) ≤ 11+λ :
PIII: wP,u = wP,o = wPb with σ
P
M = 1
µ∗(θ = P | wPs ) = 12 , µ˜P (wPb ) ≤ µ∗(θ = P | wPb ) = 12−(1−λ)σiM ∈ [12 , 11+λ ]
• σ˜Il = (ninfo, info):
– For G-proposals: Same behavior as with (ninfo, ind).
– For P -proposals:
∗ If µ˜P (wPs ) ≤ 11+λ :
PII: wP,u = wP,o = wPs with σ
P
M = 1
µ∗(θ = P | wPs ) = 11+λ , µ∗(θ = P | wPb ) = 12
∗ If µ˜P (wPb ) ≤ 11+λ :
PIII: wP,u = wP,o = wPb with σ
P
M = 1
µ∗(θ = P | wPs ) = 12 , µ∗(θ = P | wPb ) = 11+λ
Potential sequential equilibria in Area VI only exist if B∆σM ≤ 0, i.e. σGM ≤ σPM . In
any potential sequential equilibrium, the αMl -type informs with positive probability.
This means that, given l’s best responses in this area, the equilibrium G-proposal has
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credibility 1. Therefore, it is accepted by M with σGM = 1. Consequently, σ
P
M also has
to be 1, otherwise B∆σM would not be in Area VI.
The information condition for αMl , which we state in Proposition 14 already takes into
account the fact that σGM = σ
P
M = 1. Whether the equilibria of Propostion 14 exist
depends on this information condition and on the size of P -proposals. Only if at least
one P -proposal is small enough, i.e. µ˜P (w
P ) ≤ 1
1+λ
, a sequential equilibrium in Area
VI exists, which can also be explained by risk aversion. Again, there is exactly one
P -proposal that is accepted in equilibrium. M will never accept all P -reforms since
the smaller one was out-off-equilibrium and would only have credibility 1
2
.
9.2.5 Discussion of Area-VII-Equilibria
Eventually, we turn to Area VII. There, best responses never include G-proposals.
Nevertheless, at least the small G-proposal would have to be accepted if it appeared
out-off-equilibrium. Hence, σMG = 1, and we can conclude that sequential equilibria in
Area VII do not exist.
Proposition 15
There are no potential sequential equilibria in Area VII, i.e. there are no equilibria
where the l-party proposes σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
P,o, wP,o, wP,o) and σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
P,u, wP,o, wP,o).
9.3 Summary: General Characteristics of Sequen-
tial Equilibria
In this section we will summarize and discuss the results we have derived so far con-
cerning the general characteristics of sequential equilibria.
In any sequential equilibrium of the voting game, at least one G-proposal is accepted
with certainty, i.e. σGM = 1. Furthermore, in almost every area where equilibria exist,
there are equilibria where M is willing to accept both, the small and the large G-
reform. The only exception is Area I, when both types of l do not inform and the
large G-reform is too large, i.e. µ˜G(w
G
b ) >
1
2
. According to Lemma 13 (p. 108), if the
αMl -type informs with positive probability, credibility of the large G-reform is 1.
There are no sequential equilibria where σPM > σ
G
M . In this case, the α
L
l -type would
never have an incentive to inform. It would just propose P , the best policy for its
partisans. Although the αMl -type could have an incentive to inform, it could propose
the wrong policy even if it knew that θ = G (Area VII). Furthermore, no type would
ever propose G with no information. Therefore, voters can only make αLl informing
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or make both types proposing G with no information, if the chances of reelection are
higher with a G-proposal. M -voters may want the party to make a G-proposal if it
does not inform, since a G-proposal is less risky for M -voters.
Corollary 2
In any sequential equilibrium of the voting game, at least one G-reform is proposed
by l. Furthermore, it always holds that σGM = 1 and 0 ≤ σPM ≤ σGM = 1.
Sequential equilibria in Area I are the only equilibria where σPM = 0 is possible. The
reason is the assumption that benefits B from holding office are relatively high (As-
sumption 6, p. 95). Therefore, ifM -voters reject any P -proposals with certainty, even
the αLl -type has no incentives to make a P -proposal. It proposes a G-policy to secure
reelection and to obtain B, although on economic grounds, it would always prefer a
P -policy. If B was smaller it would be conceivable that αLl (or α
M
l ) proposes a P -
reform although M would reject it: Economic concerns would be high enough that l
would sacrifice reelection because in this case a P -reform would be implemented by the
r-party. Economic concerns of l would be considered indirectly through r. Propos-
ing G and getting reelected would not outweigh the loss in economic terms caused
by implementing a G-policy. Nevertheless, the high level of B guarantees that such
considerations never make l proposing a P -policy when σPM = 0. Therefore, sequential
equilibria with σPM = 0 can only be in Area I. Area I is the only area where neither
type of l ever proposes P .
Given M ’s strategy, it depends on the relationship between B∆σM = B(σ
G
M − σPM)
and ∆cΣoM = ∆c(σ
G
M∆w
G,o + σPM∆w
P,o) which sequential equilibria are possible.
B(σGM−σPM) can be interpreted as the expected additional benefit from gaining office by
proposing G instead of P . This advantage is compared with ∆c(σGM∆w
G,o+σPM∆w
P,o),
the weighted sum of reform effects exceeding the effect ∆cwPr of implementing the al-
ternative wPr . The higher B∆σM relative to ∆cΣ
o
M , the more weight office concerns
have, and l proposes rather G, since G is always accepted with certainty. One polar
case is a sequential equilibrium in Area I where both types always propose G. But the
higher σPM the lower B∆σM , and the more the l-party is willing to propose P . It is
willing to take the risk of not being reelected, but instead having a chance of imple-
menting a policy which corresponds to its economic concerns. A sequential equilibrium
in Area VI, with σGM = σ
P
M = 1, represents the other polar case where office concerns
do not matter at all. Both types behave like they would behave if no elections, i.e.
strategic considerations influenced their policy decisions. The αLl -type would always
propose P , the αMl -type could inform if advantages of informing, e.g. (w
P,o − wG,u),
were large enough (see information condition in Proposition 14, p. 121). If they were
not large enough, it would also propose P since it always also considers the l-group’s
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interests (compare with Section 8.3.1 “The l-Party’s Best Responses”).
In Table C.4, we give an overview of all potential sequential equilibria. We name
areas, information structures, and the necessary conditions for existence concerning
the minimum credibility requirements. For this, we have to distinguish three cases:
Sequential equilibria that can only constitute if µ˜P (w
P,o) > 1
1+λ
, sequential equilibria
that can constitute if µ˜P (w
P,o) = 1
1+λ
, and sequential equilibria with µ˜P (w
P,o) < 1
1+λ
.
The terms “informational quality” and Probob{G} are defined and discussed in the
next section.
In the following proposition, we name the general characteristics of the voting game’s
potential sequential equilibria. The proposition summarizes the considerations we
have made so far in this chapter and the concrete statements made in Corollary 2
(this section), Lemmas 12 to 14 (Section 9.1.1), and Propositions 11 to 15 (Section
9.2).
Proposition 16
Concerning the sequential equilibria of the voting game, we can make the following
general statements:
• In any sequential equilibrium, at least one G-reform is proposed with strictly
positive probability by the l-party.
• In any sequential equilibrium, M -voters will accept the small G-reform with
certainty.
• In any sequential equilibrium, if αMl informs with positive probability, and M is
willing to accept both G-reforms, the credibility of a wGb -proposal is 1.
• In any sequential equilibrium, M will accept at the most one P -reform with
strictly positive probability.
• In any sequential equilibrium, it holds that σGM = 1 and σGM ≥ σPM ≥ 0. That is,
at least one G-proposal is accepted with certainty by M , and reelection proba-
bilities for P -proposals are never larger than for G-proposals.
• For sequential equilibria in Areas III to V it holds that the higher wP,o is, the
higher this proposal’s credibility is.
9.4 Informational Quality of Sequential Equilibria
After we have derived all potential sequential equilibria, we wish to analyze their
“informational quality”. At least forM , it might be important to know - from his point
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of view - the ex-ante probability that a sequential equilibrium generates a “correct”
outcome. This is the ex-ante probability from the agents’ viewpoint that a policy is
implemented after voting that represents the correct state of the world. The higher
this probability, the higher the informational quality of the equilibrium.
Definition 14 (Informational Quality)
The term “informational quality” of a sequential equilibrium denotes - from the agents’
viewpoint - the ex-ante probability that a policy is implemented after voting that
represents the correct state of the world. Before the play of equilibrium strategies,
this probability is assigned by agents within the voting model, i.e., by voters and
parties (agents’ view).
In Table C.4, we give an overview of the informational quality of all potential sequential
equilibria. Furthermore, we give probabilities for the implementation of G, the actual
correct view of the economy. This is the probability that an informed observer from
outside the voting game would assign an equilibrium to generate G as outcome.
Definition 15 (Probob{G})
Probob{G} denotes the probability that a sequential equilibrium generates a policy
that represents the real state of the world G. This is the probability that an in-
formed observer from outside the voting game would assign a sequential equilibrium
to generate G as outcome (observer’s view).
From the agents’ point of view, a potential sequential equilibrium with information
structure (ind, info) generates with probability λ(1
2
+ 1
2
σiL)+(1−λ) the correct policy:
This information structure is possible in Areas III and IVa. The αLl -type informs with
probability σiL and then proposes the correct view. Even if it proposes P and P
is refused by M , this policy is implemented with certainty, because the r-party also
implemts a P -policy. With probability (1 − σiL), αLl does not inform and proposes
P . From the agents’ point of view, the ex-ante probability for P being correct is 1
2
.
Again, it does not matter whether this view is accepted or not because r implements
the same policy. Therefore, the αLl -type’s behavior generates the correct policy with
probability (σiL + (1 − σiL)12). The αMl -type does always inform and proposes the
correct policy. The probability of occurence for the αLl -type is λ and for the α
M
l -type
is (1 − λ). In summary, the ex-ante probability from an agent’s point of view that
a sequential equilibrium with information structure (ind, info) generates the correct
policy is λ(σiL + (1− σiL)12) + (1− λ) = λ(12 + 12σiL) + (1− λ).
From the observer’s point of view, in equilibria of Area III, αMl always proposes G:
If this type informs, it will learn the real state of the world, and therefore proposes
wG,u. But even if αMl only informs with a probability less than 1, it will propose
126
Chapter 9. Equilibria
the correct view, because it also proposes G if it does not inform. The G-proposal
is accepted from M with certainty, and hence αMl ’s behavior generates the correct
outcome G. The αLl -type informs with probability σiL, and therefore learns G with
the same probability. Hence, for a sequential equilibrium of Area III, the probability
for the implementation of G from the observer’s viewpoint is (1− λ) + λσiL.
Furthermore, note that - as long as r proposes a P -policy - the voting game always
leads to the implementation of the policy which is proposed by l: If l proposes G, it
is accepted with certainty. On the other hand, if l proposes P , it is implemented with
probability σPM by l and with probability (1− σPM) by r. Therefore, the informational
quality of an equilibrium corresponds to the probability with which l proposes the
correct view from the agents’ ex-ante standpoint.
Table C.4 shows that from the observer’s point of view, equilibria of Area I are the most
efficient since they always generate G. This is in sharp contrast to their informational
quality which is the lowest of all potential equilibria (Prob{Area I} = 1
2
). For the
informed observer, equilbria with information structure (ind, info) and (ind, ind) are
second best. Equilibria with information structure (ind, info) always have a higher
informational quality than equilibria with (ninfo, info) and (ninfo, ind). There are
no general statements possible about the informational quality of potential equilibria
of Area III with (ind, ind). Whether their informational quality is better or worse than
those of the other equilibria depends on paramter values. We only know that they
have higher quality than equilibria of Area I. Note that the formulas for informational
qualities in Table C.4 depend on the values of σiL and σiM which in general are not
the same for different equilibria.
Obviously, the informational quality of equilibria increases if information probabilities
of l, σiL and σiM , increase. In our discussion of equilibria in Area III to V (Proposition
13, p. 118), we have learned that σiL and σiM are higher, the higher w
P,o is, at least
for a given information structure. The reason is that the higher wP,o is, the higher
the credibility of this proposal has to be to have a chance σPM > 0 to be accepted.
Consequently, information probabilities of l have to be higher for a higher wP,o-proposal
in order to have a chance to be accepted a posteriori, i.e. after M has observed the
proposal in the voting game. A similar structure concerning informational quality can
be seen in Table C.4. For relatively low values of wP,o, i.e. if µ˜P (w
P,o) < 1
1+λ
, sequential
equilibria with σPM > 0 have a relatively low informational quality. These are equilibria
with information structures (ninfo, ind) and (ninfo, info). For higher values of wP,o,
i.e. if µ˜P (w
P,o) > 1
1+λ
, these equilibria cannot constitute. The interpretation is that
high values of wP,o may require equilibria with a high informational quality. For
example, sequential equilibria with information structure (ind, info) always have a
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higher informational quality than equilibria with information structures (ninfo, ind)
and (ninfo, info).
It is important to note that there are - from the agents’ point of view - no sequential
equilibria where both types of l inform with certainty and always propose the correct
view. This means, there are no sequential equilibria with informational quality of 1.
If corresponding strategies were played, M would accept any proposal. This behavior
of M cannot constitue an equilibrium because the αLl -type would lose any incentive
to propose a G-policy, and thus would never inform. On the other hand, we have
learned from the discussion of sequential equilibria that if M refused any P -proposal
(σPM = 0), α
L
l would not inform either and always propose G to secure reelection.
Therefore, the only “method” for M to induce the αLl -type to inform is to accept
a P -proposal with a certain probability which is neither zero nor 1. Nevertheless -
as we can see from possible information structures named in Table C.4 - there is no
sequential equilibrium where αLl informs with certainty. Only in Areas III and IVa,
are there sequential equilibria where αLl is indifferent: III and IVa (ind, info), and III
(ind, ind). But these equilibria cannot be equilibria with σiL = 1 since if l played this
strategy, credibility of the equilibrium P -proposal was 1. Furthermore, if αLl would
inform with certainty, the αMl -type would inform all the more, because it has more
incentives than αLl . Again, this would lead to σ
G
M = σ
P
M = 1 which cannot be a
sequential equilibrium.
In the following proposition, we make general statements concerning informational
qualities and Probob{G} of sequential equilibria.
Proposition 17
• For sequential equilibria where exactly one type of l is indifferent concerning its
information decision we can make the following general statement (with excep-
tion of Area-I- and Area-VI-equilibria): For a given information structure, the
higher wP,o is, the higher the informational quality of the equilibrium is.
• From the observer’s point of view, equilibria in Area I are the most efficient.
There we have Probob{G} = 1. Sequential equilibria with information structures
(ind, info) and (ind, ind) are second best. There we have Probob{G} = (1−λ)+
λσiL.
• As long as the r-party proposes a P -reform the informational quality of a se-
quential equilibrium equals the probability with which the l-party proposes the
correct view from the agents’ ex-ante viewpoint.
• There are no sequential equilibria with informational quality 1.
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Discussion and Conclusions
10.1 Existence
According to the overview given in Table C.4, sequential equilibria of Area I are the only
sequential equilibria which exist independently of the P -proposals’ credibility require-
ments, since the l-party never makes a P -proposal in these equilibria. Therefore, and
because they are the only equilibria where it is possible that both types do not inform,
this equilibria exist for a broad range of parameter values. In all other equilibria, infor-
mation conditions for existence are more restrictive. As discussed in connection with
Proposition 11 (p. 115), equilibria in Area I only do not exist if αMl >
1
2
+ k
∆c(wGs −wGb )
,
µ˜G(w
G
s ) >
λ
1+λ
, and µ˜G(w
G
b ) <
1
2
. The latter two conditions imply that wGb and w
G
s
are quite close to each other. Furthermore, the information costs k are low relative to
the maximal size ∆c of policy effects. If αMl informs, it proposes both G-reforms, but
then the small one is not sufficiently credible. On the other hand, if neither type of l
informs, both G-proposals are “too” credible to sustain a non-information equilibrium
(µ˜G(w
G
s ) <
1
2
and µ˜G(w
G
b ) <
1
2
). In all other cases, equilibria in Area I exist. In
Section 10.3.5, we will show numerical examples.
Sequential Equilibria in Area VI only exist if αMl informs with positive probability.
The information condition is αMl ≥ 12 + k∆c(wP,o−wG,u) , which is less restrictive than
the information condition for the (ninfo, info)-equilibrium of Area I: αMl ≥ 12 +
k
∆c(wG,o−wG,u) . The reason is that the α
M
l -type can gain more by information if it
proposes the correct state of the world in the case of θ = P .
For sequential equilibria not in Area I and VI, existence conditions are getting much
more complex. The (ninfo, info)-equilibria of Areas III, IV, and V only exist if the
credibility requirement for the wP,o-proposal is fulfilled with equality, i.e., µ˜P (w
P,o) =
1
1+λ
. For the rest of the potential sequential equilibria named in Table C.4 at least
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one type of l has to be indifferent concerning its information decision. This means the
corresponding information condition has to be fulfilled with equality. Nevertheless, in
Section 10.3.5 we will show the existence of IIIa (ind, info), IIIa (ind, ind), and IVb
(ninfo, ind).
As discussed above, the existence conditions of Area-I- and Area-VI-equilibria are
quite easy to describe. In Section 10.3.5, we will show numerically that they can exist
together for the same parameter values. Relationships become more complex if we
want to analyze under which conditions the other equilibria can exist together. With
the term “exist together” or “coexist” we mean quilibria that do coexist for different
values of σPM , whereas all other strategic variables of M - in particular w
P,o - and all
parameter values remain constant.
For sequential equilibria in Area III, where at least one type has the information state
of indifference, it is possible to verify that they cannot coexist. Information conditions
for all equilibria in this area are the same. If a type is indifferent in an equilibrium, the
corresponding condition is fulfilled with equality for exactly one value of σPM , if we take
all other strategic variables of M as given, especially wP,o. Hence, for a given value of
wP,o, only one of the equilibria III (ind, info), III (ind, ind), and III (noinfo, ind) can
exist, i.e., they do exclude each other. For example, if αLl has the information state
of indifference like in (ind, info) and (ind, ind), it is not possible for αMl to be with
the same σPM in the state of information and in the state of indifference. The α
M
l -type
is either indifferent or not, but not both. If we compare information conditions for
(ind, info) with (ninfo, ind) we recognize that σPM would have to increase to come
from an indifferent state of αLl to a state of non-information. On the other hand, if σ
P
M
increases we never come from the state of information for αMl to a state of indifference.
We can also exclude equilibria with high credibility requirements ( µ˜P (w
P,o) ≥ 1
1+λ
)
from coexistence. These are equilibria III (ind, info), III (ind, ind), and IVa (ind, info).
The reason is that IVa (ind, info) has the same indifference condition for αLl as III
(ind, info) and III (ind, ind), whereas σPM has to be larger in Area IVa than in Area
III. Hence, there can only be at the most one sequential equilibrium with high credibility
requirements for a given wP,o.
Finally, as can easily be seen from the information conditions in Tables C.1 and C.2,
there is a critical level of information costs k, above which no type in any area will
inform any more. Thus, the only possible sequential equilibrium which is left is I
(ninfo, ninfo).
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10.2 Equilibrium Refinements
In this section we wish to discuss whether the occurrence of some sequential equilibria
could be more plausible than the occurrence of others. For this, we use the concepts
of payoff dominance and the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps (1987)).
10.2.1 Payoff Dominance
First, we analyze which sequential equilibria could be preferred from players with
respect to payoffs. As we will see in the following, it is not possible to make general
statements, as to whether there is an equilibrium which is preferred by both players
according to payoff dominance. Nevertheless, it will be helpful to analyze under which
circumstances some equilibria might be preferred to others.
Obviously, a sequential equilibrium in Area VI is quite attractive for the l-party, since
each proposal is accepted with certainty and thus, l is reelected with certainty. In this
equilibrium, l can behave solely according to its economic concerns. For the αLl -type,
expected payoff in this equilibrium is the highest of all possible equilibria: Firstly,
it always prefers a P -reform on economic grounds1, and additionally, this is the only
equilibrium where σPM = 1. Secondly, α
L
l does not even have to incur information costs
to get reelected. For αMl , the equilibrium in VI has a strictly higher payoff than in any
other equilibrium where αMl informs with positive probability, at least as long as w
G,u
in Area VI is not smaller than in other equilibria. The reason is that αMl wants to
propose a P -reform if it learns that θ = P , and is reelected with certainty only in VI.
The payoff in VI is also strictly higher than in the Area-I-equilibrium where αMl does
not inform and chooses to propose wG,o: If αMl is reelected with certainty it always
prefers wP,o with no information. Therefore, proposing a P -reform with no information
is better than proposing a G-reform with no information. Furthermore, informing and
proposing the correct state of the economy must be better than not informing and
proposing P because otherwise, the equilibrium in VI would not exist. Hence, the
equilibrium in VI generates a strictly higher payoff for αMl than the (ninfo, ninfo)-
equilibrium of Area I.
In the next step, we want to discuss whether equilibria in Areas III, IV and V are
better or worse than equilibria in Area I for the l-party. In an Area-I-equilibrium αLl
will never inform, it proposes a G-reform but is reelected with certainty. On the other
hand, in equilibria of Area III to V, the αLl -type does not always inform with positive
probability, and then it proposes a P -reform, which is more favorable for this type
1It prefers this policy even if it knew that θ = G.
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than proposing G with respect to economic concerns. If αLl -proposes P , it has to take
into account that it is not reelected, but even if this is the case, this type’s economic
concerns are taken into account by the r-party which will impose a P -reform anyway.
Consequently, for the αLl -type many equilibria in III to V might be better than an
Area-I-equilibrium.
For the αMl -type, we can make more exact statements concerning which equilibrium it
prefers. First, we compare the Area-I-equilibrium where the αMl -type does not inform
with the other equilibria. In Areas III and IVb, if αMl only informs with probability
less than 1 and proposes G with no information, the αMl -type is obviously indifferent
between the Area-I-(ninfo, ninfo)-equilibrium and III- and IVb-equilibria.2 If αMl
only informs with probability less than 1 and proposes P with no information, it might
be worse off than under Area I with (ninfo, ninfo) because it is indifferent between
information and no information and has to take the risk of not being reelected if it
proposes P . Furthermore, αMl will prefer equilibria in Areas III and IVb where it
informs with certainty to the Area-I-(ninfo, ninfo)-equilibrium: If it did not prefer
these equilibria it would not inform, since it proposed G with no information like in
the Area-I-equilibrium. On the other hand, if αMl always informs in equilibrium, but
would play P with no information (Areas IVa and V), it is not clear whether these
equilibria are preferred to I (ninfo, ninfo). This is because reelection is not certain
for a P -proposal. Finally, note that we do not have to compare Area-I-equilibria with
other equilibria where αMl never informs, because such equilibria do not exist.
Now we turn to the Area-I-equilibrium with (ninfo, info). This equilibrium is pre-
ferred by αMl if it only informs with probability less than 1 and proposes in the case
of no information G (Areas III and IVb). The reason is that αMl prefers to inform
in Area I, because expected payoff is higher than with no information and proposing
G. But this is exactly the same payoff that αMl obtains in Areas III and IVb with
no information and proposing G. If αMl only informs with probability less than 1 in
Areas IVa and V and proposes P with no information, it is not clear whether the
Area-I-equilibrium is still preferred. The reason is that αMl prefers a P -proposal with
no information on economic grounds and might still prefer this proposal even it lowers
chances of reelection. And last but not least, if αMl informs with certainty in Area
III to V, it might prefer these equilibria to I (ninfo, info) since it always prefers to
propose θ = P if it learns that this is the real state of the world. And even if it was
not reelected, at least r will implement his preferred economic policy.
For the M -group, general statements about ex-ante equilibrium preferences are not
2If it informs, e.g. in Area III (ninfo, ind), it has to incur information costs, but is better off than
in Area I with respect to economic concerns if it learns of and proposes θ = P . In summary, it has
the same payoff as in the case of no information.
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at all possible. For example, if we compare equilibrium I (ninfo, info) with VI
(ninfo, info): From Table C.4, we can see that the informational quality of I (ninfo, info)
is only 1
2
, whereas the informational quality of VI (ninfo, info) is λ1
2
+ (1 − λ) =
1 − 1
2
λ > 1
2
. Nevertheless, it is far from clear that M would prefer the Area-VI-
equilibrium: On the one hand, if, in a VI-(ninfo, info)-equilibrium, the wP,o-proposal
occurs, M knows that this proposal corresponds with probability 1− 1
2
λ to the correct
state of the world. On the other hand, if θ = G, and, for example, wP,o = wPs is
implemented, M might lose more utility than if wG,o = wGs was imposed in an Area-
I-(ninfo, info)-equilibrium in the case of θ = P . The reason is voter’s risk aversion
represented by a concave utility function and the fact that wPr >
1
2
(compare with
the remarks to Proposition 9 in Section 8.3.2 “The M-Group’s Best Responses and
Beliefs”).
In general, for theM-voter, there might be a trade-off between the informational quality
of sequential equilibria and risk, i.e., the size and direction of reforms connected with
these equilibria: An equilibrium with a small informational quality and small reform
sizes might be preferred to an equilibrium with higher informational quality but larger
reform sizes. The IVa-(ninfo, ind)-reforms might be preferred to the VI-(ninfo, info)-
reforms, even if the wP,o’s are the same, because the “risky” wP,o is only implemented
with a probability smaller than one in the IVa-(ninfo, ind)-equilibrium. Furthermore,
as discussed in the last paragraph, an equilibrium with low informational quality and
the possible implementation of a G-reform might be preferred to an equilibrium with
a higher informational quality and the possible implementation of a P -reform.
10.2.2 The Intuitive Criterion
In this section, we want to discuss whether the sequential equilibria that we found
satisfy the Intuitive Criterion owing to Cho and Kreps (1987). According to the
concept of a sequential equilibrium that we have used so far, out-off-equilibrium actions
are interpreted as a player’s mistake. According to the Intuitive Criterion, out-off-
equilibrium actions are interpreted as a message, which is intentionally sent to the
other player. An equilibrium satisfies this criterion if there is no incentive for a player
to deviate intentionally from his equilibrium actions. In contrast, an equilibrium fails
to satisfy the Intuitive Criterion if there is an incentive for a player to deviate.
In a sequential equilibrium of our voting game, at least one type of l might have an
incentive to send the following message to M : “Although unexpected by you, I am
making an out-off-equilibrium proposal. This should convince you that I am informed
about the real state of the world and my proposal is made accordingly. Therefore, you
should approve it.” TheM -group believes this message from its sender if the following
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conditions are fulfilled:
(i) The other l-type has no incentive to lie: The equilibrium payoff of the other type
is strictly larger than if this type had played the out-off-equilibrium proposal but
had not informed. The equilibrium payoff is always strictly larger, even if M
responded to the message in the most favorable way for this type. In our case,
this would mean that M assigned credibility 1 to the unexpected proposal, and
therefore approved it with certainty.
(ii) The sender is strictly better off by informing and sending the out-off-equilibrium
proposal, as long as M believes that this message can only be made from the
sender, and thus, plays its best response accordingly. The reason for this belief
of M is that the other type can never do better than in equilibrium by making
the out-off-equilibrium-proposal no matter how M reacts (see item (i)).
If these conditions are given, the sender can improve its payoff by deviating, since M
would believe his message. Hence, the corresponding equilibrium fails the Intuitive
Criterion. In the following, we want to apply these considerations to the sequential
equilibria which we have derived in the previous sections (see Tables C.1, C.2, and
C.4).
First, we want to discuss whether there is an incentive for a type to inform and to
send an out-off-equilibrium-message wPb if, in equilibrium, l should make a G-proposal
or a wPs -proposal, i.e., w
P,o = wPs . Obviously, the α
L
l -type would never inform if M
believed that a wPb -proposal represented the real state of the world: For this type, as
long as it is elected with certainty, it is always best to propose the large P -reform even
if it knows that θ = G. Hence, the αLl -type has an incentive to lie. Therefore, in turn,
the αMl -type would not send such an out-off-equilibrium message, since condition (i)
would not hold and M would not believe that only an informed αMl -type would have
sent this message.
If l plays G or wPb in equilibrium, i.e., w
P,o = wPb , there may be an incentive for α
M
l to
inform and to send the unexpected message wPs to M . This type always prefers w
P
s to
any G-proposal if it is informed that θ = P . Moreover, in the case of θ = P , αMl may
also prefer to propose the small P -reform instead of the large one, because it would be
reelected with certainty, if M believed with certainty that the message is correct. On
the other hand, if αLl plays w
P
b in equilibrium, it may still prefer the large P -reform,
even though reelection probability in equilibrium for this proposal is smaller than 1.
Depending on parameter constellations, we also cannot exclude a situation where αLl
has an incentive to inform and play wPs , whereas α
M
l prefers to stay in equilibrium. For
example, the αLl -type might prefer to inform and send the out-off-equilibrium message
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instead of no information and playing wPb . This is because of very low information
costs and because it would be reelected with certainty when proposing wPs .
The third and last possible deviation from equilibrium is an informed wGb -proposal
instead of a wGs -proposal or a P -proposal in equilibrium.
3 The αLl -type never has an
incentive to deviate to wGb : If a G-proposal yielded a better payoff than an equilibrium
P -proposal, it would suffice for this type to play wGs . This is always economically
better for αLl than w
G
b , but nevertheless assures reelection. Furthermore, except of the
I-(ninfo, ninfo)-equilibrium, the αMl -type always informs with positive probability,
i.e., information is always at least as good as no information. Hence, it can improve
its equilibrium payoff by always informing and proposing wGb when it learns that θ = G.
Consequently, both conditions for a deviation in the sense of the Intuitive Criterion
are given if wG,u = wG,o = wGs , except for Area I (ninfo, ninfo). Therefore, these
equilibria fail the Intuitive Criterion, and we can conclude that with this refinement
only equilibria survive where the large G-reform is proposed with information.
There is actually no reason for one type to deviate from the I-(ninfo, ninfo)-equilibrium
to wGb . Otherwise, this equilibrium would not exist, i.e., α
M
l would inform in equilib-
rium (see Proposition 11, p. 115). Furthermore, in none of the Area-I-equilibria will a
deviation to a P -proposal take place, because the uninformed αLl -type always has an
incentive to lie. In summary, all equilibria in Area I satisfy the Intuitive Criterion.
Almost the same holds for the Area-VI-equilibria. If wP,o = wPs , the α
L
l -type has an
incentive to lie by deviating to wPb . In the case of w
P,o = wPb there is no incentive
to deviate for either of the two types. Deviations to a G-proposal do not make any
sense for the αLl -type. As discussed above, the only Area-VI-equilibrium that fails the
Intuitive Criterion is the one where wGs is proposed from α
M
l in the case of θ = G. The
reason is that αMl can credibly deviate to w
G
b , and hence strictly improve its payoff.
We are now able to summarize our observations concerning the Intuitive Criterion:
Observation 1 (Intuitive Criterion)
• Sequential equilibria where wPb is played with positive probability may fail the
Intuitive Criterion.
• Sequential equilibria in Area I always satisfy the Intuitive Criterion.
• According to the Intuitive Criterion and except for Area I, only sequential equi-
libria are played where αMl proposes w
G
b with information.
3A deviation wGs from a w
G
b -proposal or a P -proposal in equilibrium is not possible since there is
no equilibrium where only the large G-reform would be approved (see Lemma 11, p. 107). Moreover,
there are no sequential equilibria where only P -proposals are played. Hence, there is no deviation
possible where wGs could be played as out-off-equilibrium-message. In any equilibrium, at least the
small G-proposal is made.
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10.3 The Game’s Characteristic Sequential Equi-
libria
In the following, we wish to take a closer look at three different types of sequential
equilibria which reveal the characteristic features of the voting process.
10.3.1 Opportunistic Equilibria
First, we analyze equilibria in Area I. We will call them opportunistic equilibria because
in these equilibria both types only care about reelection and therefore always propose
G. They will propose G even if they prefer a P -proposal on economic grounds, e.g.,
even if they learn that θ = P with information. The reason for this behavior is that
M rejects any P -proposal with certainty. Furthermore, the benefit B of reelection is
high enough that even the αLl -type does not refuse reelection although in that case
the r-party would implement the optimal policy of this type, i.e., a P -reform. From
M ’s perspective, any P -proposal is rejected with certainty since any P -proposal would
be out-off-equilibrium with credibility 1
2
, which is not high enough for the risk-averse
voter.
10.3.2 Sincere Equilibria
The second type of equilibria we wish to consider are those in Area VI. We denote them
as sincere equilibria in the sense that both types of l behave as if they took only their
economic concerns into consideration and as if there were no voting game. If there
were no voting game, they would not have to make strategic considerations and they
would only act according to their true economic preferences. In a sincere equilibrium l
can behave in this way because it is reelected with certainty for any proposed view (G
and P ). The M -group is willing to accept both views with certainty if the αMl -type
informs with positive probability and if the probability λ that the l-party is of the
αLl -type is not “too high”. The reason for the latter condition is that this type does
not inform and always proposes P .
10.3.3 Highly Informative Equilibria
Finally, we wish to discuss equilibria with information structures (ind, info) and
σiL > 0 in Areas III and IV. We call them highly informative equilibria. They have
both a high informational quality and a high probability of generating the efficient
policy outcome G from the observer’s point of view (see Section 9.4 “Informational
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Quality of Sequential Equilibria”). For a given λ, their informational quality belongs
to the highest of all equilibria. Only equilibria in Area III with information structure
(ind, ind) could have higher quality.4 The highly informative equilibria are character-
ized by a relatively large P -reform (µ˜P (w
P,o) > 1
1+λ
) and reelection probabilities for a
P -reform between 0 and 1. Both characteristics support directly and indirectly a high
information probability of both types of l. Directly, because information probabilities
σiL and σiM have to be high enough that a large P -proposal is credible enough to
be approved a posteriori. Indirectly, since highly informative equilibria are supported
through an “intermediate” reelection probability σPM in the following sense: If σ
P
M = 0
there was less incentive to gather information since any P -proposal would be rejected
anyway. If σPM = 1 incentives for gathering information are also smaller since l is
reelected anyway. Further, note that the higher the benefits from holding office are,
the higher σPM will be. If B is high, there must be a high reelection probability for
a P -reform, to cause the l-party informing and not just proposing G to be reelected
with certainty.
10.3.4 Summary
As can be seen from Table C.4, opportunistic equilibria exist independently of the
P -reforms’ credibility requirements. Highly informative equilibria can only constitute
if µ˜P (w
P,o) > 1
1+λ
. In this case, either the probability λ of a αLl -type is high, or
the proposed P -reform is large, or both. Therefore, the risk-averse M is only willing
to accept the P -reform if information probability σiL of α
L
l is larger than zero. In
contrast, a sincere equilibrium does not constitute under this constellation since λ
is so high or wP,o is so large that the M -group will not accept a P -proposal with
certainty if σiL = 0. On the other hand, M will accept both possible views (G and
P ) in a sincere equilibrium if λ is small or the proposed P -reform is small. Then,
µ˜P (w
P,o) ≤ 1
1+λ
, and a highly informative equilibrium cannot constitute, since, if the
P -proposal is accepted anyway, the αLl -type has no incentive to inform.
10.3.5 Numerical Examples
Suppose we have the following parameter constellation: c¯ = 100, c = 20, B = 80,
k = 3, wPr = 0.60, wsq = 0.58, λ = 0.80, α
L
l = 0.40, α
M
l = 0.62. Furthermore, we
assume that wGb = 0.00, w
G
s = 0.56, and w
P
s and w
P
b are such that µ˜P (w
P
s ) <
1
1+λ
, and
µ˜P (w
P
b ) >
1
1+λ
.
4It is not possible to make general statements about the relationship between (ind, ind)- and
(ind, info)-equilibria with respect to their informational qualities.
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In this case, we obtain a highly informative (ind, info)-equilibrium in Area
IIIa for wP,o = wPb (µ˜P (w
P,o) > 1
1+λ
= 0.556). In this equilibrium, proposals are
σ˜Πl (α
L
l )
∗
= (wG,o, wP,o, wP,o) and σ˜Πl (α
M
l )
∗
= (wG,u, wP,o, wG,o) (see Table C.1) with
αLl ’s information probability σiL
∗. Since αLl is indifferent concerning its information
decision it must hold that 1
2
B∆σM
∗ − k = (1
2
− αLl )∆cΣoM ∗ while αMl informs, i.e.
1
2
B∆σM
∗+k < 1
2
σPM
∗
∆c∆wP,o
∗
+σGM
∗
∆c
[(
αMl − 12
)
∆wG,u
∗
+
(
1− αMl
)
∆wG,o
∗]
. Fur-
thermore, since this equilibrium lies in Area IIIa, we have (1−αLl )∆cΣoM ∗ ≥ B∆σM ∗ >
(1− αMl )∆cΣoM ∗. In the following table, we give an overview of some possible equilib-
rium P -proposals, the corresponding beliefs µ(θ = P | wP,o∗) = µ˜P (wP,o∗), information
probabilities σiL
∗ and reelection probabilities σPM
∗
. We also list their informational
quality, Prob{(ind, info)} = λ(1
2
+ 1
2
σiL
∗) + (1− λ), and their probability to generate
the actually correct view G, Probob{G}.
Table 10.1: Values for highly informative equilibria in Area IIIa with wPr = 0.60
wP,o
∗
σPM
∗
σiL
∗ µ(θ = P | wP,o∗) = Informational Quality Probob{G}
µ˜P (w
P,o∗) = 1
1+λ(1−σiL∗)
0.77 0.8868 0.030 0.563 0.612 0.224
0.80 0.8817 0.052 0.569 0.621 0.241
0.90 0.8651 0.124 0.588 0.650 0.299
1.00 0.8491 0.200 0.610 0.680 0.360
Finally, the listed highly informative Area-IIIa-equilibria can be fully described by
wG,u
∗
= 0.00, wG,o
∗
= 0.56, µ(θ = G | wG,u∗) = µ(θ = G | wG,o∗) = 1, and σGM ∗ = 1.5
From Table 10.1, we can clearly see that the higher wP,o
∗
is, the higher informa-
tion probabilities, credibilities, information qualities, and ProbG are. Only reelection
probabilities σPM
∗
decrease when wP,o
∗
increases: If the reelection probabilitiy did not
decrease, the αLl -type would no longer inform (
1
2
B∆σM − k < (12 − αLl )∆cΣoM) since
partisan (economic) concerns ∆cΣoM increase when w
P,o increases (and σPM remains
constant or increases). Therefore, the advantage of gaining office B∆σM by propos-
ing G also has to increase to induce αLl to inform with a certain positive probability.
Obviously, B∆σM increases when σ
P
M decreases.
6
As previously discussed, in the case of µ˜P (w
P,o) > 1
1+λ
no sincere equilibrium can
constitute. Nevertheless, there will be an opportunistic equilibrium for the parameter
5Since µ˜G(wGb = 0.00) = 0.575 >
1
2 , another possiblity would be that w
G,u∗ = wG,o∗ = wGs (see
Proposition 13, p. 118).
6For this argumentation, compare with Section 9.3 “Summary: General Characteristics of Sequen-
tial Equilibria”.
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constellation given above: Credibility requirements for the G-proposals are µ˜G(w
G
b =
0.00) = 0.575 and µ˜G(w
G
s = 0.56) = 0.473. According to Proposition 11 (p. 115), since
µ˜G(w
G
s ) = 0.473 >
λ
1+λ
= 0.444, no (ninfo, info)-equilibrium in Area I will exist. But
if M plays wG,u = wG,o = wGs an opportunistic (ninfo,ninfo)-equilibrium exists
because credibility requirements for the large G-reform exceed 1
2
, and thus, reject the
large G-reform if it is proposed unexpectedly is a sequentially rational behavior. In this
equilibrium, any P -proposal is rejected with certainty, the equilibrium’s informational
quality is only 1
2
, but the probabilty of implementing the actually correct view G is 1.
Now suppose that M is only willing to accept the small P -reform with positive prob-
ability, i.e., wP,o = wPs . Then, no highly informative equilibrium can constitute, since
we have assumed µ˜P (w
P
s ) <
1
1+λ
. Instead, a sincere equilibrium can constitute if the
information condition for Area-VI-equilibria is fulfilled, i.e., αMl >
1
2
+ k
∆c(wP,o−wG,u) (see
Proposition 14, p. 121). Suppose M plays wG,u = wGb = 0.00 and w
G,o = wGs = 0.56.
Suppose further that wP,o = 0.70 with µ˜P (w
P,o) = 0.551 < 0.555 = 1
1+λ
. In this
case, a sincere equilibrium with this strategy of M exists because 0.62 = αMl >
1
2
+ k
∆c(wP,o−wG,u) = 0.554. If w
P,o = 0.65, the corresponding strategies would also
constitute an Area-VI-equilibrium with 1
2
+ k
∆c(wP,o−wG,u) = 0.558. The informational
quality of these equilibria is λ1
2
+ (1− λ) = 0.6, and Probob{G} = (1− λ) = 0.2.
Note that, for the same wP,o, sincere and opportunistic or highly informative and
opportunistic equilibria can coexist, but sincere and highly informative equilibria.
Finally, suppose that λ = 0.90. Then, 0.4737 = λ
1+λ
> µ˜G(w
G
s ) = 0.4732, and an
opportunistic equilibrium with (ninfo, info), wG,u
∗
= wGb , and w
G,o∗ = wGs exists
since the information condition for αMl is fulfilled: 0.62 = α
M
l >
1
2
+ k
σGM∆c(w
G,o−wG,u) =
0.567 with σGM
∗
= 1 (see Proposition 11, p. 115). A (ninfo, info)-equilibrium exists
for a higher value of λ because the probability is higher that a wGs -proposal is not a
lie, i.e., this proposal is not made by the party, although it is informed about θ = P .
Because, in a (ninfo, info)-equilibrium, the αMl -type lies in this way, these equilibria
only exist for low probabilities (1−λ) of αMl . If (1−λ) is too large, M is not willing to
accept even a small G-proposal, because it is very likely to represent the wrong state
of the world.
In Appendix B.2, we show numerically the existence of an Area-IIIa-(ind, ind)- and
an Area-IVb-(ninfo, ind)-equilibrium.
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10.4 The r-Party Proposes the G-View instead of
the P -View
In this section, we will discuss which changes in equilibria occur when the r-party
proposes a small G-reform wGr instead of w
P
r . In this case, Assumption 5 changes
slightly, and the order of proposals is now:
0 ≤ wGb <
1
2
< wGs < w
G
r < wsq < w
P
s < w
P
b ≤ 1
Technically, this behavior of r corresponds to a decrease in wPr since the status quo
regulation level wsq has no direct influence on the strategic considerations of M or
l (see best responses of l and M in previous sections). Nevertheless, there will be
changes in the informational quality of equilibria and the probability of reversal from
the observer’s viewpoint, Probob{G}.
In the following, we will focus on the three types of equilibria that we discussed in the
previous section: opportunistic, sincere, and highly informative equilibria.
First, for the purpose of comparison, we compute Area-IIIa-(ind, info)-equilibria with
the same parameter values as in the previous section (see Table 10.1) but with wGr =
0.57 instead of wPr = 0.60. The results are shown in Table 10.2.
Table 10.2: Values for highly informative equilibria in Area IIIa with wGr = 0.57
wP,o
∗
σPM
∗
σiL
∗ µ(θ = P | wP,o∗) = Informational Quality Probob{G}
µ˜P (w
P,o∗) = 1
1+λ(1−σiL∗)
0.80 0.8824 0.032 0.563 0.599 0.316
0.90 0.8659 0.105 0.583 0.623 0.380
1.00 0.8499 0.182 0.604 0.647 0.444
For the same wP,o
∗
, reelection probabilities increase if r proposes wGr . This is a general
result for the highly informative equilibria and all other equilibria in Areas III, IV,
and V where one type of l is indifferent concerning its information decision: If the
value of wPr decreases to w
G
r , ∆w
G,o decreases by the same amount as ∆wP,o increases.
Since ΣoM = σ
G
M∆w
G,o + σPM∆w
P,o, and σPM < σ
G
M , Σ
o
M decreases. This means, first,
that the areas’ borders decrease, and, second, in equilibria where one type has been
indifferent in his information decision, this indifference is lost (see Tables C.1 and
C.2). Consequently, as B∆σM is always the “left-hand-side”-part of the information
condition, σPM has to increase for these types of equilibria if w
P
r decreases to w
G
r .
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As discussed in Section 9.3 “Summary: General Characteristics of Sequential Equilib-
ria”, we can interpret ∆cΣoM as the weighted sum of reform effects relative to their
alternative, which is the proposal of the r-party. If wPr decreases to w
G
r , ∆cΣ
o
M de-
creases relative to the l-party’s office concerns, B∆σM . If σ
P
M would not change, office
concerns would cause l to propose G instead of P to ensure reelection with certainty.
Hence, σPM , the probability of reelection when l proposes P , has to increase to induce l
to stick with its strategy in the highly informative equilibrium: The αlL-type remains
indifferent with respect to its information decision. The αLl -type needs a higher σ
P
M to
propose P because if it is not reelected, r does not impose this types’ favored P -policy.
For the sincere and opportunistic equilibria, nothing changes when r makes a G-
proposal, since in both types of equilibria l is reelected with certainty anyway: In an
opportunistic equilibrium, each type always proposes G with σGM = 1, and in a sincere
equilibrium, we have σGM = σ
P
M = 1.
Furthermore, Table 10.2 shows that information probabilities and credibilities decrease
for the same wP,o
∗
when r makes a G-proposal. The reason is a general decrease in
credibility requirements for P -proposals. Therefore, in all equilibria where credibilities
have to equal credibility requirements (equilibria in Areas III-V), credibilities and
information probabilities decrease. The decrease in credibility requirements for a given
P -proposal follows directly from the corollary below (The proof is analogous to the
proof of Lemma 30 which is part of the proof of Proposition 9. See Appendix B.2):
Corollary 3
Define µ˜P (w
P
r ) as
µ˜P (w
P
r ) :=
√
c¯− wP∆c−√c¯− wPr ∆c√
c+ wPr ∆c−
√
c+ wP∆c−√c¯− wPr ∆c+√c¯− wP∆c.
We obtain:
∂µ˜P
∂wPr
(wPr ) > 0 ∀wPr ∈ (0, 1) \ wP .
The reason for this behavior of µ˜P (·) is the risk aversion of voters. A G-proposal wGr
has a larger distance to wP,o than wPr has. Intuitively, referring to w
P,o, wGr is riskier
than wPr for voters.
Furthermore, informational qualities, with exception of Area-I- and Area-VI-equilibria
(where αMl informs with certainty), decrease when w
P
r decreases to w
G
r . The reason is
the following: If an l-type does not inform, the ex-ante probability of implementing
the correct policy from the agents’ viewpoint does not change. Since the agent assigns
probability 1
2
of each view being correct, it does not matter whether the alternative
to the l-party’s proposal is a G- or a P -policy. But if one type does inform, in all
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equilibria of Areas III to V, it proposes the correct policy. Hence, if r implements a
P -policy when l is not reelected in the case of a P -proposal, r still implements the
correct policy. This changes when r proposes G as an alternative. In this case, an
informed P -proposal of l is only accepted with probability σPM .
In Table 10.3 we list the new expressions for informational qualities and Probob{G}.
They are derived from the same lines of argumentation as in Section 9.4.
Table 10.3: Informational Quality and Probob{G} when the r-party proposes G
Information Structure Area Informational Quality Probob{G}
I 1
2
1
(ninfo, info) III-VI λ1
2
+ (1− λ)(1
2
+ 1
2
σPM) λ(1− σPM) + (1− λ)
(ninfo, ind) III, IVb λ1
2
+ (1− λ)(1
2
+ 1
2
σiMσ
P
M) λ(1− σPM) + (1− λ)
IVa, V, VI λ(1− σPM) + (1− λ)·
(σiM + (1− σiM)(1− σPM))
(ind, info) III, IVa λ(1
2
+ 1
2
σiLσ
P
M)+ λ(1− σPM(1− σiL))+
(1− λ)(1
2
+ 1
2
σPM) (1− λ)
(ind, ind) III λ(1
2
+ 1
2
σiLσ
P
M)+
(1− λ)(1
2
+ 1
2
σiMσ
P
M)
Concerning the probability of implementing G from the observer’s point of view
(Probob{G}), Table 10.3 tells us the following facts (compare with Table C.4):
If r proposes G instead of P , Probob{G} remains constant for opportunistic and sincere
equilibria. For the (ninfo, info)-, Area-III-(ninfo, ind)-, and Area-IVb-(ninfo, ind)-
equilibria, Probob{G} even increases. For the remaining equilibria, in particular for
highly informative equilibria, it is difficult to make general statements. We observe
competing effects. On the one hand, Probob{G} should increase, since in the case
that the r-party gains power, it implements a G-policy instead of a P -policy. On the
other hand, Probob{G} should decrease, since credibility requirements decrease when r
proposes wGr instead of w
P
r and hence, information probabilities also decrease. Further-
more, reelection probabilities for l from implementing P , σPM
∗
, increase. Obviously,
the latter effects lower Probob{G}. We know that credibility requirements for a given
wP,o in the case of wGr are the lower compared to w
P
r , the larger the distance between
wGr and w
P
r is (Corollary3). Hence we should expect a threshold value for w
P
r − wGr
beyond which Probob{G} decreases. That is, Probob{G} decreases if wPr −wGr exceeds
the threshold value. This conjecture can be confirmed in many simulations. In the
following, we will summarize these observations in a proposition and in a conjecture.
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Proposition 18
Suppose the r-party proposes a G-policy wGr instead of w
P
r , where
1
2
< wGs < w
G
r < wsq < w
P
r
If all other parameter values and strategic variables of M remain constant, we obtain
the following results:
(i) Probabilities for implementing G from the observer’s point of view, Probob{G},
increase for the following equilibria: Area-III-to-V-(ninfo, info), Area-III-(ninfo, ind),
and Area-IVb-(ninfo, ind). Probob{G} remains constant in opportunistic and
sincere equilibria.
(ii) For highly informative equilibria, reelection probabilities for P -proposals σPM
∗
increase.
(iii) Credibility requirements for P -proposals decrease. Consequently, credibilities for
P -proposals in equilibria of Areas III to V decrease. In particular, credibilities
for P -proposals in highly informative equilibria decrease.
(iv) Informational qualities of equilibria decrease - with exception of opportunistic
equilibria and sincere equilibria. In these types of equilibria, informational qual-
ities remain constant.
Conjecture 2
Suppose the r-party proposes a G-policy wGr instead of w
P
r , where
1
2
< wGs < w
G
r < wsq < w
P
r
If all other parameter values and strategic variables of M remain constant, we ob-
tain the following result for Area-III-(ind, ind)-, Area-IVa/V-(ninfo, ind)- and highly
informative equilibria:
Probabilities for implementing G from the observer’s point of view, Probob{G}, in-
crease, if wPr −wGr is below a certain threshold value. If wPr −wGr exceeds this threshold
value, Probob{G} decreases.
10.5 Equilibria when the r-Party Proposes a Reg-
ulation Parameter wPr <
1
2
In the previous sections we have analyzed which equilibria could occur in the voting
process and with which probabilities Probob{G} they lead to the reversal of a wrong
143
Chapter 10. Discussion and Conclusions
policy. As starting point, we have assumed that the correct view G arises on the
political agenda when economic conditions have deteriorated heavily after P had been
set for a relatively long time such that wsq >
1
2
(see Section 7.2.3). In this section
we wish to analyze whether the emergence of a crisis, i.e., wsq >
1
2
could also be
the outcome of a political process where G is already on the political agenda when
the process starts evolving from wsq <
1
2
. A crisis may be the result of a voting
process where P -proposals are accepted again and again by voters until the status quo
regulation level wsq as well as w
P
r exceed
1
2
.
Formally this means that we will analyze the voting game of the last sections under
the assumption that wsq <
1
2
, and thus, that wPr <
1
2
. In this case, Proposition
9 (ii), p. 102, tells us that any G-proposal must have a credibility higher than 1
2
in order to be approved, and that a P -proposal that is close enough to wPr has a
credibility requirement smaller than 1
2
. Therefore, to make the situation comparable to
the situation where wPr >
1
2
, we will assume that µ˜P (w
P
s ) <
1
2
, and µ˜P (w
P
b ) >
1
2
. This
means, we assume that the small P -reform is “very small” and the large P -reform is
“very large”. Remember, that we have made the same assumptions concerning the
size of G-reforms in the case of wPr >
1
2
.
For the derivation of sequential equilibria in the case of wPr <
1
2
, we can use the same
tables of the l-party’s best responses that we have used so far (Tables C.1 and C.2).
We only have to take into account that conditions concerning credibility requirements
have changed. If l’s best responses are those of Areas I to V, at least the small P -
reform is accepted with certainty by M . In these Areas, if wPs was proposed, it would
be either unexpected with credibility 1
2
or it would have a credibility not smaller than
1
2
. The reason is that in these Areas the l-party never “lies” when it proposes P , i.e., it
proposes P either if it is not informed or if it is informed that θ = P . It never proposes
P if it learns that θ = G. Therefore, M would accept at least the small P -proposal
with certainty, i.e., with σPM = 1. But then, we have σ
P
M ≥ σGM , and hence, there can
be no equilibrium in Areas I-V in the case of wPr <
1
2
. Instead, we can find sequential
equilibria in Areas VI and VII. We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 19
Suppose that wPr <
1
2
. Furthermore, suppose that µ˜P (w
P
s ) <
1
2
, and µ˜P (w
P
b ) >
1
2
. In
this case, there are only potential sequential equilibria in Areas VI and VII.
The following strategies constitute potential sequential equilibria in Area VI:
σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
P,o, wP,o, wP,o), σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wP,o, wP,o)
αLl will never inform; α
M
l will inform if α
M
l >
1
2
+ k
∆c(wP,o−wG,u)
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• σ˜Il = (ninfo, ind):
– For G-proposals:
GII: wG,u = wG,o = wGs with σ
G
M = 1
µ∗(θ = G | wGb ) = 12 , µ∗(θ = G | wGs ) = 1
GIII: wG,u = wG,o = wGb with σ
G
M = 1
µ∗(θ = G | wGb ) = 1, µ∗(θ = G | wGs ) = 12
– For P -proposals:
∗ For any wPb with µ˜P (wPb ) > 12 :
PII: wP,u = wP,o = wPs with σ
P
M = 1
µ∗(θ = P | wPs ) = 12−(1−λ)σiM ∈ [12 , 11+λ ], µ∗(θ = P | wPb ) = 12
∗ If µ˜P (wPb ) ≤ 11+λ :
PI: wP,u = wPs and w
P,o = wPb with σ
P
M = 1
µ∗(θ = P | wPs ) = 12 , µ˜P (wPb ) ≤ µ∗(θ = P | wPb ) = 12−(1−λ)σiM ∈ [12 , 11+λ ]
• σ˜Il = (ninfo, info):
– For G-proposals: Same behavior as with (ninfo, ind).
– For P -proposals:
∗ For any wPb with µ˜P (wPb ) > 12 :
PII: wP,u = wP,o = wPs with σ
P
M = 1
µ∗(θ = P | wPs ) = 11+λ , µ∗(θ = P | wPb ) = 12
∗ If µ˜P (wPb ) ≤ 11+λ :
PI: wP,u = wPs and w
P,o = wPb with σ
P
M = 1
µ∗(θ = P | wPs ) = 12 , µ∗(θ = P | wPb ) = 11+λ
The following strategies constitute a potential sequential equilibrium in Area VII:
σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
P,o, wP,o, wP,o), σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
P,u, wP,o, wP,o)
• σ˜Il = (ninfo, ninfo):
– For G-proposals:
GI: wG,u = wGb and w
G,o = wGs with σ
G
M = 0
µ∗(θ = G | wGb ) = 12 , µ∗(θ = G | wGs ) = 12
– For P -proposals:
PII: wP,u = wP,o = wPs with σ
P
M = 1
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µ∗(θ = P | wPs ) = 12 , µ∗(θ = P | wPb ) = 12
In Area VI, like in Area VII, there could also be a (ninfo, ninfo)-equilibrium with
wG,u = wGb , w
G,o = wGs , σ
G
M = 0, w
P,u = wP,o = wPs , and σ
P
M = 1. But such an
equilibrium would only exist if B < (2αMl − 1)∆c(wPs − wPr ), which is excluded by
Assumption 6 (B > ∆c ·max
wv
|wv − wPr |).
In Area VII, the αMl -type would only have an incentive to inform if w
P,u = wPs , and
wP,o = wPb . If α
M
l did inform, it would learn θ = G and, in spite of this, propose w
P,u.
This proposal would have credibility 0, and hence, would be rejected byM . Therefore,
wP,u = wP,o, and l will never inform in an equilibrium of Area VII.
Within our model, the emergence of a crisis can be easily understood. Although the
correct view G is already part of the political agenda, it will never be implemented
as long as wPr <
1
2
and αMl <
1
2
+ k
∆c(wP,o−wG,u) . The latter condition can hold if the
αMl -type’s interests for M ’s consumption are not very high, information costs k are
large, or wP,o and wG,u are quite close to each other. For example, this can be the case
if M -voters are only willing to accept the small reform proposals in either direction,
i.e., wG,o = wG,u = wGs and w
P,o = wP,u = wPs . If α
M
l <
1
2
+ k
∆c(wP,o−wG,u) , only
the Area-VII-equilibrium is possible where no type of l informs, both types always
propose wP,o = wPs , and M always accepts this proposal with certainty. Thus, w
P
s
is implemented, and hence, this proposal becomes the status quo regulation level wsq
in the next election campaign. If the r-party’s proposal in the next campaign is still
smaller than 1
2
, i.e., wPr <
1
2
, and the small reform proposals of l are still close enough
to each other, the voting process eventually leads to an ever rising regulation level, at
least as long as wPr <
1
2
.
We summarize our considerations in the following proposition:
Proposition 20
Suppose the status quo regulation level wsq is smaller than
1
2
, the P -proposal of the
r-party wPr is smaller
1
2
, and the l-party’s P -proposals are “very small” and “very
large”, i.e.,
µ˜P (w
P
s ) <
1
2
µ˜P (w
P
b ) >
1
2
.
In this case, there are only sequential equilibria with best response proposals in Areas
VI and VII. In particular, if αMl <
1
2
+ k
∆c(wP,o−wG,u) , only w
P
s will be proposed and
implemented.
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10.6 Development of Crises Over Time: Condi-
tions for Policy Reversals
In the following, we wish to discuss possible scenarios of how a crisis could develop over
time, i.e., under which conditions which equilibria occur together with the correspond-
ing probabilities of reversal Probob{G} for all possible wPr ∈ (0, 1). For this purpose,
we concentrate on opportunistic, sincere, and highly informative equilibria and formu-
late “rules of thumb”. These depend on parameter constellations k
∆c
, λ, and whether
wPr <
1
2
or wPr >
1
2
. We also analyze in which way the process could be influenced by
the behavior of agents. Therefore, we consider changes of the strategic variable wP,o.
In contrast, we take wG,o = wGs and w
G,u = wGb as given, since we assume that M
would always accept wGb if it was proposed by l. If M is willing to accept the large
G-reform, and it is proposed in equilibrium, M knows with certainty that G is the
correct view on the economy (Lemma 13, p. 108). The assumption that M behaves
in this way is also in accordance with the Intuitive Criterion (see Observation 1, p.
135). Furthermore, we use the quotient k
∆c
to simplify the description of information
conditions. This can be done by dividing the inequalities given in Tables C.1 and C.2
with ∆c, with the exception of the opportunistic and sincere equilibria for which we
have already formulated information conditions in this way.
For example, suppose k
∆c
is very large. In this case, information costs are relatively
large compared to the maximal size of reform effects. In other words, the incumbent
party would have to incur high information costs, although the maximal improve-
ment of economic conditions is small if it learns of and implements the correct policy.
Therefore, we have a “tendency towards” opportunistic equilibria in this case: Sup-
pose the G-view is already part of the political agenda, whereas the regulation level
wsq is still lower than
1
2
. As long as wPr <
1
2
and k
∆c
is very large, we have a “ten-
dency towards” an Area-VII-equilibrium, since this is the only equilibrium possible
if αMl <
1
2
+ k
∆c(wP,o−wG,u) (see Proposition 20, p. 146). Certainly, depending on the
exact values of parameters, we could also obtain an Area-VI-equilibrium, for example
if the distance between wP,o and wG,u is large enough. Nevertheless, by “tendency
towards”we mean that the value of k
∆c
is large enough that it determines which equi-
librium occurs. We can also call the Area-VII-equilibrium opportunistic since no type
of l informs, both types always make a P -proposal, and are nevertheless elected with
certainty. After wP,o has been implemented, the next elections take place, the old
wP,o-value is now the status quo regulation level, and there are new wPr -, w
P
b -, etc.
proposals. If, after some legislative periods, wPr is larger than
1
2
, and k
∆c
is large
enough, we obtain the opportunistic (ninfo, ninfo)-equilibrium, and thus a reversal
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of deteriorating policy with Probob{G} = 1.7
For the entries in the table below, Table 10.4 “Rules of Thumb”, we use the following
“rules”:
Firstly, if wPr <
1
2
, there is a tendency towards the opportunistic Area-VII-equilibrium
in the case of large values of k
∆c
, and a tendency towards an Area-VI-equilibrium in
the case of small values of k
∆c
. We also call the Area-VI-equilibrium with wPr <
1
2
a
sincere equilibrium, since both views are accepted with certainty. The only difference
from the case where wPr >
1
2
is that in the case of wPr <
1
2
, credibility requirements are
not restrictive, i.e., such an equilibrium always exists when the information condition
is fulfilled, since we have assumed that µ˜P (w
P
s ) <
1
2
(see Proposition 19, p. 144).
Concerning the size of wP,o and if wPr <
1
2
, we have a tendency towards a sincere
equilibrium if wP,o is large, since this is in accordance with the information condition.
The larger the difference between wP,o and wG,u, the more the information condition
αMl ≥ 12 + k∆c(wP,o−wG,u) is fulfilled. The reason is that the incentive for αMl to inform
increases when the value of information wP,o−wG,u increases. The value of information
is higher proportional to the level of economic gain from implementing a correct G-
reform instead of an incorrect P -reform. On the other hand, if wP,o is small, we have a
tendency towards an opportunistic Area-VII-equilibrium concerning the value of wP,o.
In this case, and if k
∆c
is small, there is a trade-off in effects between a small value of
k
∆c
and a small value of wP,o. Therefore, it is not clear which effect dominates. We do
not know whether an opportunistic or a sincere equilibrium occurs, and thus, we say
we have a tendency towards both types of equilibria.
Secondly, if wPr >
1
2
, we have to consider the following interactions: For large k
∆c
, we
have a tendency towards an opportunistic equilibrium. For small k
∆c
, there can be a
sincere or a highly informative equilibrium. We have a tendency towards a sincere
equilibrium if the probability λ of an αLl -type is small, or if w
P,o is small (see Table
C.4). The reason is that, in these cases, M also accepts a P -reform with certainty,
since credibility of this reform is relatively large. This is because the αMl -type is very
likely and it informs. Furthermore, credibility requirements for small wP,o-proposals
are small. On the other hand, there is a tendency towards highly informative equilibria,
if wP,o is large, or if λ is large. Firstly, if wP,o is large, the proposal is risky for M , and
hence, is only accepted when both types inform with positive probability. Secondly, if
λ is large, the probability for the occurrence of a αLl -type, which cares more about its
partisans, is also large. Therefore, as before, a P -proposal can only be accepted when
both types inform. Obviously, if λ is small and wP,o is large (or vice versa), there is a
7As discussed in Section 10.1 “Existence”, there is a threshold for k, and thus for k∆c , beyond
which only the opportunistic (ninfo, ninfo)-equilibrium remains.
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trade-off between low risk (high risk) caused by the type of l and high risk (low risk)
caused by the size of the proposal. In this case, the result is not unambiguous and there
is no tendency towards a special type of equilibrium, since there is one effect towards a
sincere equilibrium and one effect towards a highly informative equilibrium. Therefore,
depending on the exact proportion of parameter values, both types of equilibria could
occur.
Table 10.4: Rules of Thumb
k
∆c
wPr λ w
P,o tendency towards Probob{G}
small < 1
2
small small sincere/opportunistic (VII) large: (1− λ)∗ /0
large sincere large: (1− λ)∗
large small sincere/opportunistic (VII) small: (1− λ)∗ /0
large sincere small: (1− λ)∗
> 1
2
small small sincere large: (1− λ)∗
large sincere/highly informative large: (1− λ)∗ /
(1− λ) + λσiL
large small sincere/highly informative small: (1− λ)∗ /
(1− λ) + λσiL
large highly informative small: (1− λ) + λσiL
large < 1
2
small small opportunistic (VII) 0
large sincere/opportunistic (VII) large: (1− λ)∗ /0
large small opportunistic (VII) 0
large sincere/opportunistic (VII) small: (1− λ)∗ /0
> 1
2
small/large small/large opportunistic (I) 1
∗
If the information condition is fulfilled with equality, we have Probob{G} = (1− λ)σiM .
After discussing the rules, we can interpret the entries of Table 10.4, “Rules of Thumb”.
First, we recognize that the probability of a policy reversal Probob{G} is mainly deter-
mined by λ. Note that, when wPr <
1
2
, Probob{G} for the sincere equilibrium is (1−λ)
like in the case of wPr >
1
2
.
Starting from a low regulation level (wPr <
1
2
), and with information costs high relative
to maximal reform effects ∆c, a crisis can develop by an always increasing regulation
level, since the opportunistic Area-VII-equilibrium is played (see Proposition 20, pre-
vious section). But as soon as wPr exceeds
1
2
, a policy reversal occurs with certainty.
The reason is risk aversion of voters together with the party’s opportunistic behav-
ior, which “accidentally” generates a policy reversal, i.e., the reversal occurs without
information.
149
Chapter 10. Discussion and Conclusions
Observation 2
If k
∆c
is very large, only opportunistic equilibria exist. Then a policy reversal occurs
with certainty as soon as wPr >
1
2
.
If information costs are low or reform effects are very high, there are more incentives for
the l-party to gather information, and sincere or highly informative equilibria may also
occur.8 The l-party informs since costs are low or becauseM has too much to lose (∆c
is large) and, therefore, only accepts a P -proposal when information probabilities are
high. In these equilibria, the higher the probability (1− λ) that the l-party supports
the M -voters’ interests more than those of its partisans, the higher the probability
that a policy reversal occurs.
In Table 10.4, we assume “extreme” values to illustrate the basic driving forces of the
voting game. Intuitively, if parameter values are “moderate” relative to the values of
strategic variables, the behavior of agents can have a great influence on the occurrence
of equilibria (in the sense stated in the following observation). Therefore, concerning
sincere and highly informative equilibria, the following behavior of M could promote
a policy reversal (see also Table C.4 and Propositions 19 and 20 from the previous
section):
Observation 3
• Suppose that wPr < 12 , µ˜P (wPs ) < 12 , µ˜P (wPb ) > 12 ,and k∆c is not too large. In
this case a policy reversal could be promoted if M was willing to accept both
the large G- and the large P -reform. The reason is that a sincere equilibrium
where αMl proposes the large G-reform can only occur if α
M
l ≥ 12 + k∆c(wP,o−wG,u)
and hence, if (wP,o − wG,u) is large. If αMl < 12 + k∆c(wP,o−wG,u) , there is only an
opportunistic equilibrium where l always proposes wP,o.
• Suppose that wPr > 12 , µ˜P (wPs ) ≤ 11+λ , µ˜P (wPb ) > 11+λ , and k∆c is not too large. In
this case a policy reversal can be promoted if M accepts none or only the large
P -reform, since only highly informative, Area-III-(ind, ind)- and opportunistic
equilibria are then possible.
Concerning the second statement of Observation 3, we can say that a highly informa-
tive equilibrium will never occur if M is only willing to accept the small P -reform.
Furthermore, if we consider the second statement of Observation 3 from another per-
spective, we find a scenario which can explain the persistence of a crisis. Suppose the
crisis is already “severe”, i.e. wPr >
1
2
. Suppose further that λ is relatively large, but
the small P -reforms in each voting period are very small. In this case, it is possible
8Remember that when wPr >
1
2 , opportunistic equilibria are always possible independent of w
P,o
and λ.
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that we always have sincere equilibria since µ˜P (w
P
s ) <
1
1+λ
, but a relatively low prob-
ability of reversal as λ is relatively large (Probob{G} = 1− λ). The sincere equilibria
could be supported by the risk aversion of voters, because their expected payoff ex-
ante could be larger in a sincere equilibrium than in a highly informative equilibrium
with wP,o = wPb . The sincere equilibria could also be supported by the l-party since it
prefers them in almost all cases (see Section 10.2.1 “Payoff Dominance”).
A further question concerning policy reversals is the influence of the r-party’s policy
proposal on the outcome of the voting process. According to Proposition 18 (p. 142),
credibility requirements for P -proposals of l in highly informative equilibria decrease
when r makes a G-proposal. The reason is that P -proposals from l appear less risky
to M if r makes a wGr -proposal instead of a w
P
r -proposal. Therefore, information
probabilities in highly informative equilibria decrease. A further consequence is that
highly informative equilibria that exist when r makes a P -proposal may disappear
when r makes a G-proposal. These effects work against a policy reversal to G and are
the larger, the larger the distance between wGr and w
P
r is. On the other hand, the fact
that the r-party proposes G instead of P works for a policy reversal. According to
Conjecture 2 (p. 143), we can therefore make the following statement.
Observation 4
Suppose the r-party proposes a G-reform wGr instead of a P -reform w
P
r . If the proposed
G-reform is relatively small, i.e., wPr −wGr is smaller than a particular threshold value,
the probability of reversal Probob{G} increases. If the proposed G-reform is relatively
large, i.e., wPr −wGr exceeds the threshold value, the probability of reversal Probob{G}
decreases. The latter result is driven by the risk aversion of voters, since P -proposals
from the l-party appear less risky to M when r propses a large G-reform instead of a
small G-reform. Thus, M is more willing to accept a P -proposal when the proposed
G-reform is large.
Finally, we want to consider the possibility of a policy reversal when the party in office
is an r-party. This means there would be a type of r that cares more about the M -
voter (M -type) and another type (R-type) that would care more about its partisans,
the R-group, who would always prefer a G-policy. In this case, we would expect a
policy reversal at the latest when the policy alternative of the l-party, wPl , is larger
than 1
2
: Again, a G-proposal would need less credibility than a comparable P -proposal
when wPl >
1
2
. Therefore, there would be no incentive, either for the R-type or for the
M -type, to propose P in equilibrium. Neither of them prefers P under each view like
the αLl -type does. It is only conceiveable that the M -type proposes P if it learns that
θ = P . But this, of course, will never occur. Hence, also the informed M -type would
always propose G. Intuitively, we expect the same structure of equilibria for wPl >
1
2
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and the r-party in office as for wPr <
1
2
and the l-party in office but with G-proposals
instead of the P -proposals in Areas VI and VII. In summary, we can formulate the
following conjecture.
Conjecture 3
When the party in office is an r-party that considers the interests of the M - and the
R-group, a policy reversal occurs with certainty if the policy alternative of the l-party,
wPl , exceeds
1
2
.
10.7 Robustness: Discussion of Equilibrium Selec-
tion Criteria and other Assumptions
First of all we want to discuss Assumption 6: B > ∆c · max
wv
|wv − wPr |. We assume
that the party’s benefit from holding office is larger than the maximal possible change
in voters’ consumption level by reforms. If we interpret B and ∆c on the individual
level we can regard B as the consumption level an office holder receives for his work
and ∆c ·max
wv
|wv−wPr | as the maximal consumption level an individual voter can gain
or lose by reform relative to the r-party’s proposal. In this context, Assumption 6
implies that office holders earn more than their legislative actions cause for voters. In
our opinion, this assumption is plausible since governmental office holders, e.g. prime
ministers, usually earn much more than the average citizen. Furthermore, there is
also a deeper reasoning for this assumption. From the derivation of the l-party’s best
response proposals we can conclude9 that in the case of B ≤ ∆c · max
wv
|wv − wPr |,
equilibria are conceivable where the l-party chooses a proposal wv with which it would
sacrifice reelection with certainty (σM(a | wv) = 0) although there are other proposals
where reelection would occur with positive probability. The reason is that the party’s
economic concerns would be so high relative to office concerns that the party would
give up reelection. Again, this observation shows the empirical plausibility of our
assumption: In the history of election campaigns in democracies it is certainly hard to
find cases where parties sacrifice reelection for purely economic or partisan concerns.
If we gave up Assumption 6, it would be possible that no opportunistic equilibria exist,
and in Areas III to V there would be equilibria with σPM = 0. This means, there would
be equilibria where l proposes P although it knows that it is not reelected.
Assumption 5 states that 1
2
< wGs < w
P
r , i.e., we assume that the small G-reform
is “very small”. Therefore, we can conclude from Proposition 9 (i), p. 102, that
the minimum credibility requirement for the small G-reform is smaller than 1
2
, i.e.,
µ˜G(w
G
s ) <
1
2
. If we assumed that the small G-reform was larger such that µ˜G(w
G
s ) >
1
2
,
9In Appendix B.1.1, see derivation of Lemma 15.
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there would be no opportunistic equilibria, since the minimum credibility requirements
even for the small reform would be too high: In an opportunistic equilibrium credibility
of wG,o is never higher than 1
2
(see Section 9.2, Proposition 11). Furthermore, in the
case where both G-reforms are large with credibility requirements higher than 1
2
, only
in highly informative equilibria are both G-reforms still accepted by M . In all other
equilibria, one of the two G-reforms is no longer accepted since it only has credibility
1
2
(see Section 9.2, Propositions 12 to 15, and Table C.3).
So far we have only analyzed equilibria where at least one proposal is accepted by M
with strictly positive probability. Suppose M would reject any proposal. In this case, if
any proposal is rejected anyway, there would be no incentives for the l-party to gather
information. The l-party would not inform and would propose any of the four possible
reforms since it was indifferent between proposals. But then, independently of what l
would actually propose, at least the small G-reform would be accepted by M even if
it was unexpected since it has credibility 1
2
. Hence, there can be no equilibrium in the
voting game where M rejects any proposal with certainty.
In Tables C.1 and C.2 we show l’s best responses under the assumption that each type
of l chooses the higher regulation level w in the case of indifference. If we give up this
assumption and do not restrict l’s best response proposal decision in pure strategies,
we obtain exactly the same types of equilibria as with restriction. We can justify this
observation by the following argumentation.
Best response Tables C.1 and C.2 show that only one type of l ever changes its best
response proposal from one area to another - with the exception of Area I to II. In the
latter case, additional combinations of best response proposals σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) and σ˜
Π
l (α
M
l )
are possible, e.g. σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wP,o, wG,o) and σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,o, wG,o, wG,o). But in
all new combinations the P -proposal would have to be accepted with certainty if it is
played in equilibrium. Hence, there can be no additional equilibrium with σGM > σ
P
M .
Since in all other “transitions” between areas only one type “changes” its proposals,
and hence is indifferent between them if B∆σM equals the areas’ borders, no additional
combinations of best response proposals to the ones given in the best response tables
arise. Therefore, for a given parameter constellation, more equilibria may be found,
but the set of all possible types of equilibria does not change.
When we allow for best response proposals in mixed strategies we obtain additional
types of equilibria. For example, the following equilibrium is conceivable: Suppose αLl
is indifferent between its Area II-best-response proposals (σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wP,o, wG,o))
and its Area-III-best-response proposals (σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wP,o, wP,o)). In this case, the
αLl -type could mix a w
G,o-proposal with a wP,o-proposal if it does not inform. Hence, a
(ninfo, info)-equilibrium with σPM < 1 is conceivable because a P -proposal has credi-
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bility less than 1 if αLl chooses w
P,o with positive probability if it does not inform. This
(ninfo, info)-equilibrium with σPM ∈ (0, 1) does not have to fulfill the restrictive con-
dition that µ˜P (w
P,o) equals exactly 1
1+λ
as is necessary under pure strategies (see Table
C.4). Nevertheless, there will be no general advantages of mixed proposal equilibria
over pure proposal equilibria concerning informational quality and Probob{G}. In gen-
eral, the informational quality of equilibria is restricted since “too high” informational
value of proposals makes M accept any view, which in turn leads to the Area-VI-best
response proposals with informational quality 1
2
λ+(1−λ) (for this argumentation see
Section 9.4 “Informational Quality of Sequential Equilibria”).
Finally, note that there will also be no additional equilibria with σPM = 1, since best
response proposals in pure strategies are equal in Areas V and VI. There will also
be no additional equilibria with σPM = 0, because from Assumption 6 it follows that
B∆σM is strictly larger than ∆cΣ
o
M if σ
P
M = 0, and hence no mixture between Area I
and Area II best response proposals is possible.
In the following, we wish to relax the assumption that reelection probabilities for the
two proposals of a certain view have to be equal when both probabilities are strictly
positive (Assumption 3, p. 95).
First, we want to analyze a relaxation of Assumption 3 for P -proposals. The derivation
of l’s best responses can be viewed in Appendix B.1. It is summarized in Lemmas 15
to 28. Obviously, there will always be a P -proposal which can be denoted by wP,o since
it is at least as good for l as the other one. For example, in the case of (αLl , i, P ), α
L
l
will choose that P -proposal wPx as w
P,o which satisfies σM(a | wPx ){B + βL∆wPx∆c} >
σM(a | wPy ){B + βL∆wPy ∆c}, where x, y ∈ {s, b}, and x 6= y (see equation (B.2)).
In the case of σM(a | wPx ){B + βL∆wPx∆c} = σM(a | wPy ){B + βL∆wPy ∆c}, the αLl -
type is indifferent and can choose a mixture between both proposals. Unfortunately -
depending on σM(a | wPs ) and σM(a | wPb ) - we cannot exclude a constellation where
αLl and α
M
l use different w
P,o’s such that their best response proposals lie in different
areas. Only when both types inform and learn that θ = P would they choose the same
wP,o with certainty, since their best response decision in this case does not depend on
the values of αLl and α
M
l . Because we can expect cases where best response proposals
lie in different areas for both types, equilibria are possible with additional information
structures. Furthermore, we cannot exclude equilibria where both P -proposals are
accepted with different strictly positive probabilities. For example, suppose both types’
best responses lie in Area III, αLl does not inform and proposes w
P
b , whereas α
M
l does
inform and is indifferent between proposing wPs and w
P
b under θ = P . In this case, it is
conceivable that both proposals are accepted with different probabilities ∈ (0, 1) when
αMl does not choose w
P
s too often. Obviously, these considerations are only relevant
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in the case of σM(a | wPs ) > σM(a | wPb ). If σM(a | wPb ) ≥ σM(a | wPs ), then both
types will choose wPb as w
P,o, and we obtain the results of the original model, i.e.,
only one P -proposal will be accepted by voters. Note that all P -proposals are only
accepted if they are actually proposed, since, otherwise, they were out-off-equilibrium
and, therefore, had to be rejected.
When we give up Assumption 3 and look at G-proposals, we obtain similar results
as in the original game. In an equilibrium, the large G-reform can never be accepted
alone byM , since, in this case, l would only propose - if anything - the large G-reform.
But then, the small one was out-off-equilibrium with credibility 1
2
and, hence, had to
be accepted. Furthermore, if M is willing to accept both G-reforms with positive
probability, at least the large one must be proposed and accepted with certainty, i.e.,
σM(a | wGb ) = 1: Suppose σM(a | wPb ) < 1, then it is possible that only the small
reform is proposed, and thus, the large one was out-off-equilibrium with credibility
1
2
. Therefore, it would have to be rejected. If l proposed both reforms, the large one
would have credibility 1, since it would only be proposed by αMl after it has learned
that θ = G. Finally, at least the small G-reform must be proposed and accepted
with positive probability. If l did not propose G in equilibrium, the small G-reform
would have credibility 1
2
if it was proposed unexpectedly. But then, σM(a | wGs ) = 1.
Furthermore, if G was not proposed, the P -proposals would have no informational
value10, and thus, σM(a | wPs ) = σM(a | wPb ) = 0. Since B∆σM > ∆cΣoM , l’s best
responses would lie in Area I. Therefore, in any equilibrium, at least the small G-reform
must be proposed.
Now we are able to summarize our considerations.
Observation 5
If we allow for any combination of reelection probabilities σM(a | ·), we obtain addi-
tional types of equilibria. In general, we observe the following characteristics: Either
both G-reforms are accepted with 1 = σM(a | wGb ) ≥ σM(a | wGs ) > 0 where at least
the large one is actually proposed, or only the small reform is proposed and accepted
with σM(a | wGs ) > 0. Concerning P -proposals, either none is accepted by M , or only
one of the two possible reforms is proposed and accepted with σM(a | wP ) > 0, or
both are proposed and accepted with σM(a | wPs ) > σM(a | wPb ) > 0.
Loosely speaking, if we give up Assumption 3, we obtain essentially the same equilibria
as with Assumption 3 plus equilibria where both P -reforms are accepted, but the small
one with a higher probability.
10There would be an informational value if one type of l informed and proposed different P -reforms
for different states of the world. But this cannot be an equilibrium, since the wrong P -proposal (for
θ = G) would be rejected with certainty and, therefore, cannot be proposed in equilibrium for θ = G,
as the best response for l would be to propose the same P -reform as for θ = P .
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This observation is in accordance with intuition: The risk-averse voter accepts a small
reform with higher probability than a large reform. Furthermore, as in the case of
mixed strategies in best response proposals, there is no reason to expect that the
additional equilibria have general advantages concerning informational quality and
Probob{G}.
Finally, we want to discuss the assumptions concerning out-off-equilibrium beliefs.
So far we have used the fact that any out-off-equilibrium proposal - even if it was
played when l changed its information decision - has credibility 1
2
. For this, we had
to assume that deviation probabilities from any proposal played in equilibrium to an
out-off-equilibrium proposal were the same and that these deviation probabilities are
much higher than the deviation probabilities from l’s equilibrium information decision
(see Section 8.3.2 “The M -Group’s Best Responses and Beliefs”, Assumption 7). Now
supposeM assumes that deviation probabilities from equilibrium information decisions
are not negligible. In this case, if one type of l does not inform in equilibrium, but would
propose the correct view if it wrongly informed, an out-off-equilibrium proposal can
have a credibility higher than 1
2
. For example, best responses in Area II are σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) =
(wG,o, wP,o, wG,o), and σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wP,o, wG,o). There is no equilibrium in this
Area if we assign credibility 1
2
to an out-off-equilibrium P -proposal. If neither type of
l informed, we could obtain an equilibrium in this area if M assigned a credibility to
the unexpected wP,o-proposal which exactly equals its credibility requirement. Then
M was indifferent in accepting this proposal and with σPM > 0 small enough, we would
have found an additional equilibrium in Area II.
In general, if M assigns higher probabilities of the out-off-equilibrium P -proposal be-
ing correct, there will be no additional types of equilibria in Areas III to VII. Firstly,
in any conceivable information structure in these areas, a P -proposal is made anyway.
Secondly, it is not possible there that different P -proposals are made in different in-
formation states, since l always chooses wP,o as best response. Therefore, it may be
rather possible to “lose” some types of equilibria: IfM accepted an out-off-equilibrium
P -proposal, this cannot be a wPb -proposal, since w
P
s would never be proposed in equi-
librium in this case, as only the large P -reform was a best response of M .
If theM -group assigned higher credibility to G-proposals alone, no additional types of
equilibria could be found. For small G-reform proposals nothing would change since
they are accepted anyway (with exception of the Area-I-(ninfo, info)-equilibrium).
In contrast, if the large G-reform would always be accepted out-off-equilibrium, only
types of equilibria remain with wG,u = wGb , w
G,o = wGs , and σ
G
M = 1.
Observation 6
IfM assigns higher credibilities to out-off-equilibrium proposals which would represent
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the correct state of the world with information, additional types of equilibria may arise
in Area II where a P -proposal would be accepted. Concerning G-proposals, there could
only remain types of equilibria where both G-reforms are accepted with certainty.
10.8 Summary and Conclusions
10.8.1 Summary of Equilibria’s Characteristics and their In-
terpretation
In the voting model, we have analyzed under which conditions an economic crisis may
persist, aggravate, or be reversed. The crisis stems from a wrongly chosen governmen-
tal regulation parameter which is subject to a democratic voting process. The crisis
persists when the l-party proposes P . The reason is that either l is reelected or, if not,
the r-party gains office and also implements a P -policy. The crisis can be reversed
when the incumbent l-party proposes G in its election campaign. In this case, l is
reelected with certainty and implements the correct view G.
Without strategic considerations, the αLl -type would never inform and always propose
a P -policy which corresponds to the interests of its partisans. Furthermore, the αMl -
type could choose to inform, but only if the economic advantages from proposing the
correct policy outweigh information costs. Because the status quo regulation level
wsq is set according to a P -policy, i.e., exceeds
1
2
, the risk-averse M -voters demand
higher credibility requirements for P - than for comparable G-proposals. Therefore,
if l wants to have a chance of being reelected with a P -proposal, although it would
almost always propose P without strategic considerations, at least one type of l has
to follow a strategy where it informs with positive probability in order to fulfill the
corresponding credibility requirements. Nevertheless, P -proposals never have higher
reelection probabilities than G-proposals, i.e., σGM ≥ σPM . As a matter of fact, any
equilibrium G-proposal is accepted with certainty by the risk-averse M -voter. Hence,
in opportunistic equilibria where only office concerns matter, both types of l always
propose G, and are always reelected with certainty. For highly informative equilibria,
the higher the benefit from holding office is, i.e., the higher the incentive to “deviate”
to an opportunistic behavior, the higher reelection probabilities for P -proposals have
to be in order to prevent l from opportunistic behavior. Only in sincere equilibria
(only economic concerns matter), behave both types of l as if there were no strategic
considerations necessary to stay in office.
If M is willing to accept both G-reforms, the large G-reform wGb will only be proposed
by l, if it is informed that θ = G. Therefore, wGb has credibility 1, and thus, we should
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expect that M would always accept the large G-reform if it was proposed by l. This is
also in accordance with the Intuitive Criterion where only equilibria survive in which
αMl proposes w
G
b with information (see Observation 1, p. 135). Furthermore, this
result corresponds to the intuition that a large policy change is very credible in the
case where ideology or partisans are expected to lead a party to propose the contrary
policy (e.g. a “left-wing” party that makes a “right-wing” proposal).
Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) obtain a similar result. In their model, the incumbent
party also has office concerns, and also cares about partisan and voters’ preferences
which depend on the real state of the world. In contrast to our voting model, the
real state of the world depends on a normally distributed exogenous shock and not
on two discrete theories about the functioning of the economy. Nevertheless, voters
are also uncertain about the party’s real policy preferences and try to conclude the
real shock from the party’s proposal, since only the party can observe it (in this case
without costs). The main result is that extreme policy positions are more likely to
be implemented by parties which are supposed to support the contrary “direction” of
policies.
10.8.2 Summary of Conditions for Policy Reversal and their
Interpretation
The crucial points concerning policy reversals are the relation between information
costs and maximal reform effects ( k
∆c
) on the one hand, and the size of M ’s strategic
variable wP,o on the other.
For very high information costs (k) relative to the maximal size of reform effects (∆c)
only opportunistic equilibria remain for every wPr ∈ (0, 1). In opportunistic equilibria
strong office concerns make the parties propose the policy risk-averse voters always
accept with certainty. Consequently, starting from wPr <
1
2
the l-party always proposes
P and the crisis worsens until it is “severe enough”, i.e., wPr >
1
2
, and then it is reversed.
In other words, if the maximal consumption loss ∆c of a wrong policy is small, crises
are reversed with certainty when they are severe enough (see Observation 2, p. 149).
If the maximal consumption loss is large ( k
∆c
is small), the behavior of M may be
relevant in the following way (see Observation 3, p. 150): Policy reversals may be
promoted, i.e., the probability of reversal may be increased, if M is willing to accept
both large reform proposals (G and P ). Especially in the case of wPr >
1
2
, it may be
possible that only highly informative, Area-III-(ind, ind)- and opportunistic equilibria
can occur. In these equilibria probabilities of reversal are very high. On the other
hand, the persistence of crises for wPr >
1
2
may be explained by the very cautious be-
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havior of an M -group that only accepts small reforms. In this case highly informative
equilibria cannot constitute, but sincere equilibria can with relatively low probabilities
of reversal. This argument is strengthened by Observation 1 (p. 135) stating that equi-
libria with large P -reforms may fail the Intuitive Criterion and hence, only sequential
equilibria with small P -proposals may remain. Furthermore, the persistence of crises
can be the result of a large value for λ (probability that the l-party is of type αLl ). For
example, when sincere equilibria are played, the probability of reversal is small when
λ is large, because for sincere equilibria we have Probob{G} = (1− λ).
If the r-party proposes a G-reform instead of a P -reform, policy reversals may be
supported if the proposed G-reform is small, i.e., the distance between wPr and w
G
r is
small. On the other hand, relatively large G-proposals by r may appear too risky for
M relative to a P -proposal by r. Therefore, the probability of reversal decreases (see
Observation 4, p. 151).
The role of the l-party’s partisan interests can be illustrated by considering the polar
case of αLl = 0 and α
M
l = 1. That is, for the α
L
l -type only partisan interests matter
whereas the αMl -type only cares about the Median-voter. In this case, besides Area-
IVb-(ninfo, ind)-equilibria, only opportunistic and sincere equilibria can constitute
(see Tables C.1, C.2, and C.4). Because in this scenario highly informative equilibria
are excluded, we can conclude that strong partisan concerns have negative influence
on the possibilities of reversal. Interestingly, as soon as the αLl -type leaves its extreme
position, i.e., αLl > 0 and α
M
l = 1, highly informative equilibria can constitute.
10.8.3 Conclusions: The Outside Observer, and the Relation
to Contemporary and Further Research
In the following we take the standpoint of an outside observer contemplating his in-
fluence on the voting game’s outcome.
Given the results of our analysis, we are able to consider possible strategic consider-
ations of the so called “experts” (or outside observers) with respect to the structure
of the voting process. If we assume that agents within the voting game, i.e., politi-
cal parties and voters, are ignorant concerning the possibility of strategic behavior of
experts, we can suspect the following:
Experts who want to promote the G-view may strategically propose a very small G-
reform11, i.e., µ˜G(w
G
s ) ≤ 12 , because otherwise the opportunistic equilibria for wPr > 12 ,
and hence equilibria with reversal probability 1, would not exist (see Proposition 11, p.
11For the discussion of experts’ possible motivations not always to propose wG = 0 or wP = 1, see
Section 7.2.3 “The Starting Point: Crisis and Reform Proposals”.
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115). On the other hand, the large G-reform will be the largest possible, i.e., wGb = 0,
since it will be accepted with certainty even though it is extreme and, furthermore,
it promotes the willingness of αMl to inform. For example, in the case of w
P
r <
1
2
, a
low value of wGb (large G-reform) supports the occurrence of sincere equilibria where
αMl would propose the large G-reform with certainty. In contrast, if the w
G
b -value was
too large, only opportunistic equilibria could constitute where P would be the certain
outcome of the voting process in the case of wPr <
1
2
(see Observation 3, first item, p.
150).
On the other hand, experts who prefer the P -view may have an incentive to strate-
gically choose moderate P -reform proposals. If both P -proposals are so small that
µ˜P (w
P ) < 1
1+λ
, no highly informative equilibria exist, and hence, the probability of
reversal when no opportunistic equilibrium is played is relatively small.12
Nevertheless, the voting model supports contemporary research stating that crises can
promote the reversal of detrimental policy.13 The more severe the crisis is, i.e., the
higher wPr , the higher the possibility that even µ˜P (w
P
s ) >
1
1+λ
(see Corollary 3, p.
141), and thus, only highly informative and opportunistic equilibria can determine the
outcome of the election process.14 At the beginning of a detrimental policy develop-
ment, risk aversion of voters may support cautious P -policy proposals. But later on,
when the status quo regulation level rises too much, risk aversion requests very high
credibilities for P -proposals, and hence, promotes highly informative equilibria and
eventually a policy reversal.
In our analysis, we have assumed that the opponent r-party does not make strategic
considerations concerning its policy proposal. A scenario in which the r-party is willing
to make strategic considerations in order to win the elections is the natural extension
of our model and may be subject to further research. The main question would be
whether this constellation better supports the reversal of a crisis.
12In the case of µ˜P (wP ) < 11+λ for both P -proposals the probability of reversal is not larger than
(1−λ) with the exception of the (ind, ind)-equilibria of Area III. There, Probob{G} = (1−λ)+λσiL,
but we expect σiL to be lower than for highly informative equilibria, since credibility requirements
are lower. Furthermore, since in these equilibria both information conditions have to be fulfilled with
equality, we expect that the set of parameter constellations where these equilibria are possible is much
smaller than for sincere equilibria.
13For an overview, see Drazen (2000).
14Also remember that the information probability σiL of the αLl -type is higher, the higher the
credibility requirement is, and thus, the higher the probability of reversal Probob{G} = (1−λ)+λσiL
is.
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Overall Conclusions
In Part I (Awareness), we showed that neglecting general equilibrium repercussions
can lead to a crisis. For this end it was necessary to assume a learning scheme that
implemented a certain form of myopia. We justified the learning scheme by deducing
from findings in behavioral economics and political economy.
For future research we would suggest empirical work directly analyzing voters’ bounded
rationality. We need to investigate public discussions, party platforms, and public
opinion polls explicitly asking voters what they bear in mind when contemplating
economic policy effects. It may be possible to derive from this a falsifiable theory
about the forms of myopia voters adopt. With such a theory, predictions about the
path of a national economy and economic policy advice could be much more precise
and helpful.
As to the problem of economic crises triggered by excessive governmental regulation,
we support the view advocated by Bernholz (1982, 2000). Excessive governmental
regulation may be the long-run result of a sequence of democratic decisions where
rationally uninformed voters successively agree to increases in regulations. At some
point in time freedom may be endangered, as there are progressively fewer issues
that citizens can decide upon on their own. Consequently, one might argue that the
dynamics inherent in democratic decisions may threaten democracy itself as a political
system founded on the freedom of its members. Furthermore, the economic crises
triggered by excessive regulation may lead to political crises involving further threats
to freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. Finally, the dynamics of democracy may
even lead to non-democratic regimes claiming that they could solve the political and
economic problems more efficiently.
In order to prevent economic crises that might endanger the foundations of democracy
and the rule of law, we propose removing the foundations of a free-market economy
from the direct influence of the democratic decision-making process. These foundations
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should be part of the national constitution, which could make them very difficult to
change. Examples are the constitutional setting of a maximum total taxation rate per
capita or a maximum share of government expenditure. This is in analogy to human
rights, which in principle cannot be restricted even if a democratic majority voted to
restrict them (e.g., to suppress a minority). Accordingly, these foundations should
be supervised by a constitutional court consisting of qualified economists in the same
fashion as the protection of human rights is supervised by a court of qualified jurists.
Last but not least, any thorough scientific discussion must point to its own boundaries.
The avoidance of severe economic crises - and the preservation of democracy and a
free society - is not only a question of political economy. These issues go beyond the
scope of economics in that they cannot be completely answered by its methodologies.
If we look at recent history, democracy and the rule of law have in many cases been
the result of revolution or war.1 This may be hard to explain convincingly within a
purely economic framework. Therefore, to prevent democracy from degenerating back
into non-democracy, in the sense of Bernholz, it may be necessary to postulate the
occurrence of citizens who are willing to sacrifice their pure self-interests. The findings
of political economics may deliver the equipment assuring a functional democracy,
but the foundations of democracy can only be found in each individual it ultimately
consists of.
1Examples are the American War of Independence or the German revolution leading to the Weimar
Republic after World War I.
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Appendix Part I
Proof of Lemma 2
Under GEV, the utility function of the low-skilled in sector 1 is
UGEV1l,t = −2
LGEV1l,t
L1l
ln(s) + 2 ln(w1l,t)− ln(pGEV1,t ) + 2 ln(s)− 2 ln(2)
From this we derive direct verification that limw1l,t→wmax1l U
GEV
1l,t = −∞(by using equa-
tions (3.23) and (3.24) and equation (3.20), which implies limw1l,t→wmax1l τ =∞).
Furthermore, we have to show that limw1l,t→0 U
GEV
1l,t =∞. This is equivalent to showing
that limw1l,t→0 u
GEV
1l,t =∞:
uGEV1l,t =
LGEV1l,t
L1l
(1
2
w1l,t
pGEV1,t
) 1
2
(1
2
w1l,t
) 1
2
+
∆GEVt
L1l
(1
2
sw1l,t
pGEV1,t
) 1
2
(1
2
sw1l,t
) 1
2
=
1
2
LGEV1l,t
L1l
w1l,t
1√
pGEV1,t
(1− s) + 1
2
sw1l,t
1√
pGEV1,t
=
1
2
β
L2
L1l
1
(1 + τGEVt )
(L1h
L2
) 1−β
2
( β
w1l,t(1 + τGEVt )
)β
2
(1− s)
+
1
2
sw
1−β
2
1l,t
(L1h
L2
) 1−β
2
( β
(1 + τGEVt )
)β
2
Because limw1l,t→0(1 + τ
GEV
t ) = (1 − (sβ)/2), the first term goes to infinity and the
second term goes to zero if w1l,t approaches zero. Therefore, u
GEV
1l,t goes to infinity and
consequently UGEV1l,t does so too.
Proof of Lemma 3
Because of the continuity of p˜PEV1,t (w1l,t), p˜
PEV
1,t (w1l,t) ≥ 0, p˜PEV1,t (0) = 0 and p˜PEV1,t (w˜PEV,max1l,t ) =
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0, w˜p11l,t must be a local maximizer of p˜
PEV
1,t (w1l,t) in [0, w˜
PEV,max
1l,t ]. Moreover, since
∂p˜PEV1,t /∂w1l,t = 0 for w1l,t = w˜
p1
1l,t, we have
∂2p˜PEV1,t
∂(w1l,t)2
(w˜p11l,t) = p˜
PEV
1,t
(
(1− β) −(sL1l)
2
(L2 + τPEVt−1 w
PEV
2,t−1L2 − sw1l,tL1l)2
− β
(w1l,t)2
)
< 0
Proof of Lemma 6
The utility function of the low-skilled workers of sector 1 was
U˜PEV1l,t (w1l,t) = −2
L˜PEV1l,t
L1l
ln(s) + ln(w1l,t) + ln(
w1l,t
p˜PEV1,t
) + 2 ln(s)− 2 ln(2)
Furthermore, we obtain
w1l,t
p˜PEV1,t
=
ββ
1 + τPEVt−1
w1−β1l,t
( L1h
²t(w1l,t)
)1−β
It can be verified that limw1l,t→w˜PEV,max1l,t L˜
PEV
1l,t = 0 (see equations (3.34),(3.38),(3.39))
and limw1l,t→w˜PEV,max1l,t (w1l,t/p˜
PEV
1,t ) =∞ (see equations (3.38),(3.39)). Thus, U˜PEV1l,t (w1l,t)
goes to infinity as w1l,t approaches w˜
PEV,max
1l,t . As U˜
PEV
1l,t (w1l,t) is a continuous function
in [wmin1l , w˜
PEV,max
1l,t ), the low-skilled cannot do better with any other wage level than
w˜PEV,max1l,t .
To show that limw1l,t→0 U˜
PEV
1l,t =∞, it is equivalent to show that limw1l,t→0 u˜PEV1l,t =∞
:
u˜PEV1l,t =
1
2
L˜PEV1l,t
L1l
w1l,t
1√
p˜PEV1,t
(1− s) + 1
2
sw1l,t
1√
p˜PEV1,t
=
1
2
1
L1l
β²t(w1l,t)
1
(1 + τPEVt−1 )
1
2
( L1h
²t(w1l,t)
) 1−β
2
( β
w1l,t
)β
2
+
1
2
sw
1−β
2
1l,t
1
(1 + τPEVt−1 )
1
2
( L1h
²t(w1l,t)
) 1−β
2
β
β
2
As τPEVt−1 is taken as given and ²t(w1l,t) approaches w˜
PEV,max
1l,t , the first term goes to
infinity and the second to zero. Therefore, limw1l,t→0 U˜
PEV
1l,t =∞.
Since we obtain a polynomial of degree 2 in w1l,t for ∂U˜
PEV
1l,t /∂w1l,t = 0, there could
be two local optima in (0, w˜PEV,max1l,t ). But we can verify that there is only one local
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optimum - a minimizer - in this area because U˜PEV1l,t (w1l,t) goes to infinity for w1l,t → 0
and w1l,t → w˜PEV,max1l,t and U˜PEV1l,t (w1l,t) is a continuous function in (0, w˜PEV,max1l,t ).
Proof of Proposition 2
Equation (3.39) gives us the general connection between the Condorcet winner in one
period and the previous period’s realized tax rate and sector-2 wage values:
wˆPEV1l,t+1 =
L2 + τ
PEV
t w
PEV
2,t L2
sL1l
Thus the Condorcet winner in period zero is
wˆPEV1l,0 =
L2 + τrw2,rL2
sL1l
Using w2 = 1/(1 + τ) (see equation (3.22)), we obtain
wˆPEV1l,0 =
L2 +
τr
1+τr
L2
sL1l
=
L2 +
τr
1+τr
L2 − 1+τr1+τrL2 + L2
sL1l
=
2L2 − 11+τrL2
sL1l
With equations (3.20) and (3.22) we find in general
wPEV2,t =
2L2 − swPEV1l,t L1l
L2(sβ − 2)
and therefore
wPEV2,0 =
2L2 − swˆPEV1l,0 L1l
L2(sβ − 2)
=
1
(2− sβ)(1 + τr)
Thus the tax rate in period zero is
τPEV0 = (2− sβ)(1 + τr)− 1.
Inserting wPEV2,0 and τ
PEV
0 in (3.39) we have
wˆPEV1l,1 =
2L2 − 1(2−sβ)(1+τr)L2
sL1l
and therefore
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wPEV2,1 =
1
(2− sβ)2(1 + τr)
τPEV1 = (2− sβ)2(1 + τr)− 1
Continuing in this fashion, we obtain Proposition 2.
Proof of Lemma 8
With equations (5.2) and (5.4), the perceived utility function of the high-skilled workers
of sector 1 is
U˜PEV 11h,t = ln
{1
2
(1− β)wPEV 12,t−1
( sw1l,tL1l + wPEV 12,t−1 L2
(sβ + 2τPEV 1t−1 + 1)w
PEV 1
2,t−1 L1h
)β( β
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )w1l,t
)β}
+ ln
{1
2
((1− β)(sw1l,tL1l + wPEV 12,t−1 L2)
(sβ + 2τPEV 1t−1 + 1)L1h
)}
= 2 ln
{1
2
}
+ ln
{
(1− β)wPEV 12,t−1
}
+ β ln
{
β
}
− β ln
{
(sβ + 2τPEV 1t−1 + 1)w
PEV 1
2,t−1 L1h
}
+β ln
{
sw1l,tL1l + w
PEV 1
2,t−1 L2
}
− β ln
{
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )w1l,t
}
+ ln
{
1− β
}
+ ln
{
sw1l,tL1l + w
PEV 1
2,t−1 L2
}
− ln
{
(sβ + 2τPEV 1t−1 + 1)L1h
}
= (1 + β) ln
{
sw1l,tL1l + w
PEV 1
2,t−1 L2
}
− β ln
{
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )w1l,t
}
+ const
where const refers to the terms that do not depend on w1l,t. We can rewrite the last
expression for U˜PEV 11h,t as
U˜PEV 11h,t = ln
{
sw1l,tL1l + w
PEV 1
2,t−1 L2
}
+ β ln
{sw1l,tL1l + wPEV 12,t−1 L2
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )w1l,t
}
+ const
= ln
{
sw1l,tL1l + w
PEV 1
2,t−1 L2
}
+ β ln
{sL1l + wPEV 12,t−1 L2w1l,t
1 + τPEV 1t−1
}
+ const
Since const is finite it follows immediately that limw1l,t→0 U˜
PEV 1
1h,t (w1l,t) = ∞ and
limw1l,t→∞ U˜
PEV 1
1h,t (w1l,t) =∞.
To derive the optima, we differentiate U˜PEV 11h,t with respect to w1l,t:
∂U˜PEV 11h,t
∂w1l,t
= (1 + β)
sL1l
sw1l,tL1l + wPEV 12,t−1 L2
− β
w1l,t
=
(1 + β)sw1l,tL1l − β(sw1l,tL1l + wPEV 12,t−1 L2)
(sw1l,tL1l + wPEV 12,t−1 L2)w1l,t
=
sw1l,tL1l − βwPEV 12,t−1 L2
(sw1l,tL1l + wPEV 12,t−1 L2)w1l,t
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Equating the last expression with zero yields
w˜PEV 1,min1h1l,t =
1
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )s
β
L2
L1l
This is a local minimizer because
∂2U˜PEV 11h,t
∂(w1l,t)2
(w˜PEV 1,min1h1l,t ) =
sw1l,tL1l(sw1l,tL1l + w
PEV 1
2,t−1 L2)
(sw1l,tL1l + wPEV 12,t−1 L2)2(w1l,t)2
> 0
Proof of Lemma 9
We use u˜PEV 11l,t instead of U˜
PEV 1
1l,t :
u˜PEV 11l,t =
1
2
L˜PEV 11l,t
L1l
(1− s)w1l,t 1√
p˜PEV 11,t
+
1
2
sw1l,t
1√
p˜PEV 11,t
=
1
2L1l
(1− s)β(sw1l,tL1l + w
PEV 1
2,t−1 L2)
(sβ + 2τPEV 1t−1 + 1)
( (sβ + 2τPEV 1t−1 + 1)L1h
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )sw1l,tL1l + L2
) 1−β
2
( β
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )w1l,t
)β
2
+
1
2
sw1l,t
( (sβ + 2τPEV 1t−1 + 1)L1h
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )sw1l,tL1l + L2
) 1−β
2
( β
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )w1l,t
)β
2
=
1
2L1l
(1− s)β1+β2 (L1h)
1−β
2
( 1
sβ + 2τPEV 1t−1 + 1
) 1+β
2
wPEV 12,t−1
((1 + τPEV 1t−1 )sw1l,tL1l + L2
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )w1l,t
)β
2
·
(
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )sw1l,tL1l + L2
) 1
2
+
1
2
s
( β
1 + τPEV 1t−1
)β
2
(
(sβ + 2τPEV 1t−1 + 1)L1h
) 1−β
2
·
( w1l,t
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )sw1l,tL1l + L2
) 1−β
2
(w1l,t)
1
2
= const1 ·
((1 + τPEV 1t−1 )sw1l,tL1l + L2
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )w1l,t
)β
2
(
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )sw1l,tL1l + L2
) 1
2
+const2 ·
( w1l,t
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )sw1l,tL1l + L2
) 1−β
2
(w1l,t)
1
2
= const1 ·
((1 + τPEV 1t−1 )sL1l + L2w1l,t
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )
)β
2
(
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )sw1l,tL1l + L2
) 1
2
+const2 ·
( 1
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )sL1l +
L2
w1l,t
) 1−β
2
(w1l,t)
1
2
Note that const1 and const2 are finite. The first term approaches infinity and the
second term zero when w1l,t → 0. For w1l,t → ∞, both terms approach infinity. This
proves the lemma’s first statement (i): U˜PEV 11l,t (w1l,t)→∞ for w1l,t → 0 and w1l,t →∞.
Since we obtain a polynomial of degree 2 in w1l,t for ∂U˜
PEV 1
1l,t /∂w1l,t = 0, there could
be two local optima in w1l,t ∈ (0,∞). But we can conclude that there is exactly
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one local minimizer w˜PEV 1,min1l1l,t in this area because of the continuity of U˜
PEV 1
1l,t (w1l,t)
and the characteristics of U˜PEV 11l,t (w1l,t) stated in (i). This minimum can be smaller
or larger than the market-clearing minimum wage. For the parameter values s =
0.1, β = 0.4, L1l = 70, 000, L1h = 50, 000 and L2 = 100, 000, we obtain w
min
1l = 0.57
and wmax1l = 28.57. In this case we obtain w˜
PEV 1,min1l
1l,t = 0.79 for τ
PEV 1
t−1 = 0.3 and
w˜PEV 1,min1l1l,t = 0.27 for τ
PEV 1
t−1 = 1.0.
1
Proof of Lemma 10
According to the definition of w˜crit,1h1l,t (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , ν¯) (see Chapter 5.2.2), w˜
crit,1h
1l,t (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , ν¯) =
wmin1l if w˜
PEV 1,min1h
1l,t = w
min
1l , i.e. the minimizer of U˜
PEV 1
1h,t (w1l,t) and w
min
1l coincide. But
this is the case if τPEV 1t−1 =
1−s
s
(see Lemma 8). Hence, w˜crit,1h1l,t (
1−s
s
, ν¯) = wmin1l .
The perceived utility functions of the high-skilled workers in period t depend not only
on w1l,t but also on τ
PEV 1
t−1 . We obtain the following relationship:
U˜PEV 11h,t (w
min
1l , τ
PEV 1
t−1 ) = U˜
PEV 1
1h,t (w1l,t, τ
PEV 1
t−1 )
⇔ ln
(w˜PEV 11h,t (wmin1l , τPEV 1t−1 )
p˜PEV 11,t (w
min
1l , τ
PEV 1
t−1 )
)
+ ln
(
w˜PEV 11h,t (w
min
1l , τ
PEV 1
t−1 )
)
= ln
(w˜PEV 11h,t (w1l,t, τPEV 1t−1 )
p˜PEV 11,t (w1l,t, τ
PEV 1
t−1 )
)
+ ln
(
w˜PEV 11h,t (w1l,t, τ
PEV 1
t−1 )
)
⇔ (1 + sβ + sβτPEV 1t−1 )(L1lβL2) 11+β − (1 + τPEV 1t−1 )sβ β1+βL1l · (w1l,t) 11+β
−β β1+βL2 · (w1l,t)−
β
1+β = 0 (A.1)
We can define a function F (τPEV 1t−1 , w1l,t) as the left-hand side of the last equation:
F (τPEV 1t−1 , w1l,t) :=
(
1+sβ+sβτPEV 1t−1
)(
L1l
β
L2
) 1
1+β−(1+τPEV 1t−1 )sβ
β
1+βL1l·(w1l,t)
1
1+β−β β1+βL2·(w1l,t)−
β
1+β
The partial derivative of F (τPEV 1t−1 , w1l,t) with respect to τ
PEV 1
t−1 is
∂F
∂τPEV 1t−1
(τPEV 1t−1 , w1l,t) = sβ(L1l)
β
1+β (L2)
1
1+β − sβ β1+βL1l · (w1l,t)
1
1+β
If we insert wmin1l = β
L2
L1l
for w1l,t in
∂F
∂τPEV 1t−1
(τPEV 1t−1 , w1l,t), we obtain
∂F
∂τPEV 1t−1
(τPEV 1t−1 , w
min
1l ) = 0 (A.2)
1We have obtained these values by using the MAPLE software package in the following way: We
differentiate U˜PEV 11l,t (w1l,t) with respect to w1l,t and set the resulting term equal to zero. This yields
two possible values of w1l,t for local optima. The second values satisfying the necessary conditions
are −17.14 for τPEV 1t−1 = 0.3 and −11.27 for τPEV 1t−1 = 1.0.
The expressions for the critical points show that whether these points are smaller or larger than wmin1l
depends solely on τPEV 1t−1 , s, and β.
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Since ∂
2F
∂τPEV 1t−1 ∂w1l,t
(τPEV 1t−1 , w1l,t) < 0 for w1l,t > 0, we can conclude that
∂F
∂τPEV 1t−1
(τPEV 1t−1 , w1l,t) > 0 for 0 < w1l,t < w
min
1l (A.3)
∂F
∂τPEV 1t−1
(τPEV 1t−1 , w1l,t) < 0 for w1l,t > w
min
1l (A.4)
The partial derivative of F (τPEV 1t−1 , w1l,t) with respect to w1l,t is
∂F
∂w1l,t
(τPEV 1t−1 , w1l,t) = −(1+τPEV 1t−1 )
1
1 + β
sβ
β
1+βL1l·(w1l,t)
1
1+β
−1+
β
1 + β
β
β
1+βL2·(w1l,t)−
β
1+β
−1
It is smaller than zero if and only if
−(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )
1
1 + β
sβ
β
1+βL1l · (w1l,t)
1
1+β
−1 +
β
1 + β
β
β
1+βL2 · (w1l,t)−
β
1+β
−1 < 0
⇔ −(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )sL1lw1l,t + βL2 < 0 (A.5)
⇔ w1l,t > 1
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )s
β
L2
L1l
(A.6)
From (A.6) we can conclude:
∂F
∂w1l,t
(τPEV 1t−1 , w1l,t) = 0 for w1l,t =
1
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )s
β
L2
L1l
(A.7)
∂F
∂w1l,t
(τPEV 1t−1 , w1l,t) > 0 for 0 < w1l,t <
1
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )s
β
L2
L1l
(A.8)
∂F
∂w1l,t
(τPEV 1t−1 , w1l,t) < 0 for w1l,t >
1
(1 + τPEV 1t−1 )s
β
L2
L1l
(A.9)
Now we can use the implicit function theorem to show that w˜crit,1h1l,t (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , ν¯) decreases
in τPEV 1t−1 .
The functions F (τPEV 1t−1 , w1l,t) and
∂F
∂w1l,t
(τPEV 1t−1 , w1l,t) are continuous in (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , w1l,t)
for τPEV 1t−1 ≥ 0 and w1l,t > 0.2
Let (τPEV 1t−10 , w1l,t0) be a vector with τ
PEV 1
t−10 ≥ 0, w1l,t0 > 0 and F (τPEV 1t−10 , w1l,t0) = 0.
Since U˜PEV 11h,t (·) is U-shaped with exactly one minimizer which is w˜PEV 1,min1h1l,t = 1(1+τPEV 1t−1 )sβ
L2
L1l
,
we know that for each τPEV 1t−10 6= 1−ss there is exactly one w1l,t0 6= wmin1l that satis-
fies F (τPEV 1t−10 , w1l,t0) = 0 and thus U˜
PEV 1
1h,t (w
min
1l , τ
PEV 1
t−10 ) = U˜
PEV 1
1h,t (w1l,t0 , τ
PEV 1
t−10 ). If
τPEV 1t−10 =
1−s
s
, then wmin1l and w˜
PEV 1,min1h
1l,t coincide and F (τ
PEV 1
t−10 , w1l,t0) = 0 only holds
if w1l,t0 = w
min
1l .
Furthermore, ∂F
∂w1l,t
(τPEV 1t−1 , w1l,t) 6= 0 for all (τPEV 1t−10 , w1l,t0) except the vector (τPEV 1t−10 , w1l,t0)
that satisfies w1l,t0 =
1
(1+τPEV 1t−10 )s
β L2
L1l
(see equation A.7) and F (τPEV 1t−10 , w1l,t0) = 0. But
2Obviously, all partial derivatives of these functions exist for τPEV 1t−1 ≥ 0 and w1l,t > 0.
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this is only the case if wmin1l and the minimizer of U˜
PEV 1
1h,t (·), w˜PEV 1,min1h1l,t , coincide and
hence (τPEV 1t−10 , w1l,t0) = (
1−s
s
, wmin1l ).
Thus, according to the implicit function theorem, there exists for every (τPEV 1t−10 , w1l,t0),
τPEV 1t−10 6= 1−ss and w1l,t0 6= wmin1l a function w1l,t = f(τPEV 1t−1 ) in the neighborhood of
(τPEV 1t−10 , w1l,t0) with w1l,t0 = f(τ
PEV 1
t−10 ) and F (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , f(τ
PEV 1
t−1 )) = 0.
The total differential of F (τPEV 1t−1 , f(τ
PEV 1
t−1 )) always equals zero and thus:
dw1l,t
dτPEV 1t−1
=
df
dτPEV 1t−1
= −∂F/∂τ
PEV 1
t−1
∂F/∂w1l,t
(A.10)
Note that w1l,t = f(τ
PEV 1
t−1 ) > w
min
1l if and only if w1l,t = f(τ
PEV 1
t−1 ) > w˜
PEV 1,min1h
1l,t =
1
(1+τPEV 1t−1 )s
β L2
L1l
, which holds as long as w˜PEV 1,min1h1l,t > w
min
1l , i.e., τ
PEV 1
t−1 <
1−s
s
. The
opposite holds for w1l,t = f(τ
PEV 1
t−1 ) < w
min
1l . Therefore, from equation (A.10) we
obtain with inequalities (A.3), (A.4), (A.8), and (A.9):
df
dτPEV 1t−1
< 0 for τPEV 1t−1 ≥ 0 and τPEV 1t−1 6=
1− s
s
(A.11)
We can identify f(τPEV 1t−1 ) with w˜
crit,1h
1l,t (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , ν¯) for τ
PEV 1
t−1 6= 1−ss . Since
dw˜crit,1h1l,t
dτPEV 1t−1
< 0
for all τPEV 1t−1 6= 1−ss , and w˜PEV 1,min1h1l,t converges to wmin1l if τPEV 1t−1 → 1−ss , w˜crit,1h1l,t (τPEV 1t−1 , ν¯)→
wmin1l if τ
PEV 1
t−1 → 1−ss . Since w˜crit,1h1l,t (τPEV 1t−1 , ν¯) = wmin1l for τPEV 1t−1 = 1−ss , w˜crit,1h1l,t (τPEV 1t−1 , ν¯)
is a continuous function in τPEV 1t−1 , τ
PEV 1
t−1 ≥ 0 and decreases strictly for τPEV 1t−1 6= 1−ss .
Proof of Proposition 7
If w¯1l < w˜
crit,1h
1l,t (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , ν¯), the high-skilled workers of sector 1 will vote for w
min
1l . Since
workers of sector 2 vote for wmin1l anyway, w
min
1l is the Condorcet winner in period t
independently of the low-skilled workers’ choice. Thus, the equilibrium tax rate on
which voters base their decision in period t+1 is τPEV 1t = 0. Because of Corollary 1 (i),
w¯1l < w˜
crit,1h
1l,t+1 (0, ν¯) and the high-skilled workers will again vote for w
min
1l in period t+1.
The market-clearing wage is now the Condorcet winner for all subsequent periods, since
the critical wage level for the high-skilled workers depends on the previous periods’
equilibrium tax rate, which is 0 and does not change any more (ν¯ does not change
anyway).
This completes the proof for (i).
To prove (ii), we consider the vectors ν that make up the set Mh. The parameter
vector ν is in Mh if the following holds:
1. w˜crit,1l1l,t (ν) > w˜
crit,1h
1l,t (ν) ∧ w˜crit,1l1l,t (ν) ≤ wmin1l , or
2. w˜crit,1l1l,t (ν) ≤ w˜crit,1h1l,t (ν)
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In the first case, w¯1l is larger than w˜
crit,1l
1l,t (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , ν¯) and w˜
crit,1h
1l,t (τ
PEV 1
t−1 , ν¯) because
w¯1l > w
min
1l . Therefore, w¯1l is the Condorcet winner in period t. In the second case,
w¯1l is also at least as large as both critical wage levels, since w¯1l ≥ w˜crit,1h1l,t (τPEV 1t−1 , ν¯)
and thus, w¯1l is set as minimum wage. For each case, the Condorcet winner in period
t + 1 is determined on the basis of τw¯1l . Because of Corollary 1 (ii), we know that
w¯1l > w˜
crit,1h
1l,t (τw¯1l , ν˜).
3 But if (τw¯1l , ν¯) ∈ Mh, the same arguments as in period t hold
and w¯1l is the Condorcet winner not only in t+ 1, but also in all subsequent periods,
since ν = (τw¯1l , ν¯) for all subsequent periods.
3Note that τPEV 1t−1 cannot exceed τw¯1l because a minimum wage that would “produce” a τ
PEV 1
t−1
exceeding τw¯1l would have to be larger than w¯1l, since the equilibrium tax rate strictly increases in
w1l. But a minimum wage larger than w¯1l would be ruled out by the constitutional court.
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B.1 The l-Party’s Best Responses
We derive the l-party’s best responses by backward induction.
B.1.1 Best Response Proposals
In the first step we have to find out which proposal l should make, given M ′s strat-
egy. Formally, we have to determine the best response σl(· | αl, ı, θ) for every vector
(αl, ı, θ) ∈ P (compare with (8.1)).
For the αLl -type, if has informed and learned that θ = G, the expected utility is (see
(7.6)):
E
[
Ul
(
σl(· | αLl , i, G), (σEM)
)]
= (B.1)
σl
(
wGb | αLl , i, G
)[
σM
(
a | wGb
) {
B + c + αLl ∆c− (2αLl − 1)wGb ∆c− k
}
+
{
1− σM(a | wGb )
}{
c + αLl ∆c− (2αLl − 1)wPr ∆c− k
}]
+
σl
(
wGs | αLl , i, G
)[
σM
(
a | wGs
) {
B + c + αLl ∆c− (2αLl − 1)wGs ∆c− k
}
+
{
1− σM(a | wGs )
}{
c + αLl ∆c− (2αLl − 1)wPr ∆c− k
}]
+
σl
(
wPs | αLl , i, G
)[
σM
(
a | wPs
) {
B + c + αLl ∆c− (2αLl − 1)wPs ∆c− k
}
+
{
1− σM(a | wPs )
}{
c + αLl ∆c− (2αLl − 1)wPr ∆c− k
}]
+
σl
(
wPb | αLl , i, G
)[
σM
(
a | wPb
) {
B + c + αLl ∆c− (2αLl − 1)wPb ∆c− k
}
+
{
1− σM(a | wPb )
}{
c + αLl ∆c− (2αLl − 1)wPr ∆c− k
}]
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Rearranging terms and using Definition 6 (βL := |2αLl − 1| and ∆wv := |wv −wPr |) we
can simplify (B.1) to
E
[
Ul
(
σl(· | αLl , i, G), (σEM)
)]
= (B.2)
σl
(
wGb | αLl , i, G
)[
σM
(
a | wGb
) {
B − βL∆wGb ∆c
}
+ c + αLl ∆c+ βLw
P
r ∆c− k
]
+
σl
(
wGs | αLl , i, G
)[
σM
(
a | wGs
) {
B − βL∆wGs ∆c
}
+ c + αLl ∆c+ βLw
P
r ∆c− k
]
+
σl
(
wPs | αLl , i, G
)[
σM
(
a | wPs
) {
B + βL∆w
P
s ∆c
}
+ c + αLl ∆c+ βLw
P
r ∆c− k
]
+
σl
(
wPb | αLl , i, G
)[
σM
(
a | wPb
) {
B + βL∆w
P
b ∆c
}
+ c + αLl ∆c+ βLw
P
r ∆c− k
]
Equation (B.2) shows that the αLl -party will almost always choose to propose the
higher regulation level, i.e. wG,o or wP,o:
If the αLl -party makes a G-proposal and M is willing to accept both a small and a
large reform, αLl will choose w
G,o and not wG,u since wG,u = ∆wGb > ∆w
G
s = w
G,o
and σM
(
a | wGb
)
= σM
(
a | wGs
)
(Assumption 3). If M is only willing to accept one
of the two possible G-reforms this one is also denoted by wG,o and is chosen because
of Assumption 6: To see this, suppose that Assumption 6 does not hold, such that,
for example, B ≤ ∆wGs ∆c. Then one cannot exclude a parameter constellation where
B < βL∆w
G
s ∆c. In this case, and if σM
(
a | wGs
)
> 0 and σM
(
a | wGb
)
= 0, then[
σM
(
a | wGs
) {
B − βL∆wGs ∆c
}]
< 0 and αLl would choose w
G
b and not w
G
s = w
G,o.
Only if σM
(
a | wGb
)
= σM
(
a | wGs
)
= 0, is αLl indifferent. In all other cases, w
G,o is
strictly better for αLl .
If αLl makes a P -proposal, it also always chooses the higher regulation value, i.e. w
P,o,
except in the case of σM
(
a | wPb
)
= σM
(
a | wPs
)
= 0.
Now we can summarize our observations:
(1) Suppose that σM (a | wv) > 0 for at least one wv ∈ Π. Then the αLl -party’s best
responses are to propose:
wG,o ⇐⇒
σM
(
a | wG,o) {B − βL∆wG,o∆c} > σM (a | wP,o) {B + βL∆wP,o∆c} (B.3)
wP,o ⇐⇒
σM
(
a | wG,o) {B − βL∆wG,o∆c} < σM (a | wP,o) {B + βL∆wP,o∆c} (B.4)
wG,o and wP,o ⇐⇒
σM
(
a | wG,o) {B − βL∆wG,o∆c} = σM (a | wP,o) {B + βL∆wP,o∆c} (B.5)
(2) Suppose that σM (a | wv) = 0 for all wv ∈ Π. Then αLl is indifferent between
proposals, i.e. the αLl -party’s best responses are w
G,u, wG,o, wP,u, and wP,o.
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In the following, we will summarize best responses for a (αl, ı, θ) ∈ P by giving best
response conditions in the case of (1). (It is trivial that the l-party is indifferent
between proposals if σM (a | wv) = 0 for all wv ∈ Π.) According to (B.3), the αLl -
party’s best responses are to play
wG,o ⇐⇒
B
{
σM
(
a | wG,o)− σM (a | wP,o)} > βL∆c{σM (a | wG,o)∆wG,o + σM (a | wP,o)∆wP,o}
wP,o ⇐⇒
B
{
σM
(
a | wG,o)− σM (a | wP,o)} < βL∆c{σM (a | wG,o)∆wG,o + σM (a | wP,o)∆wP,o}
wG,o or wP,o ⇐⇒
B
{
σM
(
a | wG,o)− σM (a | wP,o)} = βL∆c{σM (a | wG,o)∆wG,o + σM (a | wP,o)∆wP,o}
Using Definition 7 we can formulate the following lemma:
Lemma 15
Suppose, that (αl, ı, θ) = (α
L
l , i, G) and σM (a | wv) > 0 for at least one wv ∈ Π. Then
the l-party’s best responses are to propose
wG,o ⇐⇒ B∆σM > βL∆cΣoM
wP,o ⇐⇒ B∆σM < βL∆cΣoM
wG,o or wP,o ⇐⇒ B∆σM = βL∆cΣoM
In the case of (αl, ı, θ) = (α
L
l , i, P ), we have
E
[
Ul
(
σl(· | αLl , i, P ), (σEM)
)]
(B.6)
=
∑
wv∈Π
{
σl
(
wv | αLl , i, P
)[
σM (a | wv) {B + c + wv∆c− k}+
{1− σM(a | wv)}
{
c + wPr ∆c− k
}]}
=
∑
wv∈{wGb ,wGs }
{
σl
(
wv | αLl , i, P
)[
σM (a | wv) {B −∆wv∆c}+ c + wPr ∆c− k
]}
+
∑
wv∈{wPb ,wPs }
{
σl
(
wv | αLl , i, P
)[
σM (a | wv) {B +∆wv∆c}+ c + wPr ∆c− k
]}
(B.7)
With the same argumentation as above we obtain:
Lemma 16
Suppose that (αl, ı, θ) = (α
L
l , i, P ) and σM (a | wv) > 0 for at least one wv ∈ Π. Then
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the l-party’s best responses are to propose
wG,o ⇐⇒ B∆σM > ∆cΣoM
wP,o ⇐⇒ B∆σM < ∆cΣoM
wG,o or wP,o ⇐⇒ B∆σM = ∆cΣoM
If αLl has not informed, it does not know whether θ = G or θ = P . Thus, the
expected utility is the same for αLl in both cases. The party assigns probabilities of
1
2
to each possible state of the world. If we consider equations (B.2) and (B.6) without
information costs k we obtain:
E
[
Ul
(
σl(· | αLl , i¯, θ), (σEM)
)]
(B.8)
=
∑
wv∈{wGb ,wGs }
{
1
2
σl
(
wv | αLl , i¯, θ
)[
σM (a | wv) {B − βL∆wv∆c}+ c + αLl ∆c+ βLwPr ∆c
]
+
1
2
σl
(
wv | αLl , i¯, θ
)[
σM (a | wv) {B −∆wv∆c}+ c + wPr ∆c
]}
+
∑
wv∈{wPb ,wPs }
{
1
2
σl
(
wv | αLl , i¯, θ
)[
σM (a | wv) {B + βL∆wv∆c}+ c + αLl ∆c+ βLwPr ∆c
]
+
1
2
σl
(
wv | αLl , i¯, θ
)[
σM (a | wv) {B +∆wv∆c}+ c + wPr ∆c
]}
=
=
∑
wv∈{wGb ,wGs }
{
σl
(
wv | αLl , i¯, θ
)[
σM (a | wv)
{
B − (1− αLl )∆wv∆c
}
+
c +
1
2
αLl ∆c+ (1− αLl )wPr ∆c
]}
+
∑
wv∈{wPb ,wPs }
{
σl
(
wv | αLl , i¯, θ
)[
σM (a | wv)
{
B + (1− αLl )∆wv∆c
}
+
c +
1
2
αLl ∆c+ (1− αLl )wPr ∆c
]}
(B.9)
Thus, in the case of no information we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 17
Suppose that (αl, ı, θ) = (α
L
l , i¯, θ) and σM (a | wv) > 0 for at least one wv ∈ Π. Then
the l-party’s best responses are to propose
wG,o ⇐⇒ B∆σM > (1− αLl )∆cΣoM
wP,o ⇐⇒ B∆σM < (1− αLl )∆cΣoM
wG,o or wP,o ⇐⇒ B∆σM = (1− αLl )∆cΣoM
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Now we turn to the other type, the αMl -party. Suppose that α
M
l has informed and
learned that θ = G, i.e. (αl, ı, θ) = (α
M
l , i, G). We have the same expected utility
structure as described in (B.1) and (B.2) with one difference: (2αMl − 1) is greater
than zero and not smaller than zero as (2αLl − 1) is. Therefore, we obtain:
E
[
Ul
(
σl(· | αMl , i, G), (σEM)
)]
= (B.10)
σl
(
wGb | αMl , i, G
)[
σM
(
a | wGb
) {
B + βM∆w
G
b ∆c
}
+ c + αMl ∆c− βMwPr ∆c− k
]
+
σl
(
wGs | αMl , i, G
)[
σM
(
a | wGs
) {
B + βM∆w
G
s ∆c
}
+ c + αMl ∆c− βMwPr ∆c− k
]
+
σl
(
wPs | αMl , i, G
)[
σM
(
a | wPs
) {
B − βM∆wPs ∆c
}
+ c + αMl ∆c− βMwPr ∆c− k
]
+
σl
(
wPb | αMl , i, G
)[
σM
(
a | wPb
) {
B − βM∆wPb ∆c
}
+ c + αMl ∆c− βMwPr ∆c− k
]
Obviously, αMl will choose w
G,u or wP,u. This is on the analogy of αLl choosing w
G,o or
wP,o in the case of information and θ = G. This time Assumption 6 guarantees that
wP,u is always chosen as P -proposal and not wP,o. We obtain:
Lemma 18
Suppose that (αl, ı, θ) = (α
M
l , i, G) and σM (a | wv) > 0 for at least one wv ∈ Π. Then
the l-party’s best responses are to propose
wG,u ⇐⇒ B∆σM > −βM∆cΣuM
wP,u ⇐⇒ B∆σM < −βM∆cΣuM
wG,u or wP,u ⇐⇒ B∆σM = −βM∆cΣuM
Note that in the case of (αl, ı, θ) = (α
M
l , i, G), α
M
l always chooses w
G,u as long as
σGM ≥ σPM and σGM > 0.
If (αl, ı, θ) = (α
M
l , i, P ), M and L would choose the same regulation parameter w, and
thus, the type of l (the level of αl) is not relevant. We can just use equation (B.6) to
determine the best response of αMl .
Lemma 19
Suppose that (αl, ı, θ) = (α
M
l , i, P ) and σM (a | wv) > 0 for at least one wv ∈ Π. Then
the l-party’s best responses are to propose
wG,o ⇐⇒ B∆σM > ∆cΣoM
wP,o ⇐⇒ B∆σM < ∆cΣoM
wG,o or wP,o ⇐⇒ B∆σM = ∆cΣoM
Equations (B.6) and (B.10) and simple calculations show that, in the case of no infor-
mation, equation (B.9) holds with αMl instead of α
L
l . Therefore, we can conclude:
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Lemma 20
Suppose that (αl, ı, θ) = (α
M
l , i¯, θ) and σM (a | wv) > 0 for at least one wv ∈ Π. Then
the l-party’s best responses are to propose
wG,o ⇐⇒ B∆σM > (1− αMl )∆cΣoM
wP,o ⇐⇒ B∆σM < (1− αMl )∆cΣoM
wG,o or wP,o ⇐⇒ B∆σM = (1− αMl )∆cΣoM
B.1.2 Best Response Information Decisions
After deriving best responses for l given M ′s strategy and l′s information decision,
we can now determine under which conditions l actually does inform (compare with
condition (8.2)). In the following, we will assume that each type of l chooses the higher
value of w in the case of indifference. As will be discussed in Section 10.7, this has no
substantial effects on the results of our analysis.
First, we analyze the information decision of αLl . Considering Lemmas 15 to 17 we
can distinguish four areas, denoted by LI to LIV, with different pure strategy best
responses σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) (see Definition 9):
B∆σM > ∆cΣ
o
M (LI)
∆cΣoM ≥B∆σM > (1− αLl )∆cΣoM (LII)
(1− αLl )∆cΣoM ≥B∆σM > βL∆cΣoM (LIII)
βL∆cΣ
o
M ≥B∆σM (LIV)
Suppose σEM is such that LI holds, then according to Lemmas 15 to 17 the α
L
l -type’s
best response proposals are σl(w
G,o | αLl , i, G) = σl(wG,o | αLl , i, P ) = σl(wG,o |
αLl , i¯, θ) = 1, i.e. σ˜
Π
l (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wG,o, wG,o). In this case, αLl always proposes w
G,o.
Thus, it will never inform, because information would only have a value if it changed
the party’s decision. We obtain the following Lemma:
Lemma 21
Suppose that B∆σM > ∆cΣ
o
M . Then the α
L
l -type’s best response is to play
σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wG,o, wG,o) and
σl(i | αLl ) = 0
If condition LII holds with inequality, we have σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wP,o, wG,o). In the
case of B∆σM = ∆cΣ
o
M , α
L
l is indifferent between w
P,o and wG,o if it has informed
and learned that θ = P . Then a best response in pure strategies is also σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) =
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(wG,o, wG,o, wG,o). The αLl -party will inform if its expected utility with information is
greater than its expected utility without information. In general, the expected utility
for αLl given σ
E
M and σ
Π
l with σ˜
Π
l (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wP,o, wG,o) is (see equations (B.2), (B.7),
and (B.9))
E
[
Ul
(
σl(· | αLl ), σΠl , σEM)
)]
= (B.11)
σl(i | αLl )
{
1
2
[
σGM
{
B − βL∆wG,o∆c
}
+ c + αLl ∆c+ βLw
P
r ∆c− k
]
+
1
2
[
σPM
{
B +∆wP,o∆c
}
+ c + wPr ∆c− k
]}
+
σl(¯i | αLl )
[
σGM
{
B − (1− αLl )∆wG,o∆c
}
+ c +
1
2
αLl ∆c+ (1− αLl )wPr ∆c
]
Therefore, αLl will incur information costs if{
1
2
[
σGM
{
B − βL∆wG,o∆c
}
+ c + αLl ∆c+ βLw
P
r ∆c− k
]
+
1
2
[
σPM
{
B +∆wP,o∆c
}
+ c + wPr ∆c− k
]}
>[
σGM
{
B − (1− αLl )∆wG,o∆c
}
+ c +
1
2
αLl ∆c+ (1− αLl )wPr ∆c
]
⇐⇒
1
2
B
(
σGM − σPM
)
+ k <
1
2
∆c
(
σGM∆w
G,o + σPM∆w
P,o
)
(B.12)
Note, that condition (B.12) also determines the αLl -type’s information decision if
B∆σM = ∆cΣ
o
M . In this case, α
L
l is indifferent between w
P,o and wG,o if ı = i and
θ = P . Therefore, the expression
[
σPM
{
B +∆wP,o∆c
}
+c+wPr ∆c− k
]
in (B.11) can
be used to derive the information condition even if αLl plays w
G,o with a certain proba-
bility. This is because, in the case of indifference,
[
σPM
{
B +∆wP,o∆c
}
+c+wPr ∆c−k
]
equals
[
σGM
{
B −∆wG,o∆c}+ c + wPr ∆c− k] or any mixture between both.
We find that αLl will never inform if B∆σM = ∆cΣ
o
M since
1
2
B∆σM =
1
2
∆cΣoM and
thus 1
2
B∆σM + k >
1
2
∆cΣoM as k > 0.
We summarize our observations in the following lemma:
Lemma 22
Suppose that B∆σM = ∆cΣ
o
M and σM (a | wv) > 0 for at least one wv ∈ Π. Then the
αLl -type’s best response is to play
σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wP,o, wG,o) or σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wG,o, wG,o) and
σl(i | αLl ) = 0
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Suppose that ∆cΣoM > B∆σM > (1− αLl )∆cΣoM . Then the αLl -type’s best response is
to play
σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wP,o, wG,o) and
σl(i | αLl ) = 1 if 12B∆σM + k < 12∆cΣoM
σl(i | αLl ) = 0 if 12B∆σM + k > 12∆cΣoM
σl(i | αLl ) ∈ [0, 1] if 12B∆σM + k = 12∆cΣoM
If condition LIII holds with inequality, we have σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wP,o, wP,o). In the
case of indifference, a best response can also be σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wP,o, wG,o). In the
same lines of argumentation as above and using (B.2), (B.7), and (B.9) we observe
that αLl informs if{
1
2
[
σGM
{
B − βL∆wG,o∆c
}
+ c + αLl ∆c+ βLw
P
r ∆c− k
]
+
1
2
[
σPM
{
B +∆wP,o∆c
}
+ c + wPr ∆c− k
]}
>[
σPM
{
B + (1− αLl )∆wP,o∆c
}
+ c +
1
2
αLl ∆c+ (1− αLl )wPr ∆c
]
⇐⇒
1
2
B
(
σGM − σPM
)− k > (1
2
− αLl
)
∆c
(
σGM∆w
G,o + σPM∆w
P,o
)
(B.13)
We obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 23
Suppose that B∆σM = (1 − αLl )∆cΣoM and σM (a | wv) > 0 for at least one wv ∈ Π.
Then the αLl -type’s best response proposals are
σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wP,o, wP,o) and σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wP,o, wG,o)
Suppose that (1−αLl )∆cΣoM > B∆σM > βL∆cΣoM . Then the αLl -type’s best response
proposal is
σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wP,o, wP,o)
In both cases, the best response information decisions are
σl(i | αLl ) = 1 if 12B∆σM − k >
(
1
2
− αLl
)
∆cΣoM
σl(i | αLl ) = 0 if 12B∆σM − k <
(
1
2
− αLl
)
∆cΣoM
σl(i | αLl ) ∈ [0, 1] if 12B∆σM − k =
(
1
2
− αLl
)
∆cΣoM
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In the case of LIV and if B∆σM = βL∆cΣ
o
M , σ˜
Π
l (α
L
l ) equals (w
G,o, wP,o, wP,o) or
(wP,o, wP,o, wP,o). Intuitively, αLl will never inform in the case of indifference, because
it could play σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
P,o, wP,o, wP,o) and thus information would have no value,
as it would not change decisions. This can also be seen from condition (B.13) which
would be relevant if αLl played (w
G,o, wP,o, wP,o). Because B∆σM = βL∆cΣ
o
M we have
1
2
B∆σM = (1−αLl )∆cΣoM , and therefore 12B∆σM−k < (1−αLl )∆cΣoM . Obviously, even
in this case αLl will not inform. If B∆σM < βL∆cΣ
o
M then σ˜
Π
l (α
L
l ) = (w
P,o, wP,o, wP,o)
and αLl will not inform either.
We summarize our considerations in the following lemma:
Lemma 24
Suppose that B∆σM = βL∆cΣ
o
M and σM (a | wv) > 0 for at least one wv ∈ Π. Then
the αLl -type’s best response proposals are
σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wP,o, wP,o) and σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
P,o, wP,o, wP,o)
Suppose that B∆σM < βL∆cΣ
o
M . Then the α
L
l -type’s best response proposal is
σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
P,o, wP,o, wP,o)
In both cases, the best response information decision is
σl(i | αLl ) = 0
Now we turn to the αMl -type. According to Lemmas 18 to 20, we can also distinguish
four areas depending on M ′s strategy:
B∆σM > ∆cΣ
o
M (RI)
∆cΣoM ≥B∆σM > (1− αMl )∆cΣoM (RII)
(1− αMl )∆cΣoM ≥B∆σM > −βM∆cΣuM (RIII)
−βM∆cΣuM ≥B∆σM (RIV)
In the case of B∆σM > ∆cΣ
o
M (RI), α
M
l plays σ˜
Π
l (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wG,o, wG,o). We
use equations (B.10), (B.7), and (B.9) with αMl instead of α
L
l , to derive under which
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conditions αMl incurs information costs. The α
M
l -type will inform if{
1
2
[
σGM
{
B + βM∆w
G,u∆c
}
+ c + αMl ∆c− βMwPr ∆c− k
]
+
1
2
[
σGM
{
B −∆wG,o∆c}+ c + wPr ∆c− k]
}
>[
σGM
{
B − (1− αMl )∆wG,o∆c
}
+ c +
1
2
αMl ∆c+ (1− αMl )wPr ∆c
]
⇐⇒
αMl >
1
2
+
k
σGM (w
G,o − wG,u)∆c (B.14)
Note that, if wG,u = wG,o, the right hand side of (B.14) goes to infinity and αMl will
not inform.
Lemma 25
Suppose that B∆σM > ∆cΣ
o
M . Then the α
M
l -type’s best response is to play
σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wG,o, wG,o) and
σl(i | αMl ) = 1 if αMl > 12 + kσGM∆c(wG,o−wG,u)
σl(i | αMl ) = 0 if αMl < 12 + kσGM∆c(wG,o−wG,u)
σl(i | αMl ) ∈ [0, 1] if αMl = 12 + kσGM∆c(wG,o−wG,u)
In the next step, we consider RII. In the case of B∆σM = ∆cΣ
o
M we have σ˜
Π
l (α
M
l ) =
(wG,u, wG,o, wG,o) or σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wP,o, wG,o). If ∆cΣoM > B∆σM > (1−αMl )∆cΣoM
then the best response is only σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wP,o, wG,o). The αMl -type incurs infor-
mation costs if (see (B.10), (B.7), and (B.9)){
1
2
[
σGM
{
B + βM∆w
G,u∆c
}
+ c + αMl ∆c− βMwPr ∆c− k
]
+
1
2
[
σPM
{
B +∆wP,o∆c
}
+ c + wPr ∆c− k
]}
>[
σGM
{
B − (1− αMl )∆wG,o∆c
}
+ c +
1
2
αMl ∆c+ (1− αMl )wPr ∆c
]
⇐⇒
1
2
B
(
σGM − σPM
)
+ k <
1
2
σPM∆w
P,o∆c+
[(
αMl −
1
2
)
σGM∆w
G,u +
(
1− αMl
)
σGM∆w
G,o
]
∆c
(B.15)
We obtain the following lemma:
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Lemma 26
Suppose that B∆σM = ∆cΣ
o
M and σM (a | wv) > 0 for at least one wv ∈ Π. Then the
αMl -type’s best response proposals are
σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wG,o, wG,o) and σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wP,o, wG,o)
Suppose that ∆cΣoM > B∆σM > (1 − αMl )∆cΣoM . Then the αMl -type’s best response
proposal is
σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wP,o, wG,o)
In both cases, the best response information decisions are
σl(i | αMl ) = 1 if
1
2
B∆σM + k <
1
2
σPM∆c∆w
P,o + σGM∆c
[(
αMl − 12
)
∆wG,u +
(
1− αMl
)
∆wG,o
]
σl(i | αMl ) = 0 if
1
2
B∆σM + k >
1
2
σPM∆c∆w
P,o + σGM∆c
[(
αMl − 12
)
∆wG,u +
(
1− αMl
)
∆wG,o
]
σl(i | αMl ) ∈ [0, 1] if
1
2
B∆σM + k =
1
2
σPM∆c∆w
P,o + σGM∆c
[(
αMl − 12
)
∆wG,u +
(
1− αMl
)
∆wG,o
]
In area RIII, we have the following constellations: If (1 − αMl )∆cΣoM = B∆σM best
response proposals are σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wP,o, wG,o) and σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wP,o, wP,o).
If (1− αMl )∆cΣoM > B∆σM > −βM∆cΣuM we have σ˜Πl (αMl ) = (wG,u, wP,o, wP,o). The
αMl -type will inform if (again, see (B.10), (B.7), and (B.9)){
1
2
[
σGM
{
B + βM∆w
G,u∆c
}
+ c + αMl ∆c− βMwPr ∆c− k
]
+
1
2
[
σPM
{
B +∆wP,o∆c
}
+ c + wPr ∆c− k
]}
>[
σPM
{
B + (1− αMl )∆wP,o∆c
}
+ c +
1
2
αMl ∆c+ (1− αMl )wPr ∆c
]
⇐⇒
1
2
B
(
σGM − σPM
)− k > (1
2
− αMl
)
∆c
(
σGM∆w
G,u + σPM∆w
P,o
)
(B.16)
Therefore, we can state the following lemma:
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Lemma 27
Suppose that (1 − αMl )∆cΣoM = B∆σM and σM (a | wv) > 0 for at least one wv ∈ Π.
Then the αMl -type’s best response proposals are
σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wP,o, wG,o) and σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wP,o, wP,o)
Suppose that (1 − αMl )∆cΣoM > B∆σM > −βM∆cΣuM . Then the αMl -type’s best
response proposal is
σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wP,o, wP,o)
In both cases, the best response information decisions are
σl(i | αMl ) = 1 if 12B∆σM − k >
(
1
2
− αMl
)
∆c
(
σGM∆w
G,u + σPM∆w
P,o
)
σl(i | αMl ) = 0 if 12B∆σM − k <
(
1
2
− αMl
)
∆c
(
σGM∆w
G,u + σPM∆w
P,o
)
σl(i | αMl ) ∈ [0, 1] if 12B∆σM − k =
(
1
2
− αMl
)
∆c
(
σGM∆w
G,u + σPM∆w
P,o
)
If we are in RIV and B∆σM = −βM∆cΣuM best response proposals are σ˜Πl (αMl ) =
(wG,u, wP,o, wP,o) and σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
P,u, wP,o, wP,o). If B∆σM < −βM∆cΣuM we have
σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
P,u, wP,o, wP,o). The αMl -type will incur information costs if (see (B.10),
(B.7), and (B.9)){
1
2
[
σPM
{
B − βM∆wP,u∆c
}
+ c + αMl ∆c− βMwPr ∆c− k
]
+
1
2
[
σPM
{
B +∆wP,o∆c
}
+ c + wPr ∆c− k
]}
>[
σPM
{
B + (1− αMl )∆wP,o∆c
}
+ c +
1
2
αMl ∆c+ (1− αMl )wPr ∆c
]
⇐⇒
αMl >
1
2
+
k
σPM∆c (w
P,o − wP,u) (B.17)
Now we can state the following lemma:
Lemma 28
Suppose that B∆σM = −βM∆cΣuM and σM (a | wv) > 0 for at least one wv ∈ Π. Then
the αMl -type’s best response proposals are
σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
G,u, wP,o, wP,o) and σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
P,u, wP,o, wP,o)
Suppose that B∆σM < −βM∆cΣuM . Then the αMl -type’s best response proposal is
σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) = (w
P,u, wP,o, wP,o)
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In both cases, the best response information decisions are
σl(i | αMl ) = 1 if αMl > 12 + kσPM∆c(wP,o−wP,u)
σl(i | αMl ) = 0 if αMl < 12 + kσPM∆c(wP,o−wP,u)
σl(i | αMl ) ∈ [0, 1] if αMl = 12 + kσPM∆c(wP,o−wP,u)
B.2 Further Proofs and Examples
Proof of Proposition 9
Firstly, we look at the denominator in the expression for
µ˜G(w
G) =
√
c+ wG∆c−√c+ wPr ∆c√
c+ wG∆c−√c+ wPr ∆c−√c¯− wG∆c+√c¯− wPr ∆c
The denominator is zero if√
c+ wG∆c−
√
c¯− wG∆c =
√
c+ wPr ∆c−
√
c¯− wPr ∆c.
This equation only holds if wG = wPr . If w
G < wPr , the left hand side is obviously
always smaller than the right hand side, since
√
c+ wG∆c is always smaller than√
c+ wPr ∆c and
√
c¯− wG∆c is always larger than √c¯− wPr ∆c. If wG > wPr , the
opposite holds. Therefore, µ˜G(w
G) is continuous in all possible values of wG except
for wPr . The continuity of µ˜P (w
P ) in wP ∈ [0, 1] \ wPr can be shown analogously.
Now we want to show (iii), i.e.,
∂µ˜G
∂wG
(wG) < 0
for any wG ∈ [0, 1] \ wPr .
We make the following definition:
n(wG)
m(wG)
:= µ˜G(w
G) =
√
c+ wG∆c−√c+ wPr ∆c√
c+ wG∆c−√c+ wPr ∆c−√c¯− wG∆c+√c¯− wPr ∆c
Therefore, we can write:
∂µ˜G
∂wG
(wG) =
n′(wG)m(wG)− n(wG)m′(wG)
(m(wG))2
< 0 ⇔ n′(wG)m(wG)−n(wG)m′(wG) < 0
We obtain:
n′(wG)m(wG)− n(wG)m′(wG) =
1
2
∆c
−c¯+√(c¯− wG∆c)(c¯− wPr ∆c)− c+√(c+ wG∆c)(c+ wPr ∆c)√
(c+ wG∆c)(c¯− wG∆c)
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Defining
f(wG) :=
√
(c¯− wG∆c)(c¯− wPr ∆c)− c¯ and
g(wG) := c−
√
(c+ wG∆c)(c+ wPr ∆c) ∀ wG ∈ [0, 1], wPr ∈ [0, 1]
it holds that:
∂µ˜G
∂wG
(wG) < 0 ⇔ f(wG)− g(wG) < 0
The functions f(wG) and g(wG) have the following characteristics:
(i) f(wPr ) = g(w
P
r ) = −wPr ∆c
(ii)
∂f
∂wG
(wG) = −1
2
∆c(c¯− wPr ∆c)√
(c¯− wG∆c)(c¯− wPr ∆c)
< 0 ∀ wG ∈ [0, 1], wPr ∈ [0, 1]
(iii)
∂g
∂wG
(wG) = −1
2
∆c(c+ wPr ∆c)√
(c+ wG∆c)(c+ wPr ∆c)
< 0 ∀ wG ∈ [0, 1], wPr ∈ [0, 1]
(iv)
∂f
∂wG
(wG = wPr ) =
∂g
∂wG
(wG = wPr ) = −
1
2
∆c
(v)
∂2f
∂(wG)2
(wG) = −1
4
(∆c)2(c¯− wPr ∆c)2
[
(c¯− wG∆c)(c¯− wPr ∆c)
]− 3
2 < 0
∀ wG ∈ [0, 1], wPr ∈ [0, 1]
(vi)
∂2g
∂(wG)2
(wG) =
1
4
(∆c)2(c+ wPr ∆c)
2
[
(c+ wG∆c)(c+ wPr ∆c)
]− 3
2 > 0
∀ wG ∈ [0, 1], wPr ∈ [0, 1]
From (i) and (iv) it follows that f(wG) and g(wG) touch each other in wG = wPr .
Furthermore, according to (v) and (vi), f(wG) is concave and g(wG) convex in wG ∈
[0, 1]. This means that to the right of wG = wPr , g(w
G) declines less than f(wG). To
the left of wG = wPr , g(w
G) rises more than f(wG). Therefore, both functions have
the same value in wG = wPr , but for all other values of w
G ∈ [0, 1], g(wG) is greater
than f(wG). Hence, we obtain:
f(wG)− g(wG) < 0 ∀ wG ∈ [0, 1] \ wPr , wPr ∈ [0, 1]
¥
With the same lines of argumentation, we now show that
∂µ˜P
∂wP
(wP ) > 0
for any wP ∈ [0, 1] \ wPr .
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Using the following definition
k(wP )
l(wP )
:= µ˜P (w
P ) =
√
c¯− wPr ∆c−
√
c¯− wP∆c√
c+ wP∆c−√c+ wPr ∆c−√c¯− wP∆c+√c¯− wPr ∆c
we obtain
∂µ˜P
∂wP
(wP ) =
k′(wP )l(wP )− k(wP )l′(wP )
(l(wP ))2
> 0 ⇔ k′(wP )l(wP )− k(wP )l′(wP ) > 0
where
k′(wP )l(wP )− k(wP )l′(wP ) =
1
2
∆c
c¯−√(c¯− wP∆c)(c¯− wPr ∆c) + c−√(c+ wP∆c)(c+ wPr ∆c)√
(c+ wP∆c)(c¯− wP∆c)
If we define
r(wP ) := c−
√
(c+ wP∆c)(c+ wPr ∆c) and
s(wP ) :=
√
(c¯− wP∆c)(c¯− wPr ∆c)− c¯ ∀ wP ∈ [0, 1], wPr ∈ [0, 1]
we obtain
∂µ˜P
∂wP
(wP ) > 0 ⇔ r(wP )− s(wP ) > 0
Functions r(wP ) and s(wP ) have the following characteristics:
(i) r(wPr ) = s(w
P
r ) = −wPr ∆c
(ii)
∂r
∂wP
(wP ) = −1
2
∆c(c+ wPr ∆c)√
(c+ wP∆c)(c+ wPr ∆c)
< 0 ∀ wP ∈ [0, 1], wPr ∈ [0, 1]
(iii)
∂s
∂wP
(wP ) = −1
2
∆c(c¯− wPr ∆c)√
(c¯− wP∆c)(c¯− wPr ∆c)
< 0 ∀ wP ∈ [0, 1], wPr ∈ [0, 1]
(iv)
∂r
∂wP
(wP = wPr ) =
∂s
∂wP
(wP = wPr ) = −
1
2
∆c
(v)
∂2r
∂(wP )2
(wP ) =
1
4
(∆c)2(c+ wPr ∆c)
2
[
(c+ wP∆c)(c+ wPr ∆c)
]− 3
2 > 0
∀ wP ∈ [0, 1], wPr ∈ [0, 1]
(vi)
∂2s
∂(wP )2
(wP ) = −1
4
(∆c)2(c¯− wPr ∆c)2
[
(c¯− wP∆c)(c¯− wPr ∆c)
]− 3
2 < 0
∀ wG ∈ [0, 1], wPr ∈ [0, 1]
From (i) and (iv) it follows that r(wP ) and s(wP ) touch each other in wP = wPr .
Furthermore, according to (v) and (vi), r(wP ) is convex and s(wP ) concave in wP ∈
[0, 1]. This means that to the right of wP = wPr , r(w
P ) declines less than s(wP ). To
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the left of wP = wPr , r(w
P ) rises more than s(wP ). Therefore, both functions have the
same value in wP = wPr , but for all other values of w
P ∈ [0, 1], r(wP ) is greater than
s(wP ). Hence, we obtain:
r(wP )− s(wP ) > 0 ∀ wP ∈ [0, 1] \ wPr , wPr ∈ [0, 1]
¥
In the next step, we prove (i), and (ii) for µ˜G(w
G), i.e.,
(i)µ˜G(w
G∗) <
1
2
for any wG∗ ∈ (1
2
, wPr ) if w
P
r >
1
2
(ii)µ˜G(w
G∗) >
1
2
for any wG∗ ∈ [0, wPr ) if 0 < wPr <
1
2
Firstly, we need two lemmas:
According to the theorem of L’Hospital, we obtain
lim
wG→wPr
µ˜G(w
G) =
n′(wPr )
m′(wPr )
=
1
1 +
√
c+wPr ∆c
c¯−wPr ∆c
(B.18)
since n(wG) and m(wG) are differentiable in a neighborhood of wPr , n(w
P
r ) = m(w
P
r ) =
0, and m′(wG) 6= 0 in a neighborhood of wPr . Therefore, we can state the following
lemma.
Lemma 29
There exists the right-hand-side and the left-hand-side limit of µ˜G(w
G) at the point
wPr . Both limits have the same value.
Furthermore, we define µ˜G(w
P
r ) as function of w
P
r for a given parameter value w
G:
µ˜G(w
P
r ) :=
√
c+ wPr ∆c−
√
c+ wG∆c√
c+ wPr ∆c−
√
c+ wG∆c−√c¯− wPr ∆c+√c¯− wG∆c =
−
(√
c+ wG∆c−√c+ wPr ∆c)
−
(√
c+ wG∆c−√c+ wPr ∆c−√c¯− wG∆c+√c¯− wPr ∆c) = µ˜G(wG)
The function µ˜G(w
P
r ) has the same form as µ˜G(w
G) but with variable wPr instead of
wG. Since µ˜G(w
P
r ) = µ˜G(w
G), it follows that
∂µ˜G
∂wPr
(wPr ) =
∂µ˜G
∂wG
(wG)
and therefore we can state the following lemma.
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Lemma 30
∂µ˜G
∂wPr
(wPr ) < 0 ∀ wPr ∈ [0, 1] \ wG, wG ∈ [0, 1]
Now, we look for the value of wPr for which
lim
wG→ 1
2
µ˜G(w
G) =
1
2
We can rearrange
lim
wG→ 1
2
µ˜G(w
G) =
√
c+ 1
2
∆c−√c+ wPr ∆c√
c+ 1
2
∆c−√c+ wPr ∆c−√c¯− 12∆c+√c¯− wPr ∆c =
1
2
(B.19)
to √
c+
1
2
∆c+
√
c¯− 1
2
∆c =
√
c+ wPr ∆c+
√
c¯− wPr ∆c (B.20)
Obviously, equation (B.20) holds if wPr =
1
2
. (This follows also from equation (B.18).)
As discussed above, we can interpret limwG→ 1
2
µ˜G (see equation (B.19)) also as function
of wPr with a given value of w
G. From Lemma 30 we know that µ˜G(w
P
r ) decreases when
wPr increases. Therefore, we can conclude that
lim
wG→ 1
2
µ˜G(w
G) <
1
2
for wPr >
1
2
and
lim
wG→ 1
2
µ˜G(w
G) >
1
2
for wPr <
1
2
Since Lemma 29 holds and µ˜G(w
G) is continuous and strictly decreasing in wG 6= wPr ,
it follows (i), and (ii) for µ˜G(w
G).
¥
Now we prove (i), and (ii) for µ˜P (w
P ), i.e.,
(i)µ˜P (w
P∗) >
1
2
for any wP∗ ∈ (wPr , 1] if wPr >
1
2
(ii)µ˜P (w
P∗) <
1
2
for any wP∗ ∈ (wPr ,
1
2
) if 0 < wPr <
1
2
Using the theorem of L’Hospital we obtain:
lim
wP→wPr
µ˜P (w
P ) =
k′(wPr )
l′(wPr )
=
1
1 +
√
c¯−wPr ∆c
c+wPr ∆c
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This limit is larger than 1
2
if
1
1 +
√
c¯−wPr ∆c
c+wPr ∆c
>
1
2
⇐⇒
√
c¯− wPr ∆c√
c+ wPr ∆c
< 1
⇐⇒ c¯− wPr ∆c < c+ wPr ∆c
⇐⇒ wPr >
1
2
This proves (i) if we consider (iii) and the continuity of µ˜P (w
P ) in wP 6= wPr . The
proof for (ii) is analogous to the proof of (i) and (ii) for µ˜G(w
G) since we can also
define a function µ˜P (w
P
r ) with a given w
P .
¥
Credibility of an equilibrium proposal which is out-off-equilibrium
Suppose the strategy of M , given by wG,u, wG,o, σGM , w
P,u, wP,o, and σPM , is such
that the l-party’s best response is to play σ˜Πl (α
L
l ) = (w
G,o, wP,o, wG,o) and σ˜Πl (α
M
l ) =
(wG,u, wP,o, wG,o). This is the l-party’s best response behavior in Area II. Suppose
further that both types of l would not inform in equilibrium, i.e., σiL = 0 and σiM = 0.
Then the proposal wP,o would be out-off-equilibrium. The question arises as to whether
we can justify that M assigns only probability 1
2
to wP,o to represent the correct
state of the world, because if l makes a mistake and informs it will propose wP,o
only if it learns that θ = P . Nevertheless, if the deviation probability from the
equilibrium information decision not to inform is small enough relative to the deviation
probability from the equilibrium proposals, the belief of 1
2
can still be justified by a
proper sequence of deviation probabilities. Suppose the sequence {σki } represents a
sequence of deviation probabilities to inform for both types of l. Let {ψk} be a sequence
of deviation probabilities from wP,o to any other proposal and from wG,o or wG,u to
wP,o (Assumption 7 (ii)). Because {σki } and {ψk} are deviation probabilities it holds
that:
lim
k→∞
σki = 0 and (B.21)
lim
k→∞
ψk = 0 (B.22)
Furthermore, we assume that the probability that l wrongly informs is much lower
than the probability that l deviates from its equilibrium proposals. We incorporate
this in assuming that {ψk} is asymptotically bigger than {σki }:
lim
k→∞
σki
ψk
= 0 (B.23)
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Now we can calculate the credibility of the out-off-equilibrium wP,o-proposal:
µ(θ = P | wP,o) =
lim
k→∞
λ
(
σki
1
2
(1− ψk) + (1− σki )12ψk
)
+ (1− λ) (σki 12(1− ψk) + (1− σki )12ψk)
λ
(
σki (
1
2
ψk + 1
2
(1− ψk)) + (1− σki )ψk
)
+ (1− λ) (σki (12ψk + 12(1− ψk)) + (1− σki )ψk)
By dividing numerator and denominator by ψk we obtain:
µ(θ = P | wP,o) =
lim
k→∞
λ
(
1
2
σki
ψk
− 1
2
σki + (1− σki )12
)
+ (1− λ)
(
1
2
σki
ψk
− 1
2
σki + (1− σki )12
)
λ
(
1
2
σki
ψk
+ (1− σki )
)
+ (1− λ)
(
1
2
σki
ψk
+ (1− σki )
)
Therefore, together with assumptions (B.21), (B.22), and (B.23) we obtain:
µ(θ = P | wP,o) = 1
2
We can always find sequences which satisfy (B.21) to (B.23), such that out-off-equilibrium
beliefs are 1
2
for all best response areas and all information structures. Precisely speak-
ing, assumption (B.23) is only necessary when the out-off-equilibrium proposal would
be played with information, but information itself is not played in equilibrium. It is
easy to verify that in all these cases sequences of deviation probabilities can be con-
structed that support our result.1 Actually, depending on limk→∞
σki
ψk
, beliefs could
take any value between 1
2
and 1. For the purpose of our analysis it would suffice to
assume that the belief is close enough to 1
2
that any out-off-equilibrium P -proposal is
rejected as well as the large G-reform. In Section 10.7, when we discuss the results of
our analysis, we will relax the assumption that out-off-equilibrium beliefs are 1
2
.
Proof to Proposition 13: Non-Existence of Equilibria in Area III with
(ind,ninfo)
In Area III, the αLl -type is indifferent concerning its information decision if:
1
2
B∆σM − k = (1
2
− αLl )∆cΣoM
Therefore, we obtain:
k =
1
2
B∆σM − (1
2
− αLl )∆cΣoM (B.24)
The αMl -type informs, if:
1
2
B∆σM+k <
1
2
σPM∆c∆w
P,o+σGM∆c
[(
αMl −
1
2
)
∆wG,u +
(
1− αMl
)
∆wG,o
]
(B.25)
1Obviously, credibility is 12 anyway, if the out-off-equilibrium proposal is never played, i.e., in none
of the two information states.
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If we insert (B.24) in (B.25), we obtain:
B∆σM−(1
2
−αLl )∆cΣoM <
1
2
σPM∆c∆w
P,o+σGM∆c
[(
αMl −
1
2
)
∆wG,u +
(
1− αMl
)
∆wG,o
]
(B.26)
In Area III, B∆σM is at the most (1− αLl )∆cΣoM . Thus, if αLl is indifferent, αMl will
always inform if:(
(1− αLl )− (
1
2
− αLl )
)
∆cΣoM =
1
2
∆cΣoM <
1
2
σPM∆c∆w
P,o + σGM∆c
[(
αMl −
1
2
)
∆wG,u +
(
1− αMl
)
∆wG,o
]
Because σGM∆c
[(
αMl − 12
)
∆wG,u +
(
1− αMl
)
∆wG,o
]
= 1
2
σGM∆c∆w
G,o if ∆wG,u = ∆wG,o,
inequality (B.26) holds if ∆wG,u > ∆wG,o even if B∆σM = (1 − αLl )∆cΣoM . The in-
equality holds all the more if B∆σM < (1 − αLl )∆cΣoM . If ∆wG,u = ∆wG,o and
B∆σM = (1 − αLl )∆cΣoM , the αMl -type is indifferent concerning its information deci-
sion. In all other cases, αMl will inform if α
L
l is indifferent.
Numerical Examples for Area-IIIa-(ind, ind)- and Area-IVb-(ninfo, ind)-equilibria
Suppose we have the following parameter constellation: c¯ = 100, c = 30, B = 80,
k = 5.207, wPr = 0.60, λ = 0.80, α
L
l = 0.40, α
M
l = 0.60. Furthermore, sup-
pose that wGb = 0.00, w
G
s = 0.55, and w
P
b = 1.00. Then there is an Area-IIIa-
(ind, ind)-equilibrium with wG,o
∗
= wG,u
∗
= 0.55, σGM
∗
= 1, wP,o
∗
= 1.00, and
σPM
∗
= 0.805. The minimum credibility requirement for the P -proposal is µ˜P (w
P,o∗) =
0.585 > 0.556 = 1
1+λ
. In this equilibrium, the requirement is fulfilled with equality,
e.g., for information probabilities σiL
∗ = 0.200, and σiM ∗ = 0.518. Then we have
µ(θ = P | wP,o∗) = λ+(1−λ)σiL∗
λ(2−σiL∗)+(1−λ)σiM∗ = 0.585 with informational quality 0.632 and
Probob{G} = 0.360. The credibility requirement could also be fulfilled by σiL∗ = 0.250
and σiM
∗ = 0.236 with informational quality 0.624 and Probob{G} = 0.400.
For the following values Area-IVb-(ninfo, ind)-equilibria exist: c¯ = 100, c = 10,
B = 80, k = 10, wPr = 0.55, λ = 0.80, α
L
l = 0.10, α
M
l = 0.65, w
G
b = 0.00, and
wGs = 0.51. The equilibria are characterized by w
G,u∗ = 0.00, wG,o∗ = 0.51, σGM
∗
= 1,
and the values listed in Table B.1.
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Table B.1: Values for (ninfo, ind)-equilibria in Area IVb
wP,o
∗
σPM
∗
σiM
∗ µ(θ = P | wP,o∗) = Informational Quality Probob{G}
µ˜P (w
P,o∗) = λ+(1−λ)σiM
∗
2λ+(1−λ)σiM∗
0.62 0.957 0.602 0.535 0.560 0.200
0.65 0.928 0.721 0.541 0.572 0.200
0.70 0.884 0.931 0.552 0.593 0.200
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Table C.4: Potential sequential equilibria of the voting game
Credibility Areas, information structures, 1 = σGM ≥ σPM ≥ 0 Probob{G}
requirements (observer’s view)
µ˜P (w
P,o) > 1
1+λ
I: (ninfo, ninfo), (ninfo, ind), (ninfo, info) 1
σPM = 0
IIIa/b: (ind, info), (ind, ind) (1− λ) + λσiL
σPM ∈ (0, 1)
IVa: (ind, info)
σPM ∈ (0, 1)
µ˜P (w
P,o) = 1
1+λ
IIIa/b, IVa/b, Va/b: (ninfo, info) (1− λ)
and all equilibria listed for µ˜P (w
P,o) 6= 1
1+λ
with σiL = 0 and σiM = 1.
σPM ∈ (0, 1)
µ˜P (w
P,o) < 1
1+λ
I: (ninfo, ninfo), (ninfo, ind), (ninfo, info) 1
σPM = 0
IIIa/b, IVb: (ninfo, ind) (1− λ)
σPM ∈ (0, 1)
IVa, Va/b: (ninfo, ind) (1− λ)σiM
σPM ∈ (0, 1)
IIIa/b: (ind, ind) (1− λ) + λσiL
σPM ∈ (0, 1)
VI: (ninfo, ind) (1− λ)σiM
σPM = 1
VI: (ninfo, info) (1− λ)
σPM = 1
Informational quality: ex-ante probability for correct policy (agents’ view)
Prob{Area I} = 1
2
Probabilities for information structures of all other equilibria except those of Area I:
Prob{(ninfo, info)} = λ1
2
+ (1− λ)
Prob{(ninfo, ind)} = λ1
2
+ (1− λ)(1
2
+ 1
2
σiM)
Prob{(ind, info)} = λ(1
2
+ 1
2
σiL) + (1− λ)
Prob{(ind, ind)} = λ(1
2
+ 1
2
σiL) + (1− λ)(12 + 12σiM)
=⇒ 1
2
< Prob{(ninfo, ind)} < Prob{(ninfo, info)} < Prob{(ind, info)}
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